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VOL. XXVII · APRIL 1975 · NO. 3

CONTENTS

The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia — *Nicholas R. Lang* — 309

The Politics of the European Communities: The Confederal Phase — *Paul Taylor* — 336

Toward a Synthesis of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism — *Chong-do Hah and Jeffrey Martin* — 361

Northern Ireland as a Case Study of Decentralization in Unitary States — *Norman Furniss* — 387

Alliance Management in Eastern Europe (The New Type of International Relations) — *Nish Jamgotch, Jr.* — 405

Communal Violence: The Armenians and the Copts as Case Studies — *Margaret J. Wyszomirski* — 430

REVIEW ARTICLE

Small States: A Tool for Analysis? — *Peter R. Baehr* — 456

The Contributors — ii

Abstracts — iii

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ABSTRACTS

The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia

By N. R. LANG

Economic reform in Communist states is usually evaluated in terms of a dichotomy between traditional "command" economies and systems in which production and investment decisions are "decentralized" in the hands of immediate producers. This distinction tends to be misleading, especially when applied to multinational and/or federal states. This is the case for two reasons. First, the concept of decentralization may be disaggregated into a number of political and economic policy packages whose goals are not necessarily compatible. Second, differences in policy preferences among subnational leaders are resolved in favor of a particular set of alternatives by the form of decentralization chosen at the national level. In Yugoslavia, decentralist reforms have subordinated the goal of reducing interregional economic inequality to the goals of rapid and stable economic growth, despite the fact that both "decentralist" goals have been equally espoused by federal planners.

The Politics of the European Communities: The Confederal Phase

By P. TAYLOR

In the Confederal phase of integration in the European Communities since 1969, governments on the one hand have been confirmed as essential actors because of the way in which decisions are taken and because of their reaction to the growing range of interdependencies among member states. On the other hand, they are compelled to enter into alliances with other governments and with other actors within the state: they have lost some of their traditional powers and authority, as nongovernmental actors have increased theirs; the Commission of the European Communities reflects these changes in abandoning its claim to be a European government in embryo. Consequently, governments tend to oscillate, in their policies toward each other, between advanced schemes for integration and the reassertion of their separate interests.

Toward a Synthesis of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism

By C. HAH and J. MARTIN

This study is an attempt to generate a theory of nationalism through a synthesis of the conflict and integration theories of nationalism. On the premise that conflict and integration theories have tapped different aspects of the same phenomenon, a more powerful theory of nationalism may be distilled. Such an endeavor, however, requires the inclusion of concepts and relationships heretofore neglected in the literature of nationalism, e.g., the concept of relative deprivation.

Northern Ireland as a Case Study of Decentralization in Unitary States

By N. FURNISS

Decentralization is widely advocated as a means of alleviating the perceived central stultification of modern nation-states, especially those lacking federal constitutional structures. The experience of a separate administrative and decision-making structure in Northern Ireland is examined in an effort to gain an insight into the advantages and weaknesses of decentralization in practice.

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

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

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Alliance Management in Eastern Europe (The New Type of International Relations)

By N. JAMGOTCH, JR.

The theory of international relations of a new type characterizes Soviet-East European relations. Six functional aspects include pragmatic adjustments to polycentric communism; theoretical provisions for a transitional phase prior to the realization of communism on an international level; emphasis upon the East European subsystem as an indispensable core of Soviet national security; organizational efforts toward economic and political integration through COMECON and WTO; Communist summit conferences to forge and publicize unity; and the internationalist duty of socialism with special military obligations toward the territorial defense and security of Marxist-Leninist regimes. Faced with the unacceptable costs and military risks in forcibly expanding the international socialist system, the Soviets have concentrated on the maintenance of their East European subsystem: for as long as the Soviet Union maintains its exclusivist Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Eastern Europe will constitute the only dependable source of regime security and ideological fulfillment for the CPSU.

Communal Violence: The Armenians and the Copts as Case Studies

By M. J. WYSZOMIRSKI

Historically, communal conflict seems to have occurred in four environments—during the evolution of the major European states, in post-independence colonies, during the disintegration of polyglot empires, and in post-industrialized societies. Within these environments, six conditions serve to heighten the possibility of the use of violence. These conditions include: (1) the presence of communal cleavages based on religion, race, or language, combinations of these cleavages being more volatile than their occurrence singly; (2) the absence of a common value or identity; (3) the concurrent development of antagonistic nationalisms; (4) the possession of an economic or cultural elite status by a subordinate communal group; (5) differential rates of modernization; and (6) the displacement of anticolonial feelings upon a communal group perceived as associated with a colonial power. The examples of the Copts in Egypt and the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire are presented as illustrations of the interaction of these conditions in two different environments and the use or absence of violence in communal conflict.

Small States: A Tool for Analysis?

By P. R. BAEHR

The usefulness of the concept of "small states" as an analytical tool is discussed in a review of books by Edward Azar and Marshall Singer. The size of states has both domestic and international ramifications. Authors who use the concept of "small states" struggle with the problem of defining it. Such definitions can be clear and unambiguous but arbitrary at the same time; more sophisticated definitions are also more ambiguous and difficult to apply to concrete cases. Inquiry into the role of small states in international politics is shown to be still in a very elementary stage. Although there does of course exist a continuum of size of states in international relations, small states form too broad a category for purposes of analysis.

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Contents

Part I Nations: Territorial and Ethnic Fragmentation of Humanity
1 The Territorial Dimension of International Politics
2 Nationalism
3 External Consequences of Internal Tensions
4 Why Nations and Men Act as They Do

Part II Men: Their Perceptions and Beliefs
5 Foreign-Policy Making: Certainty of Uncertainty
6 Perceptions: Springs of Action
7 Ideology as a Guide for Action

Part III Restraints: Moral, Legal and Social Limitations
8 Politics and Morality
9 International Law
10 International Organization

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14 Coexistence and Diplomacy

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THE DIALECTICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia

By NICHOLAS R. LANG*

THE subject of economic reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is frequently treated in the literature as a problem of "decentralization." Briefly, reform is viewed as a process of transition from systems characterized by vertical coordination and control to systems which emphasize "spontaneous, immediate contacts among operational units."[1] Under the former system, central planners not only specify desired growth and output levels, but also fix the composition of factor inputs, input mixes, output levels, and prices for most agricultural and industrial sectors. Under the latter, planners no longer determine these parameters administratively; growth and output targets are set through the interaction of immediate producers in response to market conditions. Reform is thus characterized as proceeding across a centralist/decentralist dichotomy.

An important aspect of this interpretation of reform is the assumption that advocates of both central planning and quasi-market arrangements seek the same ends—e.g., achievement of steady rates of growth and resource exploitation, low rates of inflation, full employment, and so forth. The ends of economic organization are taken for granted; debate concerns the means employed to reach them. The problem with this approach is that it fails to confront situations in which the term "decentralization" evokes different, even contradictory, goals. Policy debate in a number of Communist states (especially Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) has been concerned less with identification of the merits of centralization and decentralization as broad policy categories than with the reconciliation of incompatible proposals for decentralization.

The disaggregation of the concept of decentralization into its pos-

* The author is grateful to Robert W. Campbell, Norman Furniss, and Bernard S. Morris for many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

[1] For a useful summary of the issues involved in this view of decentralization, see Egon Neuberger, "The Legacies of Central Planning," Rand Corporation Memorandum #RM-5530-PR (Santa Monica 1968).

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sible components is no mean task. A recent study by Norman Furniss identifies no less than eight varieties of varying degrees of compatibility, and reaches the conclusion that planners "must choose which type of decentralization is desired and pay the price in other areas."[2] For example, "legislative decentralization" (the creation of more immediate governmental institutions or the transfer of power to those institutions) is not necessarily compatible with either decentralization of industrial administration or upgrading of the political power of the workplace. Regional policy planning, as it has developed in France, Great Britain, and Canada, is characterized by strong central administrative controls and may therefore conflict with all three of the decentralization policies just mentioned.[3] In addition, regional planning itself involves two disparate sets of policy goals: a *distributive* set, directed toward the achievement of optimal investment allocation over space, minimization of inflation, and full employment, and a *redistributive* set, concerned with the industrialization of backward or lagging regions, balancing of per capita income levels between regions, and equitable distribution of social services.

The problem, therefore, is to assess the progress of economic decentralization more precisely through identification of relationships among the policies associated with it. The number of decentralist policies which operate concurrently in a given state and the extent of conflict between their goals depends, of course, upon the specific characteristics of that state. A basic premise of this paper, however, is that the distribution of policy concerns leading to the advocacy of decentralist programs, and the extent to which those programs are mutually compatible, are not likely to be random. Yugoslavia will be treated as a case study of a situation common not only to the Soviet bloc (e.g., Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union), but to several Western states as well. At the outset, this situation may be described as one of economic reform in a multinational, multiregional state.

An Initial Framework

The policy relationships we expect to uncover may be summarized in a simple model. Let us postulate the existence of a country, State *A*, composed of several geographic regions. We then make five additional assumptions. First, the regions are distinguished by language, religion,

[2] See Norman Furniss, "Decentralization," in *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (November 1974), 958-82; quote from p. 975.
[3] *Ibid.*

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history, or other aspects of cultural heritage. Second, each regional population is conscious of its territory as a political entity, either because of prior existence of the region as an independent state or its aspiration to that status. Third, the regions differ markedly with respect to resource base, level of per capita income, and development of the tertiary sector of the economy. Fourth, State *A* heretofore has employed a system of central economic planning designed to effect a mobilization of national resources for maximum investment in specific economic sectors. Fifth, State *A* recently has experienced high levels of inflation, reduced growth rates, and balance-of-payments difficulties, all of which have convinced planners that some sort of decentralist reform is necessary.

Given these conditions, decentralization will assume disparate meanings to different sets of policy-makers. At least four types of policy conflict become possible. In the first place, differences will arise between advocates of devolution of planning powers to immediate producers and elites with "ideological, psychological, political, and economic vested interests"[4] in the maintenance of hierarchical controls. In addition, central planning may be opposed by regional political elites who hope to increase their control over the planning process through legislative decentralization. Third, advocates of increased regional authority may come into conflict with enterprise managers, who resent any form of bureaucratic incursion upon their decision-making powers. Fourth, policies of regional economic development, which may have been pursued in the past by central planners, may be undermined by subnational elites which either oppose the idea of any kind of development planning or place greater or lesser emphasis than the central planners upon distributive or redistributive policies.

All of the conditions postulated for State *A* exist in contemporary Yugoslavia. What follows is an analysis of the evolution of Yugoslav economic policy since 1945. Our concern is to show that decentralization refers to conflicting sets of policy goals and to determine which variant, if any, has proved dominant over time.

The Yugoslav Case

At the outset, it may be stipulated that the development of Yugoslav economic policy since 1945 has been governed by three basic factors: monopoly of political power by the Communist Party (LCY), main-

[4] See Neuberger (fn. 1), 28.

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tenance of a federal structure of government based in great measure upon nationality distinctions, and state economic planning. A dimension of conflict over decentralization is apparent with respect to each factor. Debate over party control has centered upon the applicability of Leninist principles of party organization (especially democratic centralism) to a legislatively decentralized polity. Federal structure has raised two issues: the distribution of power between the six republics, two autonomous regions, and the Federation, and between regional authorities, local communes, and economic enterprises. State planning, in addition to the traditional debate over the relative efficiency of centralized or decentralized planning mechanisms, has raised the question of conflict between the development priorities of individual republics and the objectives of regional economic planning.

The evolution of postwar economic policy reflects the Party's efforts to arrive at compromises between and within these dimensions of the nation's political structure. Centralization of political and economic power has coexisted unhappily with legislative decentralization, increased independence of the workplace through the development of "self-management socialism," and distributive as well as redistributive regional policies. For purposes of simplicity, the postwar period is here divided into four phases, each corresponding to a particular accommodation reached by the regime among these conflicting policy pressures.

THE STALINIST PHASE (1945–1950)

The first phase of postwar economic policy, from 1945 to 1950, corresponds to the LCY's efforts to develop the economy on the basis of methods employed in the Soviet Union after 1929. This Stalinist model assigned two major priorities, one political and one economic. The political priority was the integration of political and economic decision-making power at the highest level of the Communist Party, which would not only prescribe the ends of economic planning in general but also develop detailed production targets for each sector of the economy. Second, Stalin, employing Marx's adaptation of the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage,[5] had assigned the highest priority to the development of capital goods industries, e.g., iron and steel, building materials, and energy resources. High rates of investment in

[5] For a concise discussion of this theory, see Nicholas Spulber, *Socialist Management and Planning* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press 1971), 111-13.

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priority sectors, at the expense of peasant and consumer, were assured through the collection of taxes on incomes, profits, and sales, all of which were channeled through the central planning apparatus.

It was precisely this model which was implemented in Yugoslavia in the immediate postwar years. The first Five-Year Plan (1947–1951) envisaged a 1951 output roughly double the 1939 level through the development of capital goods industries and transportation networks. Special emphasis was also placed on the expansion of agricultural production to feed the growing urban population; collectivization and food processing were particularly stressed.[6] The President of the Economic Council, Boris Kidrić, underlined the need for the central planners to monitor the progress of the Plan on a daily basis.[7] Rigid production targets were imposed for every sector of the economy, and taxes were levied on profits, sales, and incomes above stipulated minimum levels.[8]

In establishing an interlocking political-economic apex to control planning decisions, the Party also created a federal structure of government. It created territorial entities based upon nationality, established constitutional guarantees for the representation of each major nationality at the federal level, and guaranteed the cultural autonomy of each national group.[9] In a state that had no rival in "out-Stalinizing Stalin," a precedent was created for devolution of power to substate entities identified specifically by nationality. The republics, moreover, met an essential condition of our model: they either had enjoyed prior existence as independent states or had aspired to that status while they were provinces of Hungarian or Turkish *imperia.*

The Party also recognized that it had inherited an economy characterized by profound disparities in regional economic development. Although there were relatively underdeveloped areas within each People's Republic, there was no doubt that the most obvious inequalities

[6] See F. E. Ian Hamilton, *Yugoslavia—Patterns of Economic Activity* (New York: Praeger 1968), 98-101.

[7] See *Zakon o Petogodišnjem Planu Razvitka Narodne Privrede Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije u Godinama 1947–1951* (Belgrade 1949), 23, and the *Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade 1947), Art. 15, p. 43.

[8] See *Zakon o Petogodišnjem Planu* (fn. 7), 23. Deborah D. Milenkovitch, in *Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1971), finds "barely perceptible" differences between the Kidrić formulation and Soviet theory which may have anticipated the new Yugoslav theory that began to develop after 1950. The most important of these were: (1) the suggestion that the market might serve as a means to achieve social objectives, and (2) the recognition that "commodity production" could occur within the state sector. See esp. pp. 58-59.

[9] See *Constitution* (fn. 7), Art. 13, p. 43.

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TABLE 1

RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE DIFFERENTIALS
IN PER CAPITA INCOME (1952–1971)*
(NEW DINARS)

	1952			1971		
	Per Capita Income	*Diff. From Nat'l Avg.*	*% of Nat'l Avg.*	*Per Capita Income*	*Diff. From Nat'l Avg.*	*% of Nat'l Avg.*
Yugoslavia	513	0	100	6,969	0	100
Bosnia-Hercegovina	391	−122	76	4,622	−2,347	66
Montenegro	281	−232	55	4,126	−2,843	59
Croatia	554	+ 41	108	8,738	+1,769	125
Macedonia	330	−183	64	4,492	−2,477	64
Slovenia	987	+473	192	13,318	+6,349	191
All Serbia	422	− 91	82	6,361	− 608	91
Serbia Proper	454	− 59	88	6,810	− 159	98
Vojvodina	431	− 82	84	7,751	+ 782	111
Kosovo-Metohija	227	−286	44	2,286	−4,683	33

* Derived from *Statistički Bilten*, No. 738 (July 1972) and No. 744 (October 1972).

coincided with republican boundaries. The Slovene and Croatian populations enjoyed far higher per capita incomes, on the average, than the Serbian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, and Albanian populations. The vastness of the "development gap" that existed can be appreciated through an examination of the per capita income figures for 1952 in Table 1. Seven years after regional planning policies had been inaugurated, the differentials were still substantial.

The Party's response to regional inequality was to declare it intolerable in a socialist country and to assign high priority to the quickest possible leveling of incomes. At the Fifth Congress of the LCY in 1948, Kidrić maintained that the idea of an integrated socialist economy was incompatible with economic inequality among the republics. He argued that relatively advanced republics such as Slovenia had a "sacred obligation" to surrender part of their revenues to help develop the backward regions of the country. Equality was to be approached through "utilization of accumulation by the State in general and its *redistribution*." The first Five-Year Plan established much higher growth targets for Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Montenegro

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than for Croatia and Slovenia, and stressed the development of capital goods industries in backward regions.[10]

Three points should be noted in connection with this approach to planning. First, with regard to the priority assigned to the development of heavy industry, a centrally planned economy is conducive to highly uneconomic allocations of resources. By setting artificially low prices for some capital goods, the planning mechanism decreased the usefulness of prices as scarcity indicators. Enterprises were able to manipulate their outputs in favor of goods with high prices and thereby achieve a paper profit. Reliance upon negotiated production targets tended to obscure the relative efficiency of enterprises within the same industrial branch and made quality controls more difficult to implement. In the regional context, planners tended to gloss over major differences between the republics because they lacked reliable measurements of comparative regional strengths within and between sectors. As a result, it was difficult to apply efficiency criteria to competing regional investment proposals.[11]

Second, when combined with redistributive regional priorities, the Stalinist model tended to foster autarkic beliefs among the authorities of the individual republics. The latter, who had already been accorded constitutional existence as governments within the Federation, adopted the planners' dictum that regional equality could not be achieved when some regions were superior to others in capital goods production. As a result, each republic tended to regard itself as a separate "nation," subject to "foreign" exploitation while its industrial base remained underdeveloped.[12] Despite the power of the Central Planning Commission, the Yugoslav system thus tended to be blind to considerable duplication of industrial development among republics—a phenomenon which frequently occurred without reference to actual industrial capacities and potentials.

Third, Stalinist practice forged strong linkages between political

[10] Boris Kidrič, "Report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," French edition (Belgrade 1948), 45 (emphasis supplied). See also *Zakon o Petogodišnjem Planu* (fn. 7), 55-56.

[11] See Spulber (fn. 5), 33-34.

[12] As Rudolf Bićanić has observed, autarkic development strategies were also a holdover from prewar Yugoslavia, in which regions which had not had access to large foreign markets (especially Serbia) unrealistically sought to achieve total self-sufficiency rather than develop selected sectors in which they enjoyed a comparative advantage. Two points are notable in this respect: first, these regions coincide with areas of relatively low economic development; second, the prewar situation was strongly reinforced by the autarkic bias of Stalinist theory. See Bićanić, *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Cambridge University Press 1973), 1-20.

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and economic decision making. The Party's efforts after 1950 to move from a command economy to one based upon indicative planning within a market system were hampered by the continued interference of political leaders in investment decisions. This interference came not only from the federal bureaucracy, but also from republican officials who had been imbued with Stalinist principles.

THE BEGINNINGS OF DECENTRALIZATION (1950–1957)

The second phase of postwar economic planning in Yugoslavia stemmed directly from the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948 and the subsequent economic boycott of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union and its satellites. These developments produced two important consequences for economic planning. First, Yugoslavia was forced to reorient her foreign trade to the West, and hence to abandon the barter agreements she had signed with the Soviet bloc, in favor of trade which depended upon the capacity of Yugoslav products to attract hard currencies. Second, the need to develop defense industries in the face of an anticipated Soviet invasion, combined with grain shortages in the wake of poor harvests in 1945–1946 and 1950, dictated the purchase of foodstuffs and war materiel from the West, again in hard currencies.[18]

The alteration of Yugoslav trade patterns forced a channeling of investment funds to productive enterprises which could earn high returns from the sale of their products in Western markets. Most such enterprises, of course, were located in the economically more advanced regions of Yugoslavia. In addition, these regions gained a strategic advantage after 1948: because of their relative distance from the Soviet-bloc countries, they were increasingly chosen as sites of defense industries. National economic survival replaced the equalization of incomes among the republics as the planners' major goal. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1952, Kidrić criticized past investment decisions for not taking sufficient account of the "rentability" (capital accumulation capacity) and rationality of particular projects "on the basis of the operation of objective economic laws, and not only of administrative decisions." He defended the practice of charging interest on credit to the less developed republics as essential to the maintenance of some sort

[18] See *Šesti Kongres Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije*, entitled "Borba Komunista Jugoslavije za Socijalističku Demokratije" (Belgrade 1952), 59. At the Sixth Congress, President Tito revealed that the Plan had counted upon Soviet-bloc imports in 1948 to cover 86% of Yugoslavia's coke requirements, 62% of its rolling stock, and 33% of all machinery.

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of objective standard in evaluating investment proposals.[14] This statement was an early indication of conflict between the objectives of efficiency in regional investment decisions and redistribution of regional incomes. Even in 1952, the former had begun to achieve primacy.

The increasing importance of considerations of profitability was given an ideological underpinning in the form of the doctrine of workers' self-management. Since 1946, Workers' Councils had been organized in Yugoslav factories as the representatives of factory workers within communal political organizations. In practice, however, they had exercised no control over investment decisions or the conduct and selection of management. In 1950, Workers' Councils were proclaimed to be the central agents of transition from state to social ownership of the means of production.[15] A gradual process was envisaged during which communal social organizations, of which the Councils were major components, would assume control over investment decisions, while the national and republican state and party organizations would slowly wither away.

The period between 1950 and the Sixth Congress involved a transition in the administration of economic planning from federal to republican and local government levels. Under the new system, enterprises for the first time were permitted to plan the range and volume of production in accordance with market criteria. In addition, a law passed in January 1951 provided for free price formation for nonrationed commodities. It should be observed, however, that the enterprises' plans for production and the distribution of profits between wages and reinvestment were restricted tightly by republican and local political organs. A series of laws passed in 1951 and 1952 established a number of "basic proportions" which remained under the control of federal planning authorities, including minimum and maximum wages, minimum production targets for each industry and region, and tax rates determining the contributions of enterprises to social funds, such as social security and wage funds.[16] The federal authorities, in

[14] *Ibid.*, 204.

[15] See *Službeni List*, No. 43 (July 5, 1950). For a later interpretation, see Edvard Kardelj, in *Borba*, April 2, 1952, p. 1.

[16] For accounts of the early evolution of the doctrine of workers' self-management, see Dušan Bilandzić, *Upravljanje Jugoslavenské Privrede (1945-1966)* (Belgrade 1967); Vladimir Bakarić, "Planning and the Law of Value in Yugoslavia," in *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 34 (July–September 1969), 23-34; Charles P. McVicker, *Titoism* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1957), pp. 61-106; Fred Warner Neal, *Titoism in Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1958), esp. pp. 123-34; and Milenkovitch (fn. 8), 66-90.

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short, continued to determine the proportion of enterprise earnings to be disposed of by the state, in contrast to earnings of working collectives and communal organizations. According to one prominent party source, this proportion ranged from 84 per cent to 97 per cent of capital accumulation, depending upon the branch of industry under consideration.[17] By 1957, government taxes on three levels claimed the greater part of enterprise profits, despite the abolition of wage ceilings. As Milenkovitch observes, moreover, the tax rate was not applied as a uniform levy; it was imposed differentially to insure equality of income among enterprises. Income for distribution to the workers was assigned as a fixed percentage of planned labor costs.[18]

The continued integration of political and economic components within the planning apparatus had two consequences with respect to regional economic development. In the first place, the federal government, in retaining control over a large proportion of enterprise earnings, continued to channel capital accumulation from enterprises in the advanced North (Slovenia and Croatia) to less developed republics and regions. Far more important, however, was the fact that the *use* of much of this transferred accumulation was no longer determined by federal authorities. Shoup points out that a large percentage of federal aid to underdeveloped regions during the 1950's took the form of direct grants-in-aid rather than loans. These grants, unlike regular credits from the Federal Investment Fund, were loosely supervised.[19] The Federal Institute of Economic Planning, which had replaced the powerful Central Planning Commission in 1953, was unable to do more than suggest general guidelines for an integrated economic plan which would ensure an optimal rate of growth for the economy as a whole.

In practice, the governments of the republics often used grants to finance prestige projects—such as steel mills, chemical factories, and electronics plants—without considering the inefficiency of such investments in view of poorly developed transportation facilities and insufficient supplies of skilled labor. Long delays in completing projects and the uneconomic operation of "political factories" became commonplace features of the economic landscape in the less developed areas.

The inefficient use of investment resources in the less developed regions was aggravated by the prevalence of "particularism," which

[17] See Bakarić (fn. 16), 27.

[18] See Milenkovitch (fn. 8), 85.

[19] See Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press 1968), 230-35.

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may be defined as the pursuit of narrow local, or republic, policies at the expense of the welfare of the country as a whole. Particularist practices included restrictions on interregional or interrepublic trade and duplication of industries already in operation in other republics without regard to their profitability. The existence of these practices was a logical outgrowth of the above-mentioned view that each "nation" needed to develop a strong industrial base in order not to be exploited by more developed economic systems.[20]

Economic planning practices during this period fell far short of the power transference envisaged in the proclamation of workers' self-management as the guiding principle of Yugoslav socialist theory. Two problems were especially pronounced. First, as Neuberger points out, a synthesis between plan and market, whereby the central planners confine their attention to broad macroeconomic decisions, could have occurred only if those decisions were few in number and related to a key set of aggregate conditions. Instead, central planners employed "manipulative planning," which retained strict central controls over prices and taxes. The freedom of enterprises to make investment decisions thus remained severely limited. Second, such transfers in decision-making power as did occur took the form of "legislative decentralization," the shifting of power to republican and local parties and governments. The issue of democracy for the workers did not arise until the third planning period (1957–1965).

Neither of these deficiencies arose accidentally. It proved impossible for the Party, in delegating power to communal authorities, to bypass the regional structures that had been accorded primacy in the Constitution. In addition to legal guarantees, republican self-consciousness had been strengthened by the autarkic practices that emerged logically from Stalinist economic theory. At the same time, maintenance of a wide range of central planning controls occurred not only because of

[20] Jerzy F. Karcz has advanced the interesting thesis that some Communist governments have pursued nationalistically inspired economic policies which enjoyed popular support despite the availability of other policies that might have produced faster growth. This concept of "psychic income" as opposed to material income might well be extended to explain particularist practices within governmental subunits of a multinational state such as Yugoslavia. See Karcz, "Reflections on the Economics of Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe," in *East European Quarterly*, v (June 1971). The eradication of "particularism" became a major concern of the LCY, especially after the Seventh Party Congress in 1958. For representative opinion by party leaders, see the articles of Milentije Popović in *Socijalizam*, vii (July–August 1964), and Dragomir Drašković in *Gledišta*, vii (January 1966). See also Edvard Kardelj, "Odvogori Na Pitanja iz Oblasti Našeg I Političkog Života na Sastanka sa Političkim Aktivom Beograd," in *Problemi Naše Socijalističke Izgradnje*, vii (Belgrade 1968), 320-21.

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assorted "legacies of central planning,"[21] but also because federal planners perceived that republican investment priorities deviated from their own vision of national development. The advanced republics resisted the high priority assigned to the redistribution of income between regions, while poorer republics were opposed to the increasing tendency for planners to impose distributory criteria (especially that of profitability) in evaluating regional investment proposals.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT (1957–1965)

Retention of federal control over regional investments did not prevent the Federation from asserting distributory over redistributory concerns in the formation of regional policy plans. Beginning in 1957, the doctrine of workers' self-management was extended to posit the criterion of profitability as the essential determinant of wage levels and investment decisions. A campaign was launched against particularist practices. At the First Congress of Working Associations of Yugoslavia in 1957, President Tito attributed disparities in the productivity of enterprises to two sets of factors: "objective factors and difficulties" over which the Workers' Councils had no control, and "subjective factors." The latter consisted of "localist" policies, which Tito defined as the allocation of investments without regard to the interests of the whole community. He expressly condemned the duplication of industries between regions as "disloyal competition."[22]

The Congress's final resolution called for a restructuring of salary payments which would reward the workers of a given enterprise "in accordance to work performed." While affirming the rights of enterprises to equal access to investment resources, the resolution strongly implied that labor productivity and profit maximization would henceforth determine standards of remuneration.[23] With the decentralization of the banking system, which occurred in 1965, these criteria would be extended to credit policies. A number of basic rights was extended to enterprises; Milenkovitch observes that this action constituted a major revision of Marxist theory with respect to the use of capital. Included were the rights to use property for personal production and consumption, and for market production; to sell one's output and keep the proceeds; to rent property from others; to alter, sell, or not use property. The

[21] See Neuberger (fn. 1).
[22] See *Kongres Radničkih Saveta Jugoslavije* (Belgrade 1958), esp. pp. 13-18, 43.
[23] *Ibid.*, 659-80.

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only remaining prohibitions concerned the using up or liquidation of property and the selling of shares. State capitalism, in short, had been abandoned in favor of the "social ownership" of capital.[24]

The principle of "payment according to work performed" explicitly contradicted the theme—expressed continuously since 1945—that every worker was entitled to a living standard comparable to that enjoyed in the most advanced areas of Yugoslavia. The new doctrine threatened the economic structure of the less developed regions of Yugoslavia by implying that the flow of investments from federal sources might be reduced drastically if levels of productivity were not raised. It constituted a threat not only to the "political factories," but also to the political elites whose careers depended upon their continued operation. The purge in 1966 of Aleksandar Ranković, Vice President of Yugoslavia and leader of both the Serbian Communist Party and the internal security apparatus, represented the culmination of the Party's efforts to overcome resistance to economic decentralization on the part of local political elites. The latter had consistently advocated redistributive priorities as guides to the formulation of regional planning policies.

The redefinition of the principle of social ownership was accompanied by a more explicit formulation of the decision-making powers of the Workers' Councils. Political reforms introduced in the Constitution of 1963 were designed to encourage "direct democracy," which may be defined as the placing of primary decision-making power in the hands of the Councils. Workers' Councils officially were made responsible for receiving and voting upon reports and planning proposals from enterprise managers. The link between "direct producers" and higher governmental bodies, in addition, was strengthened in a reform of federal, republican, and local assembly organizations along corporate lines. This legislative decentralization divided the Federal Assembly into five chambers, four of which (economy, welfare and health, political-administrative, and educational and cultural) also represented a division along corporate lines. The chamber representatives were to be selected by Workers' Councils in their respective functional areas. Finally, the Party's front organization, the Socialist Alliance, was elevated to the position of the highest forum for discussion of social issues at all levels of government. It was made responsible for creating linkages between the Workers' Councils, trade unions, youth organizations, and government and party committees on questions of

[24] See Milenkovitch (fn. 8), 90-94.

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"technical information and assistance, research and development priorities, and inter-enterprise cooperation."[25]

A central consequence of these reforms, together with the Party's redefinition of democratic centralism, was the removal of the Party from the sphere of economic decision making. Since the Party had provided the principal impetus for the country's regional development policies until this point, the new political decentralization posed an immediate threat to the less developed regions. The Seventh LCY Congress, which met in April 1958, expressly resolved this contradiction in favor of distributive priorities; it affirmed the principle of remuneration according to work performed. Although the Congress resolution reiterated the longstanding theme that inequalities in economic development between regions constituted an intolerable obstacle to the achievement of socialism, it clearly subordinated support for underdeveloped regions to the goal of maximum growth for the economy as a whole.[26]

Practical application of the new doctrine, however, developed more slowly than its rhetoric. A vigorous debate took place among economists concerning the institutional reforms that needed to be made in the planning apparatus. An immediate practical consequence of the Congress, paradoxically, was the provision in the Second Five-Year Plan (1957–1961) for large-scale, guaranteed investments from the Federal Investment Fund in less developed regions, particularly Kosovo-Metohija and Macedonia.[27]

The increased allocation of investments to underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia in turn met with increased criticism as it became apparent that many of the new projects would not be completed on schedule and would operate at low levels of productivity. Economists in more developed republics argued that investment funds had been misused, blaming republican and local party and government officials for not relating investment plans to available resources and plant capacity. Despite these objections, however, the social product grew by nearly 13 per cent per annum between 1956 and 1960. The Second Five-Year Plan was a signal success, boasting a growth in industrial production of more than 14 per cent. In 1961 and 1962, however, the

[25] See the speech by Edvard Kardelj to the Eighth LCY Congress, as reported in the English-language edition, *Practice and Theory of Socialist Development in Yugoslavia* (Belgrade 1965).

[26] See Milentije Popović (fn. 20), and Mijalko Todorovic, "Report to Second LCY Plenary Session," June 17, 1965, in *Borba*, June 18, 1965, p. 1.

[27] *Program of the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists* (Belgrade 1958), 198.

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social product rose by less than 5 per cent, reflecting a depression in agricultural production and a fall in the industrial growth rate from 13 per cent to 7 per cent. In addition, the country was plagued by a serious and increasing deficit in balance of payments, which amounted to $260 million in 1960. The deficit reflected two problems: the need to import capital equipment from the West, and the unsalability of many export items in hard-currency markets. Both problems suggested a need to reorient investment toward productive enterprises which could produce high quality, competitive exports.

The third planning period, therefore, involved efforts to remove parochial impediments to the most efficient possible allocation of scarce resources. Three types of conflict occurred. First, policies designed to encourage a major equalization of per capita income and economic growth rates across regions were rejected on the grounds that poorer regions could not absorb the required investments efficiently. The concerns of the developed regions thoroughly dominated federal policy, since they were in accord with the need to resolve the pressing macroeconomic problems which arose around 1960. Conflict between two sets of regional and local elites, as a result, was intensified. Second, the LCY engaged in a series of moves, culminating in the Ranković purge, to bypass recalcitrant republican and local authorities perceived to be undermining self-management. One type of legislative decentralization (local and corporate) was substituted for another (republican). Finally, in terms of the overall guidance of economic planning, control continued to pass from central planners to peripheral agencies: the enterprise, the commune, and corporate groups.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (1965–1974)

The new economic reform, discussed extensively in the early 1960's, codified in the new Constitution of 1963, and proclaimed at the Eighth LCY Congress in 1964, was fundamentally concerned with freeing economic units from political constraints and establishing productivity as the central criterion for new investment. The principal feature of the new reform was a sharp increase in the powers granted to Workers' Councils as opposed to republican and local sociopolitical organizations. A first step in this direction had been taken in 1961, when the Federal Assembly granted enterprises increased power to allocate earnings among salaries, reinvestment, and reserve funds. Although 30 per cent of enterprise earnings were still guaranteed to government agencies for their investment funds, and federal taxes (flat rate) on "excess"

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profits were retained, for the first time enterprises were granted authority to allocate investment funds without political interference.

It soon became apparent that this limited reform did not have a major impact upon the country's economic problems. The system of economic planning that had existed in Yugoslavia since 1950 had represented, to varying degrees, what Neuberger terms a "visible hand" approach to development. The central planners, throughout the period, used monetary and fiscal controls to restrict enterprise decisions. The main consequences of these policies were excess demand for investment funds, high consumption demand, and hence serious problems of inflation.[28] Neuberger asserts that Yugoslavia could afford to pursue these policies as long as high growth levels were retained. By the early 1960's, however, several factors which had contributed to the growth rate had lost force. Some growth had occurred simply through the abandoning of the Stalinist model. Import surpluses had been maintained in the early years by recourse to foreign grants and loans, which were no longer forthcoming. In addition, the reduction in international tensions had diminished the need for heavy military investment, which previously had added a significant increment to the growth rate.

The economic reform of 1965 sought a solution to this problem in three major ways. First, through the abandonment of state investment planning and price reform, it intended to place the distribution of profits wholly at the discretion of the enterprises, thus creating added incentives to profitability. Second, the devaluation of the dinar and the gradual elimination of both import quotas and export subsidies were designed to mitigate the balance-of-payments problem and to force Yugoslav exports into sectors of comparative advantage. Third, an effort was made to create more optimal use of scarce resources by increasing both capital mobility (granting to enterprises the right to hold shares in other enterprises) and accountability (transforming banks into profit-sharing firms with capital subscribed by enterprises and government agencies).

These reforms represented an extension of the type of decentralization that had begun in 1950, and, as stated above, posed a major threat to unproductive enterprises and the political elites which supported them. In effect, the LCY leadership sought to remove politics from economic decision making while maintaining overall control over the

[28] See Egon Neuberger, "The Yugoslav Visible Hand System: Why is it No More?," International Development Research Center Working Paper (Indiana University, Bloomington 1971), 5-7.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economy through broad indicative plans. A new synthesis between political and economic decision making was the object of parliamentary reforms along corporate lines. The Party removed intermediate barriers between its central leadership and the Workers' Councils. At the same time, however, it sought to ensure that the Councils would reach "correct" decisions by instructing party members to play an active "guiding role" in council debates.

In practice, however, the reforms effectively reduced the power of only those republican officials who sought to maintain rigid governmental controls over enterprise decisions. The republican role in development planning, if anything, was increased, and a series of constitutional amendments, ratified between 1969 and 1971, reaffirmed the position of the republics and the autonomous regions as the principal guarantors of the rights of Yugoslav nationalities. The 20th amendment, in particular, denied Yugoslavia's status as a "supranational category" and established the republics as "self-management entities." Subsequent amendments formally reduced the economic powers of the Federation to control over defense spending and production, foreign trade, and the monetary system.[29]

The combined effect of economic reform and constitutional revision has been to redefine "particularism" as a set of barriers to inter-regional mobility of investments; at the same time, the pejorative meaning of the term has been removed. Although investment decisions are expected to be subject to criteria of efficiency, the latter tend to be defined in terms of maximizing republican rather than national growth. Decisions of the "ultimate" decision makers—the enterprises—are aggregated in republican development plans, and "regions" become identified with republican boundaries. In theory, for example, enterprises in developed areas were expected to invest in the development of raw materials exploitation in backward areas, where cheap labor would lower production costs. In practice, however, they have concentrated upon the development of their own infrastructures, and, to the extent that they have invested in other regions, interest has concentrated upon growth industries (such as tourism), which tend to be located in other developed areas.[30]

[29] The texts of the Constitutional amendments and a concise analysis are contained in Milivoje Kovaćević, *Ustavni Amandmani XX do XLII* (Belgrade 1971).

[30] See Hamilton (fn. 6), esp. pp. 133-36; and Jack C. Fisher, "The Emergence of Regional Spatial Planning in Yugoslavia—the Slovenian Experience," in George W. Hoffman, ed., *Eastern Europe: Essays in Geographical Problems* (London: Methuen 1971), 306-19.

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Republican governments have proved to be perfectly capable of "integrating" enterprises within their borders, but have been unwilling to establish links with enterprises in other republics, regardless of the potential profit of such joint ventures. According to one survey of economic integration in Yugoslavia during 1968, 85 per cent of all mergers and takeovers involved enterprises within the same commune; only 13 per cent occurred between communes in the same republic; and less than 2 per cent between communes in different republics.[31] Republican governments, therefore, have continued to develop quasi-autarkic economic structures. This fact, in turn, causes them to be suspicious of regional development plans which concentrate upon the exploitation of agriculture and raw materials for industry at the expense of the construction of a heavy industrial base. Development plans that envisage increased specialization of output and concomitant interdependence of economic regions are usually rejected.[32]

Numerous examples may be cited to document the tendency of the republics to follow autarkic development plans. Perhaps the most publicized of these has been the ongoing competition among the republics for investment resources to finance the construction of seaports. Yugoslavia, blessed with an abundance of fine harbors along the Adriatic littoral, has immense potential as a conduit for international trade. Each republic, however, advocates construction of a particular seaport which is linked directly to its own markets and transportation networks. Croatia, observing that its principal port, Rijeka, is being used to its full capacity, correctly argues that it has four additional ports (Split, Zadar, Sibenik, and Bakar) which have surplus capacity and could be developed at relatively low cost. Slovenia, for its part, has built a port at Koper which, although it used to specialize in perishable goods, has expanded its capacity during the past few years

[31] See Najdan Pasić, "Integration Based on Self-Management and the Political System," in *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 39 (April–June 1970), 19. See also Branko Kubović, *Regionalni Aspekt Privrednog Razvitka Jugoslavije* (Zagreb 1961). Kubović has proposed the eventual division of Yugoslavia into twenty-five planning regions, many of which cut across existing republican boundaries. If implemented under the current system of self-management, such a plan would reduce the republics, and some communal structures, to anachronisms.

[32] Additional critiques of the role of republic organizations in limiting economic growth may be found in Zivojin Rakočević, "Planning as a Unifying Factor of Social Labour in Socialism," in *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 34 (April–June 1969); Bozidar Gluščević, "Regionalni Problemi Zaposlenosti i Produktivnosti Radne Snage," in *Ekonomska Misao*, No. 2 (June 1968); and Kosta Mihajlović, "Odnos Izmedu Sektora i Regiona u Procesu Strukturnih Promena," in *Ekonomska Misao*, No. 3 (September 1968).

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and attracted shipping from Croatian ports. Bosnia-Hercegovina advocates a port at Ploce (where Dalmatia is at its narrowest), which would provide links with the Zenica iron and steel works, Sarajevo, and Belgrade. Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia are committed to the construction of a seaport at Bar, to be linked to the eastern and southern republics by a railway line to Belgrade, Skopje, and Priština. The railway has been under construction since 1969.[33]

Similar competition among the republics has been observed in disagreements over loan priorities for both domestic and international financing.[34] The main point to be stressed in this connection, however, is not that many potentially viable development plans compete for scarce investment funds, but that the competing proposals are so strongly identified with nationality interests. Even the Belgrade-Bar railway, a regional plan par excellence which will serve three republics, was attacked by Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian officials for its expense, and as a "particularist" perpetuation of inefficient industries.[35]

The type of decentralization employed in Yugoslavia thus has created serious obstacles to the implementation of either distributive or redistributive regional development policies, both of which are logically derived from federal economic and social goals. Regional economic policy, as it has been applied in countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Italy, has defined "region" in purely economic terms, explicitly avoiding the identification of regions with any national, historical, and cultural heritage. In France, for example, regions have been defined as the spheres of influence of growth poles (*pôles de croissance*)—urban agglomerations which are the focus of communications and transactions with a host of smaller communities. That is

[33] For a detailed account of the seaport controversy, see Dennison I. Rusinow, "Ports and Politics in Yugoslavia," in *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, Southeast Europe Series, XI, No. 3 (1964). For a discussion of the Belgrade-Bar Project, see Orme Wilson, Jr., "The Belgrade-Bar Railroad—An Essay in Economic and Political Geography," in Hoffman (fn. 30), 371-87.

[34] Sharp disagreement was expressed in 1969, for example, over which republic, Slovenia or Macedonia, most needed a $30 million loan from the IBRD for highway construction. Both had valid claims; Slovenia needed to expand highway links between Koper and the industrial centers of Kranj and Maribor, while Macedonia required funds to build the first paved road linking the trade centers of Ohrid, Kičevo, and Gostivar —a road essential to the development of an industrial infrastructure. A decision in favor of Macedonia was finally reached through intervention by the Party Presidium, and the IBRD loan was formally awarded on June 5, 1969.

[35] This point of view is shared by some Western scholars. See, for example, Shoup (fn. 19), 250-53; Jack C. Fisher, *Yugoslavia—A Multinational State* (San Francisco: Chandler 1966), 177-86; and Rusinow (fn. 33).

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a dynamic concept; as some growth poles advance, others inevitably decline. In addition, two or more growth poles can combine to form an axis for further economic development.[36]

The prosecution of this sort of regional policy is clearly impossible when geographic space is identified with boundaries based on static considerations of nationality. In such cases, policy makers cannot form and reform planning units with impunity according to purely economic criteria, whether distributive or redistributive; attempts to do so will be rejected by regional elites. The likelihood of such regional policies is even less in the case of a country which, like Yugoslavia, is organized along federal lines and contains highly autonomous subnational units. It is easy to show that Skopje should serve as a growth pole for Southern Serbia, that Eastern Slavonia should be oriented toward Belgrade and the Vojvodina, or that Northern Bosnia falls within Zagreb's sphere of influence. It is quite another matter, however, for such argumentation to be more than an academic exercise in Yugoslavia.

In practice, the less developed regions have been left with only one external source of investment funds, the "Special Fund for Crediting Economically Underdeveloped Republics and Regions of Yugoslavia." This fund, created in 1965, is limited in size, and competition for its resources is fierce. In any case, the fund's resources are insufficient to finance the massive regional investment plans necessary to encourage faster development of poorer areas relative to that of developed regions.[37]

There has been an active debate among Yugoslav economists about the steadily widening development gap between richer and poorer regions. It is clear that many view this development (partially documented in Table 2) as a threat to the country's economic well-being as well as to its ultimate political stability, and consider the present *laissez-faire* approach to regional development planning to be disastrous. Some economists, for example, have emphasized the fact that, prior to 1965, the rate of expansion of underdeveloped republics increased relative to

[36] There is a voluminous literature pertaining to growth pole theory, which forms a major strand of the literature of regional economics. For a brief introduction, see François Perroux, "Note sur la Notion de 'Pôle de Croissance,'" in Jacques Boudeville, ed., *Espace et Les Pôles de Croissance* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1968).

[37] Investment figures for industry in 1971 show that the less developed regions generally received a higher proportion of investment resources from the Federation than they did from commercial banks or other republics. The absolute levels of per capita investment in these regions, however, were as much as 600% lower than in Croatia and Slovenia. See *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ* (1972), 473.

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TABLE 2

NATIONAL, REPUBLICAN, AND REGIONAL INCOME*
(MILLIONS OF DINARS)

	1952	*1958*	*1964*	*1970*
Yugoslavia	8,721	18,337	55,935	142,909
Bosnia-Hercegovina	1,114	2,430	6,775	17,317
Montenegro	118	251	972	2,187
Croatia	2,179	4,991	14,705	38,673
Macedonia	430	954	3,163	7,398
Slovenia	1,484	3,070	8,935	22,973
All Serbia	2,946	6,642	21,386	53,732
Serbia Proper	2,027	4,295	13,893	35,750
Vojvodina	733	1,989	6,376	15,138
Kosovo-Metohija	185	358	1,117	2,844

* Derived from *Statistički Bilten*, No. 744 (October 1972).

that of the more developed republics; but they add that the gap in absolute incomes increased. One study, for example, showed that in 1963 an increase in per capita income of $15 would have required an annual growth rate of 19 per cent in Kosovo-Metohija, the poorest region, as opposed to only 3 per cent in Slovenia, the wealthiest.[38] Moreover, Table 3 shows that enterprises in the less developed regions have been forced to allocate a higher percentage of their earnings to the payment of wages as opposed to reinvestment in new capacity. The mean monthly incomes shown in the table are grouped far more tightly than the figures for reinvestment per 100 dinars earned.

The tendency for major differences in take-off levels to nullify gains in productivity is further illustrated by Lazar Sokolov's analysis of changes in worker productivity and per capita income levels in the republics of Yugoslavia from 1962 to 1966. He finds that increases in productivity were not accompanied by corresponding wage increases. In Montenegro, the most extreme case, a gain in productivity of 26 per cent compared to the national average produced a gain of only 6 per cent in per capita income. Sokolov attributes this inconsistency in part to the fact that less developed regions suffer from overpopulation in rural areas, a fact which hides a significant percentage of unemployment. He advocates a development policy which would create new,

[38] Kosta Mihajlović, quoted in Hamilton (fn. 6), 142.

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TABLE 3

INCOME AND PROFITS, 1970*

	Income on 100 Dinars—Total Resources	*Ploughback of Profits Per 100 Dinars*	*Mean Monthly Personal Income (Dinars)*
Yugoslavia	36.7	6.3	1,125
Bosnia-Hercegovina	30.7	4.1	1,085
Montenegro	23.5	3.0	1,057
Croatia	41.6	7.0	1,212
Macedonia	27.5	3.7	939
Slovenia	45.2	10.4	1,290
All Serbia	34.4	5.5	1,035
Serbia Proper	35.9	5.9	1,031
Vojvodina	34.7	5.8	1,060
Kosovo-Metohija	22.6	1.3	988

* Derived from *Statistički Bilten*, No. 734 (June 1972).

modern, labor-intensive industries to absorb the surplus agricultural population.[39]

Other economists, however, have argued that the quantity of surplus labor present in less developed areas, especially in Kosovo-Metohija and Macedonia, is so large that new investments within these regions could not possibly absorb it. They maintain that, since the developed republics have created far more new jobs since 1945 than the less developed ones, the solution to the problem of agricultural overpopulation lies in policies encouraging migration of labor to developed areas where unskilled labor is in demand.[40]

Such a policy, however, ignores several depressing realities. First, it has been pointed out that, in areas where agricultural overpopulation is highest, language barriers effectively prevent the migration of labor to other regions.[41] This difficulty, moreover, is complicated by religious

[39] See Lazar Sokolov, "Problema 'Viška' Radne Snage u Nedovoljno Razvijenim Podrucima Jugoslavije," in *Ekonomist*, XXII, No. 1 (1969), 174-87; Branko Horvat, "Pitanja Tempa Razvoja Jugoslavenske Privrede," in *Ekonomist*, XVI, No. 3/4 (1963), 593-617; and Dragić Stojadinović, review of Drs. Kosta Mihajlović and Eva Berković, *Razvoj i Životni Standard Regiona Jugoslavije*, in *Ekonomska Misao*, III (September 1970), 135-40.

[40] For example, see Miloš Macura, "Politika Zaposlenosti i Proporcije Radne Snage," in *Ekonomist*, XVI, No. 3/4 (1963), 611-18.

[41] See Hamilton (fn. 6), 144.

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and cultural differences between Macedonians and Albanians on the one hand, and Slovenes and Croats on the other. Second, migration policies do not take account of a potentially more serious problem: high unemployment rates among skilled workers in the poorer regions. In the absence of new investment, a policy designed to encourage migration tends to attract skilled workers to jobs in developed areas, thereby further retarding expansion of industry in underdeveloped regions.[42] Third, even employed skilled workers are tempted to migrate to areas where salaries, working conditions, and social services are superior. Migration of this kind leaves the less productive workers behind, and a further widening of the development gap may be expected.[43]

In addition, the population problem in some of the less developed regions extends beyond the question of rural overpopulation. As Table 4 shows, growth per 1,000 population has been highest in Kosovo-Metohija and Macedonia, two of the three least developed regions in Yugoslavia. The problem is most severe among the Albanian population, which is the only nationality to have increased its growth rate since 1961. Table 5 shows, moreover, that all of the less developed regions (Kosovo-Metohija, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro) have the largest populations per household, and, for all regions except Bosnia-Hercegovina, this statistic has declined less since 1948 than has the national average.

Finally, as Kiril Miljovski has observed, failure to invest heavily in the industrial growth of underdeveloped areas leads to a retardation in the development of social services, which in turn produces a labor force less skilled than that of the more advanced regions, and social conditions which discourage investment from other republics.[44]

During the past decade, Yugoslav economists and geographers have sought means to break this vicious circle and to achieve the country's stated goal of closing the development gap while maintaining a high level of growth in the economy as a whole. The approach usually taken has been to advocate the planned development of the Yugoslav

[42] This point is made forcibly by Kiril Miljovski in his article, "Nedovoljno Razviena Područja i Sedmogodišnji Plan," in *Ekonomist*, XVI, No. 3/4 (1963), 673. In criticizing the draft Seven-Year Plan for 1964–1970, then under discussion, Miljovski observes that low investment rates had created unemployment not only in rural areas of Macedonia, but also in more developed regions. He cites an average unemployment rate for 1962 of 13% for skilled workers in Macedonia, and notes that this figure represents a steep rise from the rates of the previous three years.

[43] A good summary of these developments may be found in the OECD *Economic Survey for Yugoslavia* (Paris, November 1970).

[44] See Miljovski (fn. 42), 673.

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TABLE 4

GROWTH PER THOUSAND POPULATION*

	1948–1953	*1953–1961*	*1961–1971*
Yugoslavia	14.4	11.0	10.0
Bosnia-Hercegovina	21.9	17.6	13.2
Montenegro	22.4	14.6	11.7
Croatia	8.2	6.9	6.1
Macedonia	26.1	19.4	15.8
Slovenia	8.9	7.0	8.1
All Serbia	13.7	11.3	9.9
Serbia Proper	14.9	9.7	8.3
Vojvodina	7.1	10.9	5.0
Kosovo-Metohija	21.9	20.8	25.4

* Derived from *Statistički Bilten*, No. 662 (April 1971).

TABLE 5

POPULATION PER HOUSEHOLD*

	1948	*1971*	*% of Change*
Yugoslavia	4.37	3.80	−13
Bosnia-Hercegovina	5.15	4.41	−14
Montenegro	4.51	4.34	− 4
Croatia	3.94	3.43	−13
Macedonia	5.27	4.68	−11
Slovenia	3.78	3.34	−12
All Serbia	4.39	3.76	−14
Serbia Proper	4.54	3.63	−20
Vojvodina	3.61	3.18	−14
Kosovo-Metohija	6.36	6.61	+ 4

* Derived from *Statistički Bilten*, No. 738 (July 1972).

economy by treating it as a composite of spatially related regions, each with its own particular resources and investment priorities. In one sense, advocacy of regional development strategies represents a continuation of the attack against particularist practices; communal organizations are urged to integrate their economic plans with those of adjoining communes in order to avoid duplication of investment, achieve economies of scale, and to make available larger amounts of

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investment funds from the consumers themselves and from central banks. In 1969, the Ninth LCY Congress called for "broad integrations and the creation of large, economically strong organizations of associated labor. . . ."[45]

Yugoslav economists have observed that economic underdevelopment has persisted in areas which, although potentially wealthy in human and natural resources, have been unable to develop an infrastructure of administrative and regional communications conducive to large-scale economic development. Enterprises in these areas, although perhaps viable operations in the long term, have remained isolated, and excluded from comprehensive development plans. There has been considerable support in the Yugoslav economic literature for large regional investment schemes such as the Drina Valley Project and other projects designed to integrate the economies of underdeveloped regions. Rapid growth in energy resources, transportation networks, and large-scale industry, according to this argument, would attract investment into less developed regions. Such policy recommendations, however, postulate the existence of a spirit of inter-republican cooperation that has proven to be largely absent from republican development plans; alternatively, they presuppose a measure of federal control over investment which has long since been superseded through "legislative decentralization."[46]

In summary, developments since enactment of the 1965 reforms have tended to accentuate differences in economic development between the developed Northwest and the underdeveloped Southeast. Economic decentralization policy, in removing politics from economic decision making, has removed central planners from political power and in practice has substituted nationalistic political considerations for political control by the Communist Party.

The Ninth LCY Congress reaffirmed that the closure of the development gap between developed and underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia constitutes the basic component of socialist equality. The Party advocated several measures designed to redistribute regional incomes, including enlargement of the Special Fund and cooperation between the Fund's administrators and investment banks, communal organiza-

[45] Ninth Congress of the LCY, entitled "Socialist Development in Yugoslavia on the Basis of Self-Management and the Tasks of the League of Communists," in *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 33 (January–March 1969), esp. p. 53.

[46] For example, see Borisav Srebić, "Neki Problemi Usavršavanja Metoda i Mehanizma Razvoja Nerazvijenih Podrucja u Jugoslavije," in *Ekonomist*, XXII, No. 1 (1969), 158-59.

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tions, and foreign investors. It also called for the employment of fiscal measures by the republics to encourage the flow of investment to the less developed areas, and for further integration of banking and industrial organizations among regions.[47]

All these recommendations, however, were made in very vague terms which failed to suggest concrete measures that might be employed to bring about equalization of regional economic development. The Party, moreover, committed itself only to the achievement of a higher relative level of economic growth in the poorer regions; nothing was said about producing greater absolute gains in income levels.

There have also been indications that even these modest recommendations have met with resistance from the developed republics. In his speech to the Ninth Congress, President Tito went out of his way to assure the assembled delegates that he had spoken with representatives of all republics and had found that all favored continuation of the Special Fund. In view of the fact that there had been virtually unanimous support for the Fund since its establishment in 1965, Tito's remarks would have been superfluous unless there had been proposals to abolish special aid to underdeveloped republics.[48] Such proposals, indeed, became commonplace in the arguments of "liberals" in the course of the Croatian "uprising" of 1971.

Conclusion

The Yugoslav debate, since 1950, over decentralization has involved a great deal more than formation of a national consensus favoring a reduction in the powers levied by central planners. The term has embraced a set of heterogeneous policy demands which reflect disparate and often incompatible goals. It has proved impossible for planners to pursue the goals of regional economic equality and efficient investment within regions simultaneously. In addition, devolution of planning power to communal organizations and enterprise managements has impeded prosecution of both varieties of regional policy planning. All of the conflicts anticipated in our introductory model have occurred in Yugoslavia and have forced the LCY elite to choose between "decentralist" alternatives.

The regime has consistently attempted to pursue both welfare and

[47] See Ninth LCY Congress (fn. 45), 55-56.

[48] See Josip Broz Tito, "Brže od Prosečnog Razvoja Jugoslavije," in Voja Jovanović and others, eds., *Savez Komunista o Nedovoljno Razvijenim Područjima* (Belgrade 1970), 8.

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efficiency goals. Its commitment to legislative decentralization, however, has resulted in a series of policies which have fragmented power among competing republican elites. Constitutional sanction of this process has made it increasingly difficult for the Federation to resolve the decentralist debate in favor of any alternative. The Party's commitment to self-management has initiated a "style" of decentralization that may well be irreversible. At present, the LCY increasingly finds itself in the role of arbitrator between incompatible policy demands. Whereas reassertion of elements of central planning by the Federation might permit a clear resolution of the debate, it is highly questionable that the Party could permit a reversal, even to a limited extent, of the major original Yugoslav contribution to Marxist theory.

The Yugoslav case provides excellent documentation for the proposition that the study of decentralization needs to move beyond the confines of the traditional debate over the efficacy of central economic planning. Where indicative planning by the center is unaccompanied by consensus over the meaning of decentralization among periphery elites, a state's choice of decentralist policies becomes not merely a commitment to a new economic mechanism, but a *political* choice that goes beyond economic considerations to embrace the goals of particular subnational elites. We need to ask ourselves not only whether economic decentralization will promote a set of goals more efficiently, but also whether that set of goals is sustained by a state-wide consensus.

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THE POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: The Confederal Phase

By PAUL TAYLOR

THIS essay will describe some of the main features of the style of politics found in the present phase of integration in relations between member governments of the European Communities. There are various views about the nature of international integration: Functionalists, Neofunctionalists and Federalists have each stressed particular aspects of the process. And there are a number of ideas about how the integration process in Europe may be divided up chronologically into its various phases since 1945. One useful way is to describe the period from 1950 to 1954 as the Federal phase (after Altiero Spinelli),[1] the period from 1955 to 1969 as the Neofunctional phase (after Ernst Haas),[2] and that from 1969 to the present as the Confederal phase.[3] The present essay does not consciously follow any of the established modes of theorizing about international integration, but concentrates upon the contemporary or Confederal phase of the process.

The approach is to follow three major interrelated themes which summarize the major qualities of contemporary integrative politics. They are, first, the broadly defensive stance of the governments in their conduct of relations with the Brussels institutions; second, the appearance of a system of political interaction which may be called a "managed *Gesellschaft*"; and third, the oscillation between advanced schemes for integration and retreats into nationalism which can be seen in the stated intentions of governments. The theme of the defensive posture of governments involves the consideration of factors that have identified them as actors in the European Communities and have underlined their separateness; the theme of the "managed *Gesellschaft*" involves the consideration of the major features of the political system of which the governments are members; the theme of the

[1] *The Eurocrats* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1966).

[2] For a useful account of Neofunctionalist ideas, see Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration* (London: Faber and Faber 1973).

[3] For a preliminary account of the Confederal phase, see Paul Taylor, "The Common Market and the Forces of History," *Orbis*, XVI (Fall 1972), 743-59.

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oscillation in their stated intentions concerns the conscious response of governments to their involvement with each other. The broad question of whether all regional integration ventures eventually reach a Confederal phase is left unanswered. But it is implicit in this essay that the Confederal phase is a mature one in the European context and that it represents a culmination of earlier phases.

The defensive posture of governments in relation to the Brussels institutions might be thought to be a general reaction to the work of international institutions. Yet there are striking differences between the response of governments to institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, now OECD), on the one hand and the institutions of the European Communities on the other. The IMF and OEEC encouraged each government to think of itself as the sole, legitimate, and/or ultimate, spokesman for the state. It was the government's interpretation of views among the various groups in the state which mattered. Dealing with the international institution, in fact, reinforced the idea that there was indeed a national interest and that the particular government was its rightful interpreter. Encouraging agreement between governments could, paradoxically, contribute to the preservation of their individual identity and could in some sense further separate the groups and peoples which they served.

In contrast, the working methods of the European Communities have tended to fragment the idea of national interest and to weaken a government's claim to be its spokesman. A more cautious approach by governments to the work of the Communities has thereby been encouraged; in addition, the development in the European Communities of an extensive range of economic, social, and cultural interdependencies has led them to adopt an increasingly defensive attitude in the face of a potential or actual threat to their powers, which could, it is felt, challenge their sovereignty. As was to be expected, as integration proceeded governments became more defensive in the face of an increasing range of regional constraints.

The working method which was developed first within the European Coal & Steel Company (ECSC), and which is now characteristic of the European Communities, involved an independent initiating agency—the Commission—in extensive, continuing consultation with nongovernmental groups within the state as well as with governments and their agents. The importance of these consultations is underlined by their relevance, under the terms of the Rome Treaty, to the taking

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of decisions, mainly in the Council of Ministers, on questions which could affect the whole economic, social, and ultimately political life of member states. It must be stressed that these consultations are very extensive indeed (as extensive as the range of work of the Community), that they take place mainly as the result of initiatives taken by the Commission, and that their timing in the policy-making process is very often decided by the Commission. The effect is to make it very difficult for governments to maintain their exclusive claim on the national interest. The Commission's activities encourage other groups within the state to articulate their positions in the European context and to present their views as an alternative and a challenge to those of the government. There are occasions on which representatives of trade unions or industrial confederations side with Commission members against the members of the permanent delegations of their own nationality. The Commission frequently talks of the trade unions and employers' organizations as its "social partners," a clear reference to the continuing potential for joint opposition to the views of governments. There are more than three hundred interest groups with offices in Brussels. In these circumstances, the idea of national interest is fragmented, and the traditional task of governments of presenting a coherent position for the whole state is made more difficult.

It must not be concluded that the extent of the fragmentation of the idea of the national interest is a measure of the decline of national governments in the European Communities. The point is rather that the Community method of decision making, by fragmenting the idea of national interest, has placed governments on their guard. They have lost something; compared with the general pattern of relations between governments in the 1930's and before, when *raisons d'état, Realpolitik*, and the zero-sum game mentality were the rule, they have lost a great deal. But the process of losing this much has encouraged a watchful defensiveness rather than posing a fundamental challenge to their existence.

It is arguable that governments constructed the institutions of Europe and defined their roles and their specific tasks within the Rome Treaty so as to make it easier for them to defend their interests as integration proceeded than it had been in the Federalist phase of 1950–1954. At the time of the negotiations in Brussels and in Rome, the Six realized that although they could agree in detail about tariff reductions, the creation of a Common Market, and the gradualist approach, there were many questions, for instance in agricultural policy, commercial

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policy, regional policy, and social policy, on which they could then only agree in outline. There was indeed an expectation that future compatibilities would allow detailed agreement, but there was no certainty that this would follow. It was agreed, therefore, that a mechanism would be created—namely, the Commission—which would draw up detailed proposals to which governments could respond at greater leisure.[4] The governments were in the position of being asked to agree to schemes which were put to them rather than initiating their own proposals. Their role was the responsive or defensive one of catching the ball rather than throwing it. From the beginning, the institutions of the Communities made it easy for national governments to adopt a defensive stand if they so wished; they were designed to allow a relatively undramatic, stonewalling approach if it happened that in practice the government's expectations of future compatibilities were unrealized. This defensive style is a characteristic and natural response of governments to the Communities rather than an unnatural departure from the intentions of the founders.

There are numerous examples of governments dragging their feet in the development of the European Communities. That is not unusual in diplomacy in international institutions. It is, however, perhaps paradoxical that the granting of unusual powers and the right of initiative to an independent body of international civil servants should be part of a deliberate strategy for making it easier for governments to reduce their level of cooperation or to resist further integration. It is not surprising though that, faced with a broadly uncooperative or defensive posture on the part of members, some governments became impatient and tried more desperate remedies. West Germany's procrastination on the arrangements for financing the Community's agricultural policy was probably one of the causes of France's partial withdrawal from the Communities in June 1965, at the onset of the crisis.[5] The Commission's proposals of March 1965 on institutional reform would probably have received the usual undramatic, defensive cold shoulder from the French had they not been linked with an issue about which the French Government felt strongly, and had agreement on this issue not already been considerably delayed in French eyes. The same kind of impatience was shown by West Germany before the Hague meeting of 1969. The occasional crisis is one of the dangers of the broadly

[4] For an account of the powers of the Commission, see Roy Pryce, *The Politics of the European Community* (London: Butterworths 1973), 55-64.

[5] Nina Heathcote, "The Crisis of European Supranationality," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, v (December 1966), 140-71.

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defensive posture in governments which is encouraged by the Communities' institutional arrangements. One may conclude that a characteristic dynamic of integration in Europe is the reaching of a critical level of impatience with partners as a result of their failure to provide perceived benefits.

The alternative would have been to attempt to draw up more detailed proposals for integrative arrangements in intergovernmental conferences. The record of such conferences in the Federalist phase, and, as will be shown below, in the Confederalist one, is not encouraging. When asked to involve themselves directly in the process of initiating integrative ventures, statesmen are too often carried away by the prospect of unbridled political creativity. They tend to overestimate their own capacity for agreement: the message is "marry in haste, repent at leisure." The long drawn-out miscarriage of the European Defense Community and of the European Political Community between 1952 and 1954 gave ample opportunity for governments to regret their earlier enthusiasms.[6] The Werner proposals for Economic and Monetary Union[7] and the Summit Conference of October 1972 may well prove to be additional examples of the same phenomenon. (Paradoxically, there are circumstances in which a form of supranationalism allows governments to defend their interests more consistently, while intergovernmentalism is a temptation to extravagant experiment.)

The most powerful pressure toward the adoption of a defensive posture in the Confederal phase, however, probably derives from the very success of the integration process. Governments in the European Communities no longer preside over states whose various "functional" tiers are largely coextensive. In many respects, states have been economically, legally, and politically penetrated by systems which extend throughout the area of the European Communities and, occasionally, beyond them. One result is that governments are now unable to take decisions which refer to their own territory without taking into account a range of influences, pressures, and sometimes rules which originate outside their own frontiers, and which they are unable to control. It has been calculated that in West Germany, "about two-thirds of all questions of agricultural policy . . . can no longer be made in a purely

[6] Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, eds., *France Defeats EDC* (London: Thames and Hudson 1957).

[7] Report to the Council and Commission on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community (Brussels: European Communities Information Service 1970).

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national context, but rather must be made within the decision-making structure of the agricultural system of the European Communities."[8] Upwards of 50 per cent of the external trade of members of the Communities is with other members. In member states, the law of the Communities has a status comparable with municipal law: in Britain, "Parliament has identified an area within which it intends to refrain from exercising its own legislative power."[9] Within the Communities, according to one commentator, are to be found about three thousand nongovernmental international organizations, including some powerful multinational companies—by far the largest concentration in the world.[10] It is hardly surprising that governments, when faced with these developments, have been pushed toward a more defensive posture.

Writing about relations between developed states in general, Edward Morse finds that "It is often concluded that the increases in national cohesiveness that accompany modernization counteract international interdependence. Actually the reverse is true." He elaborates, "as the levels of interdependence within a state rise, the same order of trade has increased implications for domestic employment, fiscal, monetary, and welfare policies."[11] Within the Communities, it may be concluded, the higher the level of trade with other members, the greater will be the impact of variations in their trade upon national attempts to control, for example, employment levels, interest rates, and welfare standards. It should be added that it is partly because of the development of higher levels of international interdependence that national cohesiveness increases; in reacting to increasing levels of international interdependence, governments seek to involve themselves in larger areas of national economic and social life. This reaction derives from their urge to defend themselves against international functional encroachment on their traditional domain; it is not just another example of governments' asserting their traditional powers.

These developments can be related to certain arguments about Functionalism: opponents of that approach to international organization have noted the tendency of an increasing range of activities within the

[8] Karl Kaiser, "Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics," *International Organization*, XXV (Autumn 1971), 799.

[9] Geoffrey Howe, "The European Communities Act 1972," *International Affairs*, Vol. 49 (January 1973), 6.

[10] See Kjell Skjelsbaek, "Transnational Associations and their Functions," in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., *Functionalism and International Relations: Theory and Practice* (London: University of London Press 1975).

[11] Edward L. Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization," *World Politics*, XXII (April 1970), 389.

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state to become politicized; governments are becoming more involved in activities within the state, and more questions seem subject to political controversy. Functionalists have said that integration would occur most easily in noncontentious and nonpolitical areas (which no one would deny) and, further, that as integration proceeded, a greater range of such noncontentious areas would manifest themselves. (David Mitrany, in fact, argues that political disagreement would tend to be about different issues—welfare rather than high politics—as integration proceeded; and he does not say that there would be no politics and no contention.)[12] It is readily accepted that governments have, indeed, become more involved in a greater range of issues within the state. But they have become involved in this Confederal phase of integration in part because of the earlier success of the Functional approach to integration; in part because of the practical requirements of integration which frequently demand decisions of governments about matters with which they were not previously directly concerned (such as the manner of drawing up the accounts of railroads); and in part because of factors such as modernization and the changing political culture. A much greater range of issues has international dimensions and implications for the standing of governments. It may be that Functionalism as a strategy for integration is less useful in the later phases of regional integration because governments have become increasingly sensitized to the political implications of integrative ventures. But they are so sensitized because of the past success of the Functional approach; in future, the chances of political decisions on establishing common institutions must depend upon political values which are also likely to be affected by functional interdependencies. It should also be stressed—and this point will be explored at greater length later—that the pervasiveness of governmental intervention is not the same thing as the ability to control or dominate. Functionalism as a strategy for integration should be related to the specific conditions of the phase of integration, and criticism in this context should not be crudely interpreted as a comment upon the general validity of the approach.

To what extent, then, has the condition of the Europe of the Confederal phase been affected by the defensive postures of member governments? (It is necessary to distinguish at this stage between the *scope* and the *level* of integration: scope refers to the horizontal extent

[12] See Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (reprinted with other essays, Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1966); analysis in Paul Taylor, "The Functionalist Approach to the Problem of International Order: A Defence," *Political Studies*, XVI (October 1968), 393-409.

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of integration, the number of functional areas which are linked together in some way within the larger territory; level refers to the manner in which the areas are organized—in particular, the extent to which they are ruled from new centers which can act independently of governments.) A salient feature of Confederal Europe is that the scope of integration is extensive (a wide range of matters has been brought within the integrated area), but the level of integration is low. It is very difficult to show that there has been any significant transfer of authority to the Brussels institutions; they can take decisions on a range of questions, particularly the management of the common agricultural policy, but these powers are exercised within the framework of policies agreed on by national governments and only with their approval. Another outstanding feature is that the low level of integration, the fact that national governments retain ultimate control, has to be balanced by the habits of cooperation on a significant range of questions and of using established procedures, and by the development of pressures toward agreement in cooperative arrangements. The Communities Bill legally preserved the sovereignty of the British Parliament, but in the view of Mitchell, Kuipers, and Gall it is likely to lead to the entrenchment of the practice of parliamentary acceptance of Community decisions in Britain, much as the Statute of Westminster of 1931 entrenched the practice of accepting the independence of Commonwealth governments.[13] Pressures toward agreement derive from public expectations, the high level of interdependence, and the range of regional constraints. The Europe of this Confederal phase of integration is therefore decentralized but highly interdependent, potentially autarchic but in practice united by entrenched practices of consultation.

A second theme which emerges from an examination of the Confederal phase of integration is that of the "managed *Gesellschaft*." The central features of this system are the undermining of the hierarchy of actors and interests, both at the national and the European level and, as a corollary, the legitimization of an increasing range of interests which are fed into the political arena. The development of mechanisms for the management of relations between existing actors of more or less equal status, whose interests are generally seen as having more or less equal validity, is increasingly the condition for stability.

[13] J. D. B. Mitchell, S. A. Kuipers, and B. Gall, "Constitutional Aspects of the Treaty and Legislation Relating to British Membership," *Common Market Law Review*, IX (May 1972), 141-47.

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It is not that all interests are in principle equally worthy or just, and that this is part of the essential condition of society; but rather, that they have come to be accepted as such, at least in part because of the integration process.

A large number of interest groups, the activities of which cut across national frontiers, have emerged in the area of the European Communities. There is also an increasingly dense range of international interdependence and interaction. Compared with developments at the level of organizations and transactions, there has been but a weak development of positive identification with the institutions of Europe. At the same time, governments are no longer able to marshal popular support or tolerance in the way that was once possible. Changes in popular attitudes have helped to undermine the authority of governments; there is, for instance, likely to be a greater measure of disagreement about what constitutes a crisis in national politics. As was pointed out earlier, the Community method of decision making has encouraged groups within the state to articulate their interests and to judge them as equally valid with those of governments. This undermining of the hierarchy of interests, as well as the fracturing of the earlier agreement about priorities among values and attitudes within the state, has contributed to the reduction of the status of governments in the Community's political system. Despite the increasing pervasiveness of government activity, the authority and status of governments seem to be declining.

Dissatisfaction with existing conditions within a particular state is reinforced by comparison with conditions in other states; claims—which may even challenge the authority of governments—are legitimized. The developments of May 1968 in France, and the success of the workers there in achieving unprecedented increases in wages, certainly sharpened the appetites of trade unionists in other European states and reinforced their determination to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth. Indeed, the events of May 1968 have been considered as the real starting point of the tendency toward higher wage claims, thought to have contributed so much to inflation in many European states. Expectations within the Communities, and the fact that transmission of demands is made easier by the extensive range of interdependencies and transnational links, have aided the process of fracturing the national interest and helped to undermine the hierarchy of interests within the states.

The development of extensive international interdependencies has

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also made it more difficult for governments to control their economies effectively. Since the late sixties, the issue of an ever-increasing rate of inflation has been added to the traditional problems, such as control of the business cycle, regional development, and balance-of-payments difficulties. In essence, the problem of control which governments are facing is that the number of tasks exceeds the number of mechanisms for control which are available. Some mechanisms for controlling the economy have become insensitive and incapable of fine tuning, or to be effective, would involve increasingly unacceptable social costs. The impact of the use of demand-management upon inflation, for instance, has been reduced by the increasing power of trade unions and by the view that it would probably not be effective without unacceptably high levels of unemployment. Control of balance-of-payments deficits by increasing tariffs or by adjusting exchange rates has also become a less straightforward affair: within the Community, tariff adjustments cannot as a rule be made unilaterally and in any case, increased tariff levels might have adverse effects, both directly and indirectly, upon foreign trade, and consequently upon levels of production. The devaluation of currencies to improve terms of trade and adjust a balance-of-payments deficit is also likely, in present circumstances, to increase the level of inflation. Those countries in the Communities which have let their currencies float downward have higher levels of inflation than those which stayed with the "snake in the tunnel." According to one influential theory, the control of inflation is made more difficult by an international transmission mechanism: the price of manufactured goods, and hence of wages in the industrial sector, is defined in the context of the international market; wages in the service sector are jacked up to compare with those in the industrial sector; but because this is not matched by a corresponding increase in the quantity of goods entering the market place, it has the effect of inflating prices. The elimination of the international mechanisms by which inflation is transferred by increasing tariffs, for instance (thus lowering dependence on world trade), would involve unacceptable costs by decreasing productivity and increasing unemployment, and so on, for all but the biggest states.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that international interdependencies make it more difficult for national governments to control their economies. As the Nine have a greater range of interdependencies with each other than with outsiders, it might be argued that the development of the European Communities has added to the difficulty. The

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importance of this development for the status of governments cannot be overstressed: it means that they are now removed from that position of command over the levers of economic power which was one of the hallmarks of government. And this has happened precisely at a time when economic success—the ability to deliver the goods—has been the main test of political virtue. In this sense, they have been reduced in status. It means also that, in trying to compensate for the loss of mechanisms of control, governments are increasingly pushed toward what might be called *government by alliance*. The condition of successful government is the arrangement of an effective alliance or set of alliances with other governments in order to achieve specific objectives. Furthermore, governments may enter into arrangements with other organized groups, involving negotiations and concessions on their demands in return for help with the running of the economy.

The failure of the last Conservative government in Britain to exercise authority over other groups, and to exercise the mandate to govern which it thought it had received from the electorate, was predictable. The successor Labour government's "social compact" with the trade unions reflected a clearer understanding of national governments' limited capacity for controlling their own affairs independently in the context of the European Communities.

Two developments which affected the status of governments adversely have now been identified; they are each partly attributable, though not exclusively so, to membership in the European Communities. Membership has contributed to the weakening of the *Gemeinschaft* in the nation-state, has helped to undermine the hierarchy of values and attitudes, and has reduced the authority of governments. Membership has also exacerbated the problem of control over national economies and has disposed governments to seek alliances with other organized groups in an attempt to regain control. The weakening of agreed values in the state, the declining authority of governments, and the reduction of the effectiveness of their mechanisms for control have encouraged organized groups to increase their demands on governments, and to view their own and the governments' interests as possessing an equal validity. The Community links have certainly contributed to these developments.

There is, however, no tendency for governments to be eliminated as actors from the European *Gesellschaft*. In fact, their right to remain as actors has, if anything, been reinforced by developments in the Communities over recent years. The absence of a *Gemeinschaft* at the

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European level means that there is no means of establishing the priority of any one set of interests and no way of deciding whether any actor should be eliminated from the system. As has been implied, it is accepted that satisfaction of any one interest depends upon the construction of appropriate alliances of power and influence between groups, including governments, rather than upon a government's ability to relate specific demands to a general interest. This is as true at the Communities level as at the national one. The Commission of the European Communities—the main independent, active element in the Brussels institutions—has in effect renounced its claim to be a rival center of authority, a putative European government. It has accepted the role of *actor*, like any other in the European *Gesellschaft*, with the specific task of encouraging European arrangements and encouraging alliances to solve particular problems. In other words, it no longer sets out to challenge national governments. In helping them to define their interests and to form alliances, it reinforces their right to exist. The total effect has been an equalization of the hierarchy of actors both at the national and at the European level.

The character of the Commission and the major features of decision making in the Communities have come to reflect the abandonment of the ambition to build at Brussels a centralized European government—a development which mirrors at the European level the changing status of governments at the national one. It can be said that before 1965, the Commission was self-consciously defining a European interest, and that it was active in initiating policies for European integration and creating the norms of the European would-be polity. That was the period of optimism in the Commission about the building of a more centralized Europe, a mood—for it was largely a question of mood rather than actual achievement or method—sustained by the personality and ideas of Walter Hallstein. It was he who, in the beginning of 1965, told a group of American journalists that he could be seen as a kind of European Prime Minister.[14] The crisis later in 1965 marked the deflation of this optimism: the resistance to the Commission's proposals of March 1965 for expanding the powers of the institutions, and the confirmation of the powers of European governments in relation to Brussels (of which the French Government was the instrument), led to a period, between 1965 and 1969, in which the Commission's mood was subdued. During that time, the dominant features of the Commission's method were a relatively passive involve-

[14] *Common Market*, v (September 1965), 190.

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ment in the process of mediation between the governments, and the execution of agreed policies. The Commission of the European Communities had been recreated in a more traditional style of international bureaucracy.[15]

After the Hague Conference of the Heads of States and Governments of the Six, in December 1969, a third style of Commission involvement in decision making in Europe began to emerge. It combined the greater energy of the first period with the purpose of the second: the Commission began more actively to seek the reaching of agreements between governments; it began to see its role as the bringing together of actors the separateness of which it recognized, and it accepted the status of "interest group," as governments were having that status in the Communities thrust upon them. In addition, the Commission actively sought to coordinate the work of Europe's institutions, even those strictly outside the framework of the Communities, and to manage the *Gesellschaft.* The Commission's ambition to transcend the other actors in defining Europe seemed to weaken, but there was no loss of energy in attempting to build agreements among them. This role of the Commission is another of the features of the Confederal phase of integration.

The range of initiatives taken by the governments of the Six at The Hague in December 1969 signalled the arrival of a new kind of politics between governments in the Communities. The Government of West Germany under the leadership of Willy Brandt showed signs of having abandoned the role of "economic giant and political dwarf." A range of factors such as the success of the Ostpolitik and the new approach towards détente, the abandonment of the Hallstein doctrine, and the energy and political standing of the German Chancellor contributed toward a new forcefulness in German diplomacy. The relative decline in France from the high plateau of economic and political power in 1967 under President de Gaulle made the resurgence of West Germany more striking. At the summit, it was the Chancellor rather than de Gaulle's successor, President Pompidou, who proved to be the dominant statesman.[16] The range of proposals for further integration which emerged from the Hague meeting was the first fruit of a phase of integration which, because of the German recovery, was marked

[15] David Coombes, *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community* (London: Allen and Unwin 1970).

[16] See account in Uwe Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion* (London: Thames and Hudson 1973), 68-72.

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by much more intensive diplomatic activity, at a higher level, than there had been in the Communities since 1958. The German interest and activity were instrumental in demonstrating that diplomacy and the convergence of diplomatic objectives were now the touchstone of success in the integration process. The Commission was faced with a new situation in which, paradoxically, the condition of further progress towards integration was the reassertion of the separate identity of the government actors and their engagement in a higher level of diplomacy than had hitherto been the case. It could but respond to their new awareness of themselves and their interest in integration, and seek to adjust to the new intergovernmental machinery which they created.

The impact of the new phase of integration upon the Commission and its role in decision making in the Communities was clearly visible by the time of the enlargement of the Communities and the accession of three new members, including Britain, in January 1973. The Commission of Thirteen under President Ortoli is different in many respects from its predecessors. The membership of Britain in the Communities has strengthened the idea of the informal representativeness of individual commissioners. It is certainly not suggested that any members of the Commission or their staff are in receipt of specific instructions, but member governments aim to get their men into positions of responsibility for areas in which they are particularly interested. Since the advent of British membership, the notion that European commissioners should in some way strive for the definition of the pure form of European interest has been weakened, though probably as yet not entirely dropped. It was no accident that responsibility for two areas in which the British Government is particularly interested was allocated to British commissioners: George Thomson has responsibility for regional questions, and Christopher Soames is in charge of relations between the Communities and the developed countries.

The danger that the ascendancy of governments might lead to a decline in the caliber of individual commissioners and a mood of dull resignation, as had happened previously, has on the whole been avoided precisely because of the active and continuous involvement of diplomacy in questions of integration. Because of their awareness of the importance of integration to their separate interests, governments have appointed men of high ability to the Commission. At the same time, it was inevitable that a phase of integration which stressed diplomacy and the rights of individual actors should spawn institutions which

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did not necessarily accrue to the center in Brussels. The Commission has had to make the task of coordinating the work of intergovernmental institutions a much more important part of its work: it has set itself the task of managing the *Gesellschaft* rather than of obtaining higher levels of unity under more centralized institutions.

Accordingly, the governments of the Nine now frequently meet for discussions outside the framework of the Communities' institutions—in the Davignon framework on questions of foreign policy, and in meetings of Economic Ministers and Finance Ministers. At the summit meeting of October 1972 it was agreed that Ministers of Foreign Affairs should henceforth meet four times a year;[17] discussions about the nature and location of a permanent political secretariat continued into 1974. The Commission's response has been to expand the practice, which was developed in relation to the Council of Ministers, of sitting in on all meetings and, as formulated when the Communities were the Six, of "acting as a seventh member." The convention is that members of the Commission also attend the intergovernmental meetings: Wilhelm Haferkamp (Germany) and Henri Simonet (Belgium) represent the Commission at the meetings of Ministers of Economics and Finance which are held outside the framework of the Communities; President Ortoli and the Secretary-General of the Commission, Emile Noel, are responsible for maintaining links between the Commission and the member-states group for political cooperation (The Davignon Committee). These are indications of the way in which the Commission has evolved as a coordinating element in a more dispersed system of decision making.

Thus, the Commission, in relation to developments at the European level, has in some ways become more like governments at the national level. It has found itself unable to sustain its claim of being a putative European government which would accede to an unusual authority and power as national governments lose some of their traditional functions within the state. Half-hearted (and unsuccessful) attempts have been made to amend the Treaty of Rome under the terms of Article 236, so that new areas could be brought within the framework of the Treaty, protecting the cohesiveness of the control institutions.[18] The Commission and governments have in a way become more like each

[17] *Communiqué of the Summit Conference of the Heads of State of the New Europe in Paris*, October 19-20, 1972 (Brussels: European Communities Information Service), par. 14.

[18] See President Ortoli's Introduction to the *Sixth General Report of the Communities* (Brussels: European Communities Information Service, February 1973), 4.

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other as actors, seeking alliances with other actors as one condition of success, and attempting to extend their presence in striving for proper coordination and management. Like national governments, the Commission has also sought alliances with its so-called "social partners," trade union federations and the representatives of the national confederations of industry in Brussels. It may be that in addition to the pressures of the European Communities, there is a vast range of influences deriving from the processes of modernization and the development of the welfare state, which affect governments and the Commission alike, and which are conducive toward the same changes in their status as actors. Among these are the development of attitudes and values, in national leaders and in commissioners, which tend to be managerial and technocratic in style and dispose them to see the major test of their success in the growth of material standards. The experience and style of the European Communities has certainly reinforced these attitudes.

In this Confederal phase of integration, what are the implications of the "managed" *Gesellschaft* for proposals for improving the European institutions and the quality of integration?

Despite pessimism about prospects of centralization, there are considerable opportunities for improving the quality of coordination between the various actors and for tackling specific problems, such as those of obtaining greater representativeness and greater responsibility in decision-making institutions. The earlier institutional fundamentalism of the Commission has in practice been gradually abandoned over a number of years. This is in line with the undermining of the hierarchy of actors both at the national and at the European level. It may now be appropriate for the Commission to extend its direct consultation and involvement to actors other than those who exist at the European level: in the "managed *Gesellschaft*" there is no justification for giving precedence to one over the other. In practice, some interest groups within the state are already directly consulted: a range of problems, such as the coordination of consumer protection and the easing of links between universities, national medical organizations, accountants, and so on, demand the establishment of direct links between appropriate national actors and the center. It should be formally accepted now that European umbrella organizations need not always have priority in Commission consultations. The technique of the marginal adjustment of existing national practice to ease contacts or to obtain necessary harmonization, rather than the laying down of community

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rules, is one of the concomitants of greater contact between Brussels and the parts.

The theme of the management of relations between diverse actors may be extended into the fields of control over community "legislation" and the improvement of methods for representing wider interests in the decision-making process, as well as for increasing the responsibility of central organs. The first step should be for the Commission to spend much more time in following the passage of legislation through national parliaments and to investigate prospects for strengthening its own role as an interest group at the national level. By what means could it seek to bring about changes in proposed legislation so that inconsistencies or clashes with legislation of other states in the same area could be minimized?[19] Could it also promote, possibly through direct contact with individual MP's or party organizations, the introduction of legislation into national parliaments? This might be particularly useful in areas where adequate European standards of goods or services are compatible with existing national procedure, structures, or customs.

The reaching of such "adequate European standards" through national parliamentary activity under the guidance of the Commission could be attained by the more frequent use, in the Council of Ministers, of directives which are binding as to their objectives but leave the choice of means to the agent. The more frequent use of the *directive* rather than the regulation as a form of decision making in the Council of Ministers is clearly compatible with the nature of the "managed *Gesellschaft*," in that it allows greater discretion to the law-making and administrative institutions within the states.[20]

A further step would improve the techniques by which national parliaments might exercise control over the performance of their governments in Community institutions such as the Council of Ministers. Different national constitutional and political systems present different kinds of difficulties in the exercise of this task. (It is probably easier in assembly systems with coalition governments than in the parliamentary system of the United Kingdom.)[21] The Danish Parlia-

[19] In this area, a special role for the Commission is foreseen in the making of "parallel legislation," a notion which has been developed in the context of the Communities by Otto Kahn-Freund.

[20] See Emile Noel, *How the European Community's Institutions Work*, Community Topics 38 (London: European Communities Information Service 1972).

[21] Coalition governments tend to reflect the kind of agreements which parties can make between themselves in the Assembly: to subject ministers in Brussels to controls

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ment's method of asking its representatives in the Council not to depart from an agreed mandate without the permission of an inter-party parliamentary committee—itself on 24-hour call during meetings of the Council—is an approach which might also be considered in other states. The habit of debating Community policy in national assemblies (as, for example, in the Dutch Parliament on the proposal to introduce Value Added Tax), could also be encouraged: it would support the process of parallel legislation in the various national legislatures in the Community. It is even conceivable that debates in national assemblies could be held at the same time, so that preceding discussions would have a cross-fertilization effect, and transnational party contacts would be given additional point. Meetings between, say, representatives of left-wing parties in Europe would probably have greater significance if each party faced similar issues at the same time in national assemblies. The aim would be to intermesh the politics of national assemblies.

Who knows how far this process of linking together the various diverse actors could go in the "managed *Gesellschaft*"? Provision could be made for the linking of national assemblies by television and radio as debates proceeded. It might even be possible to arrange for the taking of votes in plenary meetings at the same time: in this way a very clear expression of the collective will of the elected representatives of the European people could emerge. And, most important, the technique used for expressing that will would respect the integrity of the national actors: their survival as actors would be an important aspect of the system. National assemblies could further their control over ministers in the Council and at the same time be more immediately involved in the European political systems.

These are but a few of the conceivable implications of a "managed *Gesellschaft*" for the institutions of the European Communities. If realized, they would lead to a completely new kind of constitutional political order in Europe, the features of which can be but dimly perceived. Nevertheless, they are closely attuned to the structural and behavioral realities of Western Europe during this Confederal phase of integration. One is tempted to rephrase the saying—*plus c'est la même chose, plus ça change*.

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by an inter-party committee is not so very different from what already happens at home. Ministers in the British parliamentary system, and in the French Fifth Republic, however, would be unused to receiving instructions from any formally constituted all-party committee.

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The third theme in this account of the Confederal phase of integration in Europe is the oscillation between advanced schemes for integration and retreats into national independence which may be found in the stated intentions of governments. That such oscillation exists is not difficult to demonstrate; the reasons for its existence are more difficult to uncover. It does, however, have implications for the chances of increasing the scope, as distinct from the level, of integration.

The Communiqué of the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government at The Hague, on December 1 and 2, 1969, led to a number of real achievements. At The Hague, the member governments indicated "their agreement to the opening of negotiations between the Community on the one hand and the applicant states on the other."[22] They were prepared "to progressively replace the contributions of member countries by the Community's own resources" and "to lay down a definitive financial arrangement for the common agricultural policy by the end of 1969";[23] they agreed that "a plan in stages should be worked out during 1970 with a view to the creation of an economic and monetary union";[24] they reaffirmed their readiness "to continue more intensively the activities of the Community with a view to co-ordinating and promoting industrial research and development in the principal advanced sectors";[25] and they instructed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to "study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification."[26] A significant number of these proposals were implemented in some sense: they led to the opening of negotiations with four states and the accession of three, including Britain; they started discussions which led to the *Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary Provisions of the Treaties* . . . of April 22, 1970, by which the Community was allowed its own resources, and the powers of the Assembly on budgetary questions were increased; and they led to the setting up of the Davignon framework for the discussion of foreign policy.[27] They did not lead to a Community industrial policy, but they did lead to the setting up of the Werner Committee and the issuing, on October 15, 1970, of its report on European "Economic and Monetary Union" by 1980.

But there is also a sense in which the Hague meeting began the

[22] *Communiqué of the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government at The Hague*, December 1 and 2, 1969 (Brussels: European Communities Information Service), par. 13.

[23] *Ibid.*, par. 5. [24] *Ibid.*, par. 8. [25] *Ibid.*, par. 9. [26] *Ibid.*, par. 15.

[27] Gerhard Mally, *The European Community in Perspective: The New Europe, the United States, and the World* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1973), 196-98.

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oscillation effect which became so evident later on. In questions which affected the scope of integration there was, in the main, success; but in matters which seemed to threaten to change the level of integration there was much less progress. The terms of the Treaty of April 1970 on the powers of the European Assembly over the Community's budget after 1975 have been the subject of endless reinterpretation: a maximalist interpretation, which a careful reading of the Treaty certainly justifies,[28] is that after 1975 the Assembly will have the final say on the Community's budget, which by then will include all tariffs, agricultural levies, and up to 1 per cent of VAT, and that it could legally reject the budget as a whole if it so decided. (This right is seen as applying to the whole budget regardless of whether parts of it have been previously "regulated" by the Council; the Assembly could not, however, re-allocate expenditure among various parts of the budget in the regulated sector.) The minimalist interpretation on the other hand is that the Assembly's right to reject applies only to the administrative budget, about 12 per cent of the whole.[29] This disagreement has yet to be resolved; it is worth mentioning that the French Government, having signed the original Treaty—the wording of which is hard to misunderstand—now supports the minimalist position, while the Assembly itself, with rather weak support from the smaller states in the Communities, supports the maximalist one. The proposals for monetary and economic union by 1980, though they have occasionally promised to come to something—as in the Council Resolution of February 1971[30]—have similarly resulted in very little real achievement so far. The "snake in the tunnel" approach to monetary alignment, by which members tried to keep their currencies in a closer relationship with each other than with outside currencies—particularly the dollar—was only partially successful: by 1974 several members of the Communities had opted out of the snake.

The Communiqué of the Summit Conference of October 1972 promised more than the Hague Conference, but led to the achievement of considerably less. It was also much more detailed and explicit in its promises than the earlier communiqué. The member states "affirmed

[28] *Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary Provisions . . .* as presented to Parliament, January 1972, Cmnd. 4867, 8-9.

[29] David Coombes and Ilka Wiebecke, *The Power of the Purse in the European Communities* (London: PEP/Chatham House 1972).

[30] *Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on Economic and Monetary Union* (Brussels: European Communities Information Service 1971).

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their intention to transform before the end of the present decade the whole complex of their relations into a European union";[31] and they "reaffirmed their determination to base the development of their Community on democracy, freedom of opinion, and the free movement of people and ideas."[32] To achieve this, the Community was to have a regional policy, a social policy, and an industrial policy, *inter alia*. The member states agreed to reinforce the Community's institutions and "to strengthen the powers of control of the European Parliamentary Assembly" (though not by direct elections).[33] More specifically, "they decided to institute before April 1973, by solemn instrument, based on the EEC Treaty, a European Monetary Cooperation Fund which will be administered by a Committee of Governors of Central Banks." The Fund was to manage the "snake" and "multilateralize positions resulting from interventions in Community currencies and the multilateralization of inter-Community settlements."[34] It was subsequently agreed that the Fund would acquire reserves from the Central Banks of member states.

Very few of these objectives had been achieved by the middle of 1974. There was no regional fund and no industrial policy; the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, though it had materialized as scheduled on April 1, 1973, had no funds and little work to do. There had been some detailed adjustments in the organization of the relationship between the Council and the Assembly; in particular, the Council agreed to wait for the view of the Assembly before itself making a decision on major questions. But no significant formal re-arrangement had taken place.[35] It now seemed that the high hopes for economic and monetary union, and for "European Union" by the end of the decade, were further from realization than they had been in 1969. The gulf between ambitions and achievement was wide: governments oscillated between statements of high ambition and statements that seemed to reflect their determination to go it alone. At party conferences, such as that of the Conservatives in Britain in 1971, nationalist sentiments were restated *and* European unity proclaimed; the French Government continued to assert its independence and at the same time to demand a form of unification. The energy crisis of late

[31] *Communiqué of the Summit Conference* (fn. 17), par. 7, Preamble.
[32] *Ibid.*, par. 1, Preamble.
[33] *Ibid.*, par. 15.
[34] *Ibid.*, par. 2.
[35] The Commission produced a number of suggestions for detailed improvements in the work of the Assembly. See *Communication to the European Parliament* (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, May 30, 1973), Com. (73) 999.

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1973 and 1974 produced a new harvest of statements of unilateral intent.

One reason for this oscillation effect is the confusion in the minds of European statesmen between questions about the level of integration and questions about the scope of integration. On the one hand, there is the awareness of advantages to be gained from further integrative measures; there are problems to be solved and also, of course, prizes to be won. In summit conferences, statesmen are liable to be particularly impressed by the advantages of working together; the accession of Great Britain has been the occasion of several such meetings. Once generated, a particular set of diplomatic initiatives acquires a dynamic and creates an ethos of its own, working through national bureaucracies and Community institutions, and is added to the material temptations and more idealistic promptings of the summit. Furthermore, as the Neofunctionalists have suggested, some technical problems in relations between integrating states can undoubtedly be solved by further integration.

Once away from the conference table, however, different factors may swing the pendulum to the side of doubt: a reassertion of what is conceived as the special interest of governments takes place. It is, of course, possible to argue that the proposals for integration were thwarted by practical considerations, by the world economic crisis of 1971 and the world energy crisis, and by the mundane factor of disagreement about means rather than ends. There have also been occasions when doubts were reinforced by electoral considerations. In West Germany, Willy Brandt and his successor, Helmut Schmidt, had to bear in mind the unpopularity of appearing to subsidize the French economy or the British regions. And in Britain, the minority Labour government of Harold Wilson, which succeeded Edward Heath's Conservative government in February 1974, reflected the doubts of the British Left about Europe and tried to gain popular support by maintaining a critical attitude toward the Communities and seeking to renegotiate the terms of accession. Yet, world events, disagreements among economists in Germany and monetarists in France, and even electoral considerations are not the only, or even the major, reasons for contention among the member governments of the European Communities. They may indeed be only the immediate "trigger" or superficial expression of a more profound pressure toward intergovernmental strife.

The reassertion of the separate interests of governments has also

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been bound up with the peculiar vulnerability that intensive interdependence creates. States which are interdependent are exposed to exploitation by each other because of the very high cost which severing the relationship would entail. As Richard Rosecrance points out, each partner acquires hostages from the other.[36] It is therefore natural that statesmen, faced with the prospect of strengthening a diplomatic weapon which could be used against them, will hesitate to accept further interdependence and will seek a marginal capacity for independence. It is also natural that, once extensive interdependencies have developed, doubts about further integration will be greater if the next steps appear to involve a sacrifice of governmental control to the center—and there are many who argue that this is indeed involved in economic and monetary union—and to increase the threat to their survival as actors. The oscillation effect is the result of a very complex set of diplomatic pressures which are characteristic of relations between governments involved in close interdependencies. It revolves around the paradox that interdependence involves a capacity for independence.

However, these pressures are only partly based on the reality of the political situation which now prevails in the European Communities. The difficulty is that statesmen have become convinced that it is now virtually impossible to act in Europe without transferring greater authority to the center—that the *scope* of integration cannot be increased without significantly increasing its *level*. In this view, statesmen and the Commission are probably wrong: they are the victims partly of their own rhetoric in more euphoric moments and partly of a mistaken strategy by the Commission which has not yet been entirely abandoned. Statesmen have been taken in by their own assertion of being "one," and believe that this must mean the birth of some transcendental European entity; the Commission, in continuously reminding statesmen of the relevance of practical questions to political unity and in arguing that a particular question is indeed political and that it must necessarily be transferred to the center, has succeeded only in warning statesmen of possible dangers and of frightening them into confusing questions about the level with questions about the scope of

[36] In a public lecture at the London School of Economics and Political Science, in May 1974, Rosecrance argued that one of the consequences of interdependence was the placing of some of the goods or personnel of one state on the territory of other states. These could be compared with "hostages," which increased in numbers as interdependence increased, and their possession could be exploited by the host country against the "donor" country. A similar argument is developed in his *International Relations: Peace or War?* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1973), 291-92.

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integration. In discussing this danger, Ralf Dahrendorf has particularly blamed the Functionalist approach to integration and the Commission's acceptance of it. He criticizes the strategy of integration which poses a necessary link between one level of integration and the next, and which maintains that governments are led inevitably from a Common Agricultural Policy to monetary union, and thence to "political union by 1980." He labels any such gradualist strategy "Functionalist."[37]

Individual governments and the Commission seem to be equally responsible for this impasse; it is surely incorrect to blame Functionalism in general for some of the errors in the strategy of integration which have been suggested mainly by interpretations of one of its offsprings, namely, Neofunctionalism. It should be recalled also that governments were tempted into extravagant and unfulfilled ambitions in the early fifties without any help from Functionalists or Neofunctionalists. And the oldest style of Functionalism, that of Mitrany, would certainly lead the Commission to develop a strategy such as is recommended by Dahrendorf—of concentrating entirely on questions of scope, and of avoiding the "necessary logic" of European political integration.

Among the consequences of that mistaken strategy is a tendency to reduce the chances of attempting specific solutions to specific problems. As Dahrendorf has pointed out, the Community's regional policy, for instance, concerns at least three different kinds of regional problems which could more conveniently be tackled separately: the problem of unindustrialized areas, the problem of declining areas of old industry, and the problem of agricultural areas.[38] The European Monetary Fund could be separated from the proposals contained in the Werner Plan, and could probably be launched and given a role in the European community of states if governments were not afraid that it would increase the level of integration and tend toward "political union by

[37] *Plädoyer für die Europäische Union* (Munich: Piper Verlag 1973). Dahrendorf does not distinguish between the older style of Functionalism of Mitrany and its derivatives, particularly Neofunctionalism as developed in the 1960's by such scholars as Ernst B. Haas. Those who advertise the "necessary logic" of political union, within the Commission and outside it, are influenced more by Neofunctionalism, although it is not suggested that this was the intention of the Neofunctionalist theorists. The "necessary logic" approach was the result of an uncritical adaptation for purposes of political strategy, by those involved with the European Communities, of the Neofunctionalists' scholarly account of the ways in which a regional political system might be described and explained. For an analysis and critique of both approaches, see Groom and Taylor (fn. 10).

[38] Dahrendorf (fn. 37), 86.

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1980" (surely one of the most debilitating political slogans yet invented).

The danger is that the chances of doing something about practical matters will be reduced by lumping various issues together and defining a relationship to a conceived end-situation. Achievements in the *scope* of integration are endangered by inventing a "necessary" relationship with the *level* of integration. Both Commission and governments should concentrate upon the short-step, problem-solving approach and should avoid crippling intimations of federalism. The hope is that the oscillation effect which is characteristic of a Confederal Europe can be damped down, though its elimination is probably impossible in a situation in which governments survive as actors.

These then are the major features of the Confederal phase of European integration. Each theme illustrates characteristics of the actors, the system, and the behavior of governments. The themes also link with particular kinds of proposals for changing the nature of integration and for tackling specific problems in the present phase. It is essential that the proposals and any theory which is explored as the source of strategy of further integration be related to this specific phase of the process.

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TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

By CHONG-DO HAH and JEFFREY MARTIN*

I. Introduction

IN an age in which colonialism has been dramatically eroded and decolonized nations are asserting themselves in the international arena, it is often suggested that nationalism is the foundation for their development. Although there is general agreement on the importance of this concept, no such agreement exists on a theory which explains how nationalism has developed. The literature of nationalism may be divided into two competing general theories: one which views nationalism as a process of successive integration of social groups and another which views nationalism as a process of conflicting relations among social groups. A systematic analysis of these two theories of nationalism, however, will indicate that they should not be viewed as competing. Since they tap different aspects of the same phenomenon, their synthesis can generate a more powerful theory of nationalism.

NATIONALISM: A DEFINITION

Underlying much of the confusion in the literature on nationalism is the absence of an accepted definition of the concept. According to one source, the term was first defined in 1836 as a form of "national sentiment."[1] This orientation gave rise to mysticism where science should have been. Nationalism was alternately thought of as a communal spirit which infused a populace with fellowship or as a demonic emotion which could only be sated by the aggrandizement of national power.[2] It has also been defined as a doctrine which held that "hu-

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[1] G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, "Liberalism, Nationalism, Socialism: The Birth of Three Words," *Review of Politics*, XXXII (April 1970), 147-66.

[2] For examples of the former see Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism, Myth and Reality* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World 1955), 10; Richard Pfloff, "The Function of Arab Nationalism," *Comparative Politics*, II (January 1970), 150; Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: Macmillan 1960), 10; E. Shillto, "The Religion of Nationalism," *Hibbert Journal*, XXX (October 1931), 22; and Hans J. Kohn, *The*

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manity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government."[3] These definitions may be useful for obtaining a general impression of what nationalism is, but they do not specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an application of the term. As Silvert says, "To state that something exists as a feeling or idea and then hazily to add that this ideational commitment leads to overt political action leaves out the proof of the relationship. To find out how nationalism grows as idea and action, where it stands in the ordering of social events, and what its complex components and types of manifestations may be demands a different kind of definition."[4] For this reason, we propose the following definition: *nationalism consists of organizationally heightened and articulated group demands directed toward securing control of the distributive system in a society.*

The above definition suggests five necessary and collectively sufficient conditions for the development of nationalism. In that respect, it represents an improvement upon previous conceptions of nationalism. First, the definition specifies that demands must be *organizationally heightened.* As Fishman suggests, nationalism is a structured response to common social influences. A degree of organization among the involved groups is essential for goal-directed activity.[5] Second, nationalism is composed of *articulated demands* rather than sentiment or ideology. Consequently, it is possible to distinguish it from sentiments such as patriotism and yet perceive it to be related to certain attitudinal

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Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan 1945), 16. Several scholars have emphasized the negative, often evil, aspects of nationalism, among them Julius Braunthal, *The Paradox of Nationalism* (London: St. Botolph 1946), 7, and Frederick Hertz, "The Nature of Nationalism," *Social Forces,* XIX (March 1941), 412. For an excellent discussion explaining the historian's propensity to inject mysticism and prejudice into the study of nationalism, see David M. Potter, "Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," *American Historical Review,* Vol. 67 (July 1962), 924-50.

[3] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson 1971), 9. Robert I. Rotberg, among others, advances the argument that the mere achievement of independence by a territory does not demonstrate the working ethos of nationalism within it. That is to say that the ideological conception of nationalism articulated by Kedourie is begging the question in that it assumes what is yet to be proven. See Rotberg, "African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* IV (May 1966), 46.

[4] K. H. Silvert, *Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development* (New York: Vintage 1963), 46. For a comprehensive critique of conceptions of nationalism, see Anthony B. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Harper and Row 1971).

[5] Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and Nationalism* (Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House 1972), 5.

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dispositions.[6] This condition suggests that nationalism is both observable and measurable. Third, *groups* are the carriers of nationalism. We would not expect these demands to be randomly distributed throughout society; in each society, they tend to be articulated by different groups. Fourth, the demands are for the *control* of the distributive system in a society. This finding derives from Karl Deutsch's statement that a nationality "is a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over its members."[7] Nationalism, therefore, requires that a group undertake action to control its mode of life. Finally, demands for control are made for the *distributive system in a society*. In Lenski's words, "the struggle for power and privilege involves not only struggles between individuals and classes, it also involves struggles between class systems, and thus between different principles of distribution."[8] The allocation of power and privilege may be based upon different principles in different societies; an individual's position in one social ranking or status system does not necessarily determine or coincide with his location in other status systems.[9] Thus, a general theory of nationalism should not have to seek a common denominator in its specification of the dominant nationalist group.[10] The character of nationalist groups will vary among societies with different principles of distribution. The stipulation that the demands must be made for the control of the distribution system of a society rather than some other level of aggregation excludes those group demands which are directed at a smaller segment of the society. Consequently, not all organized demands can be considered nationalistic—only those which have the society as their reference point.[11]

[6] Leonard Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1964), 6.

[7] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press 1953), 104.

[8] Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1966), 81.

[9] This argument was advanced by Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Vol. II (New York: Bedminster Press 1968), 926-40; see also Petirim Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality* (New York: Harper 1947).

[10] The opposite position has been adopted by Donald C. Hodges in his "Class Analysis and Its Presuppositions," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, xx (October 1963), 23.

[11] A further complication is the assumption that one can set observable parameters for the concept, "society." Discussion of the elements comprising this concept is beyond the scope of this paper. It is understood here in the spatial sense. For useful discussions of the concept, see T. B. Bottomore, *Sociology* (New York: Pantheon 1971), chap. 7; Talcott Parsons, *Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1966); Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, *Economy and Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1956), chap. 2.

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TYPOLOGIES OF NATIONALISM

With the foregoing definition, it is possible to develop typologies of different conflict and integration theories of nationalism. We are then able to state many important propositions about nationalism without having to redefine the concept. The most informative typology would differentiate theories of nationalism on the basis of the role attributed to social groups in the process of developing nationalism. Previous typologies have classified nationalism on the basis of the content of the demands, the direction of the demands, and the geographic locus of the demands.[12] In this paper, we will discuss the different theories of nationalism with specific reference to their explanation of (1) the process of group crystallization, (2) the generation of group demands for the control of the distributive system, and (3) the composition of the nationalist groups in a society. Integration and conflict theories of nationalism can both be distinguished by these three dimensions. *The thesis of this study is that the integration theories offer the most plausible explanation of the processes by which groups become organized; that the conflict theories provide a convincing explanation of the causes of group demands; and that the concept of relative deprivation can effect a synthesis of the two theories by explaining which groups are apt to develop nationalism.*

II. Integration Theories of Nationalism

The concept "integration" has many different connotations. In the literature on nationalism, integration refers to the "process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity within that unit."[13] This definition is reflected in the assimilationist version of society.

[12] Carlton Hayes is the chief exponent of the typology of nationalism according to the content of the demands. See his *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: R. R. Smith 1931). Most typologies of nationalism have focused upon the direction of the demands; more specifically, they deal with the goals which nationalists strive toward. For examples of this approach, see K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, "Nationalist Movements: An Attempt at a Comparative Typology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VII (January 1965), 221-30; and Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nationalism, Old and New* (London: Methuen 1965). Louis Snyder and Hans Kohn have used the geographic region of the nationalist movement to classify different types of nationalism. See Snyder, *The New Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1968); Kohn (fn. 2). See also Peter Worsley, *The Third World* (University of Chicago Press 1970).

[13] Myron Weiner, in "Political Integration and Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 358 (March 1965), 53, singles out five current usages of the term; the first is the one adopted in this paper.

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According to Claude, "Assimilation demands that minorities consent to abandon the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic characteristics which distinguish them from the national majorities with whom they live, and to become merged into nationally uniform communities with the majorities. It demands also that the majorities concerned accept and facilitate this merger."[14] The primordial ties which must be abandoned in this process are those identifications which constitute the "givens" of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connections which are interwoven in the religious, linguistic, and historical fabric of a society.[15] Central to this argument is the premise that relatively permanent factors like geography, race, religion, or a common culture or tradition—which have existed for centuries—cannot explain the rise of nationalism. Rather, it is the process of modernization—consisting of an increased centralization of power in the state, the differentiation and specialization of institutions, and an expansion in the level of social mobilization—which generates sufficient quantitative changes in the life-style of a people to effect a qualitative change in their level of organization.[16] This should not be interpreted to mean that nationalism cannot be produced within a traditional framework. As Apter has shown, traditional societies vary in the degree to which they can adapt to modernization.[17] In all societies, however, the process of modernization is necessary to cause a sufficient change in a group's level of organization to permit it to make demands at the societal level.

Two different theories operate within the integration concept of nationalism. The first explains nationalism as a process of social com-

[14] Inis L. Claude, Jr., *National Minorities, An International Problem* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1955), 79. See also Aristide R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, v (December 1967), 451.

[15] The nature of primordial attachments is explained in E. Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology*, VIII (June 1957), 130-45; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution—Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1965), 104-57.

[16] This definition of modernization is from Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization," in Welch, ed., *Political Modernization* (2d ed.; Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth 1971), 7. See also Marion J. Levy, Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (2 vols., Princeton University Press 1966). For a discussion of the relationship between quantitative and qualitative changes in group organization, see Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, XXIV (April 1972), 330.

[17] David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," *World Politics*, XIII (October 1960), 45-68; also, *The Politics of Modernization* (University of Chicago Press 1965). Apter suggests that instrumental systems which are structured along hierarchical authority stemming from a king or command figure can more easily adapt to changes than consummatory systems which regard religion as the cement that is binding society, the state, and authority.

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munication with particular emphasis upon group organization. The second explains nationalism as the result of an erosion of primordial loyalties, with particular emphasis upon the society as the arena for nationalism. Although these theories approach nationalism from different directions, they are complementary in that the former attempts to explain the mechanics of group crystallization while the latter attempts to explain why group crystallization takes place at the societal level.

SOCIAL COMMUNICATION THEORY OF NATIONALISM

Perhaps the most widely discussed theory of nationalism is the one pioneered by Deutsch. According to Deutsch, nationalism "essentially consists of wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders."[18] The following propositions reconstruct the logic of the social communication theory of nationalism:

1. A prerequisite for a sense of group integration is communication among its members.
2. If communication among members is hindered relative to that among nonmembers, the likelihood that group integration will develop is also hindered.[19]
3. The degree to which communication among groups is hindered depends upon the balance between the rate of social mobilization and the rate of assimilation. If the former exceeds the latter, the rate of group integration will diminish, and vice versa.[20] The level of social mobilization can be measured by several indicators, among them the level of technological innovations, the expansion of mass media, the shift to nonagricultural occupations, monetization, literacy, urbanization, transportation networks, language, and trade. The rate of assimilation can be measured by the proportion of individuals in an area with languages and historical traditions different from those of the majority.[21]

[18] Deutsch (fn. 7), 71.

[19] Louis Kriesberg, *The Sociology of Social Conflicts* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1973), 64; H. G. Leibholz, "Nationality in History and Politics," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 62 (October 1944), 122.

[20] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60 (September 1961), 507.

[21] *Ibid.*, 494; and Deutsch (fn. 7), 63.

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4. Depending upon the balance of assimilation factors and mobilization factors, modernization either facilitates or retards the level of communication that is essential for the process by which a people becomes a nationality and a nationality becomes a nation-state.[22]

The propositions are useful for explaining the process of group crystallization, but they do not suggest a cause for the presence of group demands for the control of the distributive system. Clearly, it would be a leap of faith to assume that demands of this nature should arise from close physical and social contact. There is no reason to suppose that a nationality would reflect nationalism rather than some other form of expression. Although the process of becoming a nation-state does subsume the idea of establishing control over a distributive system, we cannot assume (1) that only the establishment of a nation-state can constitute a demand for the control of the distributive system, or (2) that increases in social communication always ultimately lead to the establishment of a nation-state.

This theory also fails to meet the third criterion by which theories of nationalism are evaluated in this paper: the degree to which the composition of social groups is explained. From the foregoing propositions we can infer that the group with the highest level of social communication is the most nationalistic. We would therefore expect the level of nationalism in the upper classes to be greater than that in poor and middle-class groups. Kautsky and others, however, have suggested that the reverse is true.[23]

EROSION OF PRIMORDIAL LOYALTY THEORY OF NATIONALISM

Eisenstadt, Smelser, and Silvert belong to a group of scholars who perceive the development of nationalism as being conditioned by the presence of modernization and the related process of structural differentiation.[24] Erosion theory defines nationalism to be the existence of

[22] *Ibid.*, 101-05. A *people* "forms a social, economic, and political alignment of individuals from different social classes and occupations around a center and a leading group." A *nationality* is "a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behavior of its members." A *nation* results when "a nationality has added this power to compel its earlier cohesiveness and attachment to group symbols."

[23] John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* (New York: Wiley 1962), 13-56; Worsley (fn. 12), 49-84.

[24] Silvert (fn. 4), particularly the Appendix; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1966); N. J. Smelser, *Essays in Sociological Explanation* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1968), 125-46; cf. Smith (fn. 4).

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shared positive affections toward the nation-state or toward the formation of a nation-state. Unlike the social communication theory, it is based upon the premise that modernization leads only indirectly to group integration. The theory of nationalism discussed here can be expressed in the following propositions:

1. Modernization entails structural differentiation which dislodges people from their traditional societal roles.
2. As traditional roles become disrupted, allegiance to the norms and authority patterns which provided the foundations for these roles becomes undermined.
3. Social groupings become atomized while the society is in transition between a precontractual *Gemeinschaft* and a *Gesellschaft* based on community of interest.[25]
4. Because of a sociopsychological need for security and identity, social groups then transfer their traditional allegiances to the emergent nation.[26]
5. Consequently, nationalism takes root in a society for the purpose of linking traditional modes of social organization with the new roles forged by the modernizing process.

This theory points to the effect of modernization on traditional patterns of social groupings and offers an explanation which accounts for group crystallization at the society level. The social communication theory, however, is more precise in its explanation of the process of group organization. The simple assertion that identification with national symbols replaces primordial loyalties leaves absent the proof that identity *per se* can be equated with group organization. While identity with the nation may facilitate organizationally heightened demands for control of the distributive system, additional factors (which are not present in this theory) must occur for group integration to develop, e.g., the expansion of social communication.[27]

[25] Eisenstadt (fn. 24), 15.

[26] Other scholars have also expressed this proposition. Daniel Katz, for example, suggests that the motivating force behind nationalism can be "traced to three sources: it makes possible a greater satisfaction of men's material needs; it makes possible an enhanced psychic income; it supplements the projection of hatred and hostility upon the out-group." See "The Psychology of Nationalism," in J. P. Guilford, ed., *Fields of Psychology* (New York: Van Nostrand 1940), 165; Krasrow Mostofi, *Aspects of Nationalism, A Sociology of Colonial Revolt* (Salt Lake City: Institute of Government, University of Utah 1964), 41.

[27] Anthony Smith writes that the concepts of nationalism and in-group sentiment cannot be treated as equivalents because the latter concept deals with group identity at

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Since this theory contends that group divisions are irrelevant to the development of national identity, the composition of those groups which are the most nationalistic cannot be predicted. One is left to assume that differential identity and security needs are responsible for the variation in degree of nationalism among different groups. Yet we know that the propensity to organize is not evenly distributed throughout society.

III. Conflict Theories of Nationalism

According to Quincy Wright, "conflict [is] the opposition among social entities directed against one another."[28] Conflict theory therefore focuses upon the conditions under which social groups perceive their common interests and achieve social organization to become competitors for power. In the context of nationalism, the basic premise of the conflict theories is that competition among groups gives rise to demands for control of the distributive system.[29]

The conflict theories of nationalism are reflected in the pluralist model of society.[30] This model assumes that groups are mutually exclusive because they are organized along different principles of stratification. Furthermore, conditions of inequality are held to be inherent in all social systems. When modernization or some other social change increases the level of inequality, higher levels of social tension result, and conflict ensues. In a conflict situation, the level of group identification is intensified, and group integration develops.[31] Because the parties to the conflict view their positions as mutually exclusive, the conflict takes the form of a zero-sum game for the control of the distributive

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many levels of analysis while the former is fixed at the societal level of aggregation. Thus, the identity function fulfilled by the nation could also be fulfilled by other institutions. See "Ethnocentrism, Nationalism, and Social Change," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, XIII (March 1972), 5.

[28] Quincy Wright, "The Nature of Conflict," *Western Political Quarterly*, IV (June 1951), 197.

[29] It should be noted here that the two theories are not mutually exclusive. Many scholars (Kautsky, Emerson, and Deutsch, for instance), incorporate elements from both theories into their own writings. For example, Emerson views nationalism in the context of social class conflict, yet he also recognizes integration tendencies among groups within a society. See Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1960).

[30] The pluralist argument is best illustrated in several of the writings contained in M. G. Smith and Leo Kuper, eds., *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971); and Frederik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown 1969).

[31] See George Simmel, *Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1955); Lewis Coser, *The Function of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press 1956).

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system—the source of their mutually exclusive positions. When this process takes place at the societal level, nationalism is generated.

Three theories of nationalism can be identified within this general category: economic, social class, and ethnic. They are distinct in that they emphasize different components of distributive systems. As a result, no one theory can explain why a group would make demands for control of the *whole* distributive system. The theories are similar in their acceptance of the pluralist model of society and the basic premise of the conflict theories of nationalism.

ECONOMIC CONFLICT THEORY

Conflict over property relationships is at the core of the theory of nationalism advanced by Breton and Johnson.[32] In their writings, they use a much narrower definition than the one proposed in this paper: nationalism is defined as the utility or value of holding certain jobs or certain property owned by members of the national group. Despite this restricted scope, the theory they propose is important because it explains demands for changes in the inter-national or inter-ethnic distribution of property. The importance of economic competition between internal and external groups is evident in the following reconstruction of their theory:

1. There are two ways in which nationalistic utility can be acquired. The first is through observation within the country of foreign operations: the property yielding income and status to the foreigner becomes property valued by the nationalists. The second mechanism—contact with and observation of other nations—provides knowledge of the forms of property that are highly regarded in other societies.
2. The national group will try to maximize its control over desired property and jobs. Monopolistic competition is the byproduct of certain jobs or certain property being held by members of the national group.
3. Monopolistic competition will tend to merge economic with cultural interests because the groups who advance economic and cultural interests wish to increase their monopoly at the expense of *foreign* purveyors of the same types of products.

[32] Albert Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 72 (August 1964), 376-86; Harry Johnson, "A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 80 (June 1965), 169-86.

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4. Given the two mechanisms by which nationalistic utility becomes attached to specific items of property (proposition 1), these items will tend to be those which yield benefits primarily to the elite, the educated, the entrepreneurially qualified, and some of the wealthy. Thus, there is an inherent class slant to the economic interest in pursuing nationalism.

In this theory, the impetus for group organization is the similarity of economic and cultural interests. This assumption rests upon the demonstration effect that foreign ownership of property has upon nationals. However, no reason is offered to suggest why foreign income and only foreign income should motivate nationals to imitate the economic policies of other countries. In fact, the reverse may be more likely. Nationals may view the policies of foreign governments as exploitative and therefore undesirable as models for economic development.[33] In addition, we are left to assume that this demonstration effect in and of itself can unite groups irrespective of the level of social communication among them. Although it is conceivable that economic and cultural interests can promote group integration under some conditions, the necessary and sufficient conditions for such integration are not articulated.

Breton's and Johnson's theory permits the inference that the proportion of property owned by foreigners in a society is directly related to the scope of nationalist demands for control of that property. The theory also suggests that the composition of nationalist groups tends to parallel the distribution of education and entrepreneurial talent. However, the economic elite and the intelligentsia are often diametrically opposed to each other. The former group is often concerned with maintaining its privileged position, a position which may rest upon foreign control of certain property, as was the case in the Philippines in the 1890's. Conversely, members of the intelligentsia often do not accept the values of capitalist societies. Given their exposure to new ideas and their "marginal" position in society, they often question the legitimacy of the existing social order. Consequently, they would not be likely to be motivated by economic interests. To extend the logic of the economic conflict theory, if the scope of demands is directly related to the level of foreign ownership of property, would it not be more plausible to suggest that the groups most adversely affected by

[33] See Denis Goulet, *The Cruel Choice* (New York: Atheneum 1971); John H. Kautsky, *The Political Consequences of Modernization* (New York: Wiley 1972), esp. chap. 4.

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this pattern of distribution would be most likely to make such demands? The major limiting factor in this theory's ability to explain the composition of nationalistic groups is its exclusive focus upon economic principles of distribution. Societies characterized by social, ethnic, or religious cleavages are not amenable to that type of analysis.

SOCIAL CLASS CONFLICT THEORY OF NATIONALISM

Although there are many definitions of social class, the one most frequently employed in the literature of nationalism is that advanced by Marx: a class is any aggregate of persons who perform the same function in the organization of production.[34] In a highly crystallized class structure (one in which there are very distinct divisions in the organization of production), class division serves important sociopsychological needs for security and identity. At the collective level, the price of these divisions is social cleavage.[35] Not all such cleavages lead to demands directed at the structures of authority in society. The fact that people are being conditioned to the class situation and the results of that class situation must be distinctly recognizable. Only then can social cleavage be perceived to result from the structure of the distributive system.[36]

Many scholars who treat nationalism as a process of social class conflict attempt to reconcile Marxist analysis with the concept of nationalism.[37] Their argument is that nationalism results from a set of demands advanced by those social classes which have unequal access to the resources allocated by the distributive system. The origins of this conflict may be either internal or external to the society, but nationalism always includes conflict among the groups within the society for control of the distributive system.[38] This process is expressed in the following propositions:

[34] The definition is from Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Karl Marx's Theory of Social Class," in Bendix and Lipset, eds., *Class, Status, and Power* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1953), 7.

[35] Werner S. Landecker, "Class Crystallization and Social Cleavage," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 54 (April 1970), 343-56.

[36] Weber (fn. 9).

[37] Several studies are informative in their discussion of Marx's failure to explain nationalism. See, for example, Kautsky (fn. 23), 67; T. B. Bottomore, *Classes in Modern Society* (London: Ruskin House 1965), 22; Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1967).

[38] Several proponents of this theory argue that colonial relations between developed and underdeveloped countries have elevated the plane of conflict to the international system, with the developed countries adopting the role of the oppressor class and the developing countries taking the role of the oppressed class. For a more detailed dis-

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1. The creation of an urban bourgeoisie and an intellectual class is the product of modernization.
2. These new groups develop interests which are opposed to the elite that controls the distribution of valued resources in a society.
3. The conflict of interests between the native aristocracy and the local intelligentsia arises because the latter group is underemployed and culturally displaced in traditional societies. The existing structure of social inequality is no longer accepted as legitimate.[39]
4. The process of conflict further solidifies traditional and modern opposition and in turn generates demands for control of the distributive system by the intelligentsia, the native bourgeoisie, and the nascent working class.[40]

Several important comparisons can be made between this theory and the social communication theory of nationalism. Though modernization promotes the integration of groups by increasing the extent of communication within them, it does so selectively within the class structure. In addition, modernization not only intensifies the extent of social communication within existing social classes; it also creates new social classes: the intellectuals, a native bourgeoisie, and a small working class. The social class conflict theory further amplifies the social communication theory by recognizing that the process of conflict as well as that of communication can produce enhanced group integration.[41] Because the class theory limits itself to the socioeconomic spectrum of the distributive system, however, other modes of integration, e.g., religious or ethnic, are neglected.

Perhaps the most enlightening aspect of this theory is the explanation of how group demands originate. Modernization, by its differential impact upon social classes, exacerbates inequalities in the distribution of resources; it also leads to the creation of groups which reject the legitimacy of the existing distributive system. These two effects combine to become the catalyst that generates nationalism.

As is the case with the economic conflict theory of nationalism, the

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cussion, see Smith (fn. 4), chap. 4. However, others—particularly Worsley and Kautsky—depict this process as taking place within the colonial society. Consequently, the process of nationalism can be treated as a conflict among groups *within* a society. This perspective removes the tautological definition that nationalism is anticolonialism. In addition, such a viewpoint recognizes that other types of class relationships can generate nationalism.

[39] Kautsky (fn. 23), 37.

[40] *Ibid.*, 62.

[41] Coser (fn. 31); Simmel (fn. 31).

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social class conflict theory explains the composition of nationalistic groups in terms of only one principle of distribution. Many types of cleavages other than those based on class can lead to nationalism.[42] Thus, a social class explanation of nationalism oversimplifies reality; historical traditions or tribal or ethnic cleavages may supersede class identifications. Furthermore, it would be fallacious to assume that the intelligentsia, the native bourgeoisie, and the small working class are the only nationalistic groups. Peasant groups may be much more important in the rise of nationalism, since they embody the historical traditions which instill a sense of identity for those who are uprooted by modernization.[43]

ETHNIC CONFLICT THEORY OF NATIONALISM

In the ethnic conflict theory, ethnic criteria are the salient sources of contention between societies. Distinctive historical and linguistic ties are perceived to be the primary reference points for individuals. When the pattern of social relationships between two ethnic groups is such that social tension and conflict results, demands to extend the influence of the ethnic group are produced. The following propositions articulate the mechanics of this process:

1. Linguistic and ethnocultural similarity are two elements which are essential for defining the boundaries of a society.[44]
2. The process of modernization erodes primordial loyalties, permitting identification to be based upon larger regions of linguistic and ethnocultural similarity.[45]
3. Modernization also creates acute cleavages of interest between ethnic groups which are affected by it at differing times. These cleavages are rooted in the ethnic groups' desire to obtain access to political and economic resources.[46]

[42] See Zolberg (fn. 14), 460.

[43] See Martin L. Kilson, Jr., "Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa," *Journal of Politics*, XX (May 1958), 368-87; K. R. Minogue, *Nationalism* (Baltimore: Penguin 1967), 60-61; Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford University Press 1962).

[44] Paul C. Rosenblatt, "Origins and Effects of Group Ethnocentrism and Nationalism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (June 1964), 131; Florian Znaniecki, *Modern Nationalities: A Sociological Study* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press 1952), 30.

[45] Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (University of Chicago Press 1964), 163; Geertz (fn. 15). A note of caution: one should not necessarily equate the erosion of primordial loyalties with the erosion of traditional patterns of authority.

[46] Gellner (fn. 45), 171; Smith (fn. 27), 18; also, Smith (fn. 4), chap. 6.

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4. "Ethnic groups whose expectations for access to political and economic facilities are frustrated, and which live in close proximity to other such groups, tend to become antagonistic to those neighbors and claim that stretch of territory."[47]
5. The more extensive an ethnic group's demands, and the more these dominate the aggregate number of demands upon a system, the closer will the group come to obtaining an autonomous political identity within that territory.[48]

The process of group integration proposed in this theory parallels the erosion theory of nationalism. Their chief point of difference lies in the relative importance of linguistic and ethnocultural similarity. While there can be little doubt that these factors can facilitate the process of group organization, it seems highly unlikely that they represent necessary and sufficient conditions for organization. By contrast, the erosion theory does not restrict the process of group organization to any one principle of stratification such as ethnic similarity.

The ethnic conflict theory, like the social class conflict theory of nationalism, relates to modernization in two ways. First, it promotes identification based upon ethnocultural and linguistic similarity. Second, it creates cleavages between groups with different degrees of access to valued resources. When highly integrated ethnic groups are unable to acquire valued resources, they initiate demands for the control of the distributive system. The major difference between this theory and the preceding one is simply the reference group.

Like the other theories of nationalism, the ethnic conflict theory of nationalism offers only a partial explanation of the composition of nationalistic groups. It is clear from the theories discussed earlier that factors other than ethnocultural identity and linguistic similarity are involved in explaining which groups display the greatest propensity toward nationalism.

IV. A Synthesis of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism

It should be apparent that integration theories best explain the process of group integration, and conflict theories best explain the demands

[47] B. Akzin, *State and Nation* (London: Hutchinson 1964), 53.
[48] Gordon Lightbody, "A Note on the Theory of Nationalism as a Function of Ethnic Demands," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, II (Summer 1964), 331.

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for control of the distributive system. What is lacking in the literature of nationalism is a theory that explains the process of group integration, demand formation, *and* the composition of the nationalist group. A summary of the conditions that cause groups to become organized and demands to be formed would be a starting point for such a theory. We may then relate these two dimensions of nationalism through the argument that organization is necessary for demand formation.

As developed in the foregoing discussion, the integration of social groups can be accomplished by at least three methods:

1. The process of modernization may intensify the level of social communication, creating sociopsychological bonds which link individuals in various regions within a society.
2. The process of modernization may erode primordial loyalties and promote society-wide loyalties in their place.
3. Conflict with other groups may promote internal solidarity.

Two conclusions have been suggested as being causally related to the propagation of group demands:

1. Demands for control of the distributive system may arise from the desire to possess a monopoly over valued foreign property; the scope of the demands is therefore directly proportional to the extent of foreign ownership of national property.
2. Modernization creates and then acts as a catalyst for the two components of nationalist demands: a group which rejects the principles underlying the distributive system, and an increase in the degree of inequality in the distributive system.

These five propositions, distilled from the preceding theories of nationalism, demonstrate the importance of four concepts: modernization, group integration, inequality in the distribution of resources, and nationalism itself. Integration theories of nationalism suggest that modernization causes groups to become integrated at the societal level. Conflict theories of nationalism suggest that these groups make nationalistic demands when confronted with an unacceptable level of inequality in the distribution of valued resources. Integrated groups are not likely to demand control of a distributive system unless they perceive an unequal distribution of resources. Conversely, groups are not likely to exert demands for the correction of what they perceive to be a maldistribution of resources unless they have attained a certain level of integration. Thus the two approaches tap different aspects of the same

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reality. A synthesis of these two approaches suggests that the causal sequence which generates nationalism can be represented as diagrammed below.



FIGURE 1. THE CAUSAL RELATIONS IN AN INTEGRATION-CONFLICT THEORY OF NATIONALISM

The theory implied in the above model suggests that modernization, group integration, and inequality are all necessary conditions for nationalism. Though there may well be other forces not represented here, it is assumed that this model depicts the most elemental relationships at this level of generality. Some brief comments on the assumptions depicted in Figure 1 may serve to guide future discussion of this theory of nationalism.

MODERNIZATION AND GROUP INTEGRATION

Integration theories of nationalism contend that modernization promotes group organization through intensified social communication, accompanied by the erosion of primordial loyalties. Huntington succinctly states the relationship between modernization and group integration:

> Modernization means that all groups, old as well as new, traditional as well as modern, become increasingly aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups. One of the most striking phenomena of modernization, indeed, is the increased consciousness, coherence, organization, and action which it produces in many social forces which existed on a much lower level of conscious identity and organization in traditional society.[49]

[49] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968), 37-38.

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MODERNIZATION AND INEQUALITY

Wealth and income are normally more unevenly distributed in poor countries than in those which are economically developed.[50] Not only are economic resources more unevenly distributed in poor societies, but modernization, as reflected in economic growth, tends to exacerbate the level of inequality. In periods of rapid economic growth there are often several forces that work toward a concentration of most of the gains and a widespread diffusion of the losses. Wage rigidity, capital-intensive (labor-saving) technology, and the absence of institutions for income redistribution are three such factors.[51] Modernization not only increases inequality, it also produces an awareness and resentment of inequality. New patterns of social behavior and new ideas generate questions concerning the legitimacy of the distributive system. Thus, modernization increases the level of inequality while it decreases the legitimacy of that inequality.[52]

GROUP INTEGRATION, INEQUALITY, AND NATIONALISM

Since one component of nationalism is the existence of organizationally heightened demands, it is essential that groups be integrated to the point where they perceive their common interests. Furthermore, this integration must take place at the societal level in order to open the group's horizon to the possibility of acting to gain control of the distributive system.

Integration *per se*, however, does not lead to nationalism. Organization alone will not lead to nationalism either, unless there exists inequality which is perceived as illegitimate. That is to be expected, since demands for the control of the distributive system imply that the current system fosters an inequitable distribution of valued goods. Conversely, pervasive inequality will not lead to nationalism unless there is a modicum of group integration. Only then can nationalist demands be organizationally heightened—a necessary condition for nationalism

[50] Simon Kuznets, "Qualitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, VIII: Distribution of Income by Size," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 68 (January 1963), 1-80.

[51] Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (December 1963), 529-52. Even more significant are the findings of Cynthia Adelman and Irma Morris, in *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford University Press 1973), which showed economic development to be accompanied by an absolute decline in the living standards of those who were already disadvantaged.

[52] Huntington (fn. 49), 57-59.

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according to the proposed definition.[53] There must first be integration and then a perceived situation of inequality in order for nationalism to arise. The absence of either factor precludes nationalism.

CONFLICT FEEDBACK AND GROUP INTEGRATION

That social conflict can generate integration is well documented. The timing of this relationship, however, is such that it occurs after nationalism has been generated. Logically, a group must demonstrate that its intentions run counter to the interests of another group before a conflict situation can be perceived. Hence, demands for control of the distributive system are antecedent to integration by conflict behavior.[54] We would therefore expect that integration of this nature will increase the scope of group demands, as greater integration would lead to a heightened aversion to inequality, which in turn would generate more nationalist demands.

Implicit in this relationship is the assumption that not all types of conflict can generate the type of group integration which may increase the degree of nationalism—only conflict which arises from demands articulated for the purpose of securing control of a society's distributive system can.

V. Modifications of the Proposed Synthesis

Though the "synthesis" of nationalism represents an improvement upon existing theories of nationalism which restrict the scope of the phenomenon to a conflict or integration process, two important modifications are necessary to give the theory greater explanatory power. First, it is necessary to evaluate, in light of evidence provided by re-

[53] This contention is contrary to Huntington's analysis (*ibid.*, 53-56). He argues that a combination of mobilization and inequality will lead to social frustration and ultimately to political demands only when opportunities for mobilization are not present. Although opportunities for mobilization can reduce frustration, this sort of analysis is begging the question. It has already been shown that modernization creates inequalities which include the lack of mobility for a large segment of the population. See also James A. Geschwender, "Continuities in Theories of Status Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance," *Social Forces*, XLVI (December 1967), 169, for a discussion of mobility and frustration. The analysis offered in the present article is also in conflict with the assumption that economic growth may be dependent upon nationalism. *Cf.* Bert F. Hoselitz, "Nationalism, Economic Development, and Democracy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 305 (May 1956), 3. The discrepancy between the two positions can be explained by noting that Hoselitz perceives nationalism to be a sentiment of fellowship, while we maintain that a definition of nationalism must recognize the elements of conflict inherent in nationalism.

[54] William Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Development," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War* (New York: Free Press 1964), 146.

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search in the field of political conflict, the contention that inequality gives rise to nationalist demands. Second, it is necessary to revise two of the assumptions made in the synthesis theory of nationalism.

While the relationships diagrammed in Figure 1 may be an improvement upon existing theories of nationalism, we have yet to explain the composition of nationalist groups. The synthesis theory permits the inference that those integrated groups which experience the greatest inequality are the ones most likely to produce nationalism. However, this hypothesis is at variance with the accepted theories of conflict behavior: that the level of relative deprivation (the balance between the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them), determines a group's propensity to initiate conflict behavior.[55] Consequently, conditions of inequality are important sources of nationalism only to the extent that they cause value expectations to outpace value capabilities.

The concept of relative deprivation is particularly useful for explaining the rise of nationalism for two reasons. First, it subsumes and amplifies previous explanations of group demands. Second, it permits us to explain the composition of nationalist groups.[56]

The desire to obtain a monopolistic control over foreign property and group responses to inequality can both be conceived in terms of situations in which value expectations exceed value capabilities. If

[55] Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton University Press 1970), 13. Gurr and others have derived this concept from the proposition that aggression is always a consequence of frustration and that frustration always leads to some form of aggression. What is perceived to be frustrating depends upon the balance of value expectations and value capabilities. See John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neil E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1939), and Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1962).

[56] An additional advantage of this concept is the very high degree of explanatory power it has acquired in studies of social conflict, of which nationalism is a part. For example, see Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (December 1968), 1104-24, in which he explains over one-third of all civil strife by using the concept of relative deprivation. Other highly informative studies include Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr, eds., *Anger, Violence, and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1972), 107-18; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (January 1962), 5-19, and Douglas P. Bwy, "Political Instability in Latin America: The Cross-Cultural Test of a Causal Model," *Latin American Research Review*, III (Spring 1968), 17-66.

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foreign or domestic groups hinder the acquisition of a legitimate share of the distributive system, a gap forms between what people hope to achieve and what they are capable of achieving. This gap causes group frustration which, according to one well-known theory, leads to an aggressive response.[57] When the source of this frustration involves the legitimacy of the distributive system, the aggressive response is nationalism.

The concept of relative deprivation suggests why social inequality, even when it is perceived as such, does not always lead to nationalism. The failure of a group to obtain benefits does not provoke an aggressive response if the group is not frustrated by this failure.[58] Unequal access to the resources of a society may be accepted as legitimate. As Coser points out:

> Negatively privileged groups or individuals may not develop the awareness that they are deprived of rights and privileges. In a caste society, for example, members of the lower caste, considering this system justified for religious reasons, may not feel frustrated by it. If the privileges of the superordinate groups are not considered legitimately attainable by their subordinates, lower-status people compare themselves only with each other and not with members of higher-status groups.[59]

The concept of relative deprivation can also offer an explanation for the composition of nationalist groups. Those groups which experience the highest levels of relative deprivation may be expected to be the most nationalistic. Given a high degree of organization and relative deprivation, any alignment, be it class, ethnic, or religious, could cause nationalism. Which types of cleavages are salient in a society depends upon the nature of the distributive system. The particular structure of the distributive system in terms of which sources of cleavages predominate, however, is largely irrelevant to the creation of nationalism.

It is now possible to explain why a country like Ceylon could have two nationalist movements generated by different social groups. In the 1920's, the Ceylonese Tamils, the Indian Tamils, and the Sinhalese were all experiencing a sense of relative deprivation fostered by colonial rule. Their demands were consequently unified against British control of the distributive system. Some thirty to forty years later, it was

[57] See Dollard and others (fn. 55).

[58] Anthony Obershall, "Rising Expectations and Political Turmoil," *Journal of Development Studies*, VI (October 1969), 8.

[59] Lewis Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press 1967), 59.

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the Sinhalese group which exerted nationalist demands in opposition to the Tamil groups. Internal ethnic conflict was the factor instrumental in creating relative deprivation among the Sinhalese.[60] As this case illustrates, different patterns of cleavages can be equally viable as sources of nationalism. It is therefore the distribution of relative deprivation, rather than any particular cluster of groups in conflict, which contributes to nationalism.

To summarize, it is not inequality *per se* which is a component of nationalism, but inequality only as it is reflected in the concept of relative deprivation. We can now relate the concept of relative deprivation to the synthesis theory of nationalism in the following statement: (1) groups which are organized at the national level will make demands for the control of the distributive system to the extent that they experience relative deprivation; (2) the extent to which a group experiences relative deprivation is related to the level of modernization and the degree of integration. Schematically, we can depict these relationships as diagrammed below:



FIGURE 2: THE CAUSAL RELATIONS IN A MODIFIED INTEGRATION-CONFLICT THEORY OF NATIONALISM

All but two of these relationships have been previously discussed. With the substitution of relative deprivation for inequality, the relationships between modernization and relative deprivation and among group integration, relative deprivation, and nationalism have yet to be analyzed. An examination indicates that we cannot assume these two relationships to be linear.

[60] B. H. Farmer, "The Social Basis of Nationalism in Ceylon," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIV (May 1965), 431-40.

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MODERNIZATION AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

The relationship between modernization and relative deprivation parallels that between modernization and inequality. At the root of this relationship is the assumption that all of the conditions conducive to relative deprivation are produced by modernization.[61] Societies undergoing modernization are likely to be rife with status inconsistency among individuals and groups.[62] This situation, combined with a high degree of social inequality, is likely to lead to challenges to the legitimacy of the distribution system. According to Feierabend, these challenges are the consequence of relative deprivation. In addition, the challenges exhibit a curvilinear relationship with modernization:

> The adoption of modern goals, although an integral aspect of modernity, is hardly synonymous with their attainment. The arousal of an underdeveloped society to awareness of complex modern patterns of behavior and organization brings with it a desire to emulate and achieve the same high level of satisfaction. But there is an inevitable lag between aspiration and achievement. The more a country is exposed to modernity and the lower its level of development, the greater the discrepancy between achievement and social aspirations. It is postulated that the peak discrepancy between systemic goals and their satisfaction, and hence maximum systemic frustration, is likely to occur during the transitional phase.[63]

These observations are in accord with past observations of traditional, transitional, and modern societies.[64] In a traditional society, social relationships tend to be embedded in parochial loyalties. Status is ascribed rather than achieved. Expectations of social benefits conform to the same expectations experienced by the ancestors of the community. Group capabilities are rooted in long-standing social experience. Thus, value expectations tend to match value capabilities.

In contrast to traditional societies, modern societies have increased centralization of power, social differentiation, and popular participation. Substitution of achieved for ascribed roles produces high value expectations; the structure of the society permits value capabilities to keep pace with them. Opportunities for social mobility, dissemination

[61] Feierabend and others (fn. 56), 117.

[62] Arnold S. Feldman, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolution," in Eckstein (fn. 54), 121. Feldman describes this process as "fragmentation" rather than modernization.

[63] Feierabend and others (fn. 56), 117-18.

[64] The terms "traditional," "transitional," and "modern" societies correspond to the meaning given to them by M.I.T. Study Group, "The Transitional Process," in Welch (fn. 16), 29-46.

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of information to prevent the formation of unattainable goals, and government policies to redistribute income act as checks upon a high level of relative deprivation in a modern society.

The transitional society, however, undergoes rapid changes in its economic, political, social, and religious order. If the changes brought about by modernization were even in their impact, relative deprivation would not be likely to result. However, economic growth tends to exacerbate inequalities in the distribution of valued resources. That fact, coupled with an expanding awareness of the possibilities for advancement in one's social and economic position, leads to a situation of high relative deprivation.

The curvilinear relationship between modernization and relative deprivation suggests that nationalism should be considered as a phenomenon peculiar to certain stages of modernization. Any other assertion would not explain decreased nationalism in the more developed countries.

GROUP INTEGRATION, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, AND NATIONALISM

The relationship between group integration and relative deprivation provides additional support for the proposition that levels of nationalism parallel stages of modernization. We would expect high levels of group crystallization to lead to the establishment of organizations and institutions. To use Michels' classic argument, these organizations would tend to develop interests peculiar to themselves.[65] Consequently, we would expect groups in these organizations to be concerned with maintaining their institutions and the society in which they are rooted. Possession of a stake in the stability of the society would reduce value aspirations for changes in that society.

Placing this argument in the context of modernization, we would expect a curvilinear relationship between the level of group integration and a society's level of relative deprivation. At low levels of group integration (a situation most likely in a traditional society), parochial organizations would be imbedded in the social order, for instance, the farming community. In transitional societies, where social organizations are still in the formative stages, organized groups have only a marginal commitment to the social order. Hence, group integration could lead individuals to develop value expectations which outrun value capabilities. Conversely, highly developed patterns of group organization in more modernized societies would be likely to facilitate a

[65] See Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York: Free Press 1962).

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commitment to the legitimacy of the social order. Value expectations for changes in the control of the distributive system would therefore be minimized.

According to the definition of nationalism posited at the beginning of this paper, nationalism is a set of organizationally heightened demands. Organization is a prerequisite for translating relative deprivation into demands for control of the distributive system. In the context of the curvilinear relationship between group integration and relative deprivation, we can assert that low to moderate levels of group organization will assist the formation of nationalistic demands; high levels will retard that process.

VI. Conclusion: A Synthesis Theory of Nationalism

The attempted synthesis of integration and conflict theories of nationalism can now be stated in a series of propositions relating the concepts of modernization, group integration, relative deprivation, and nationalism:

1. Modernization generates nationalism indirectly by integrating groups at the societal level, and directly by causing relative deprivation.
   a. The level of modernization varies directly with the levels of integration.
   b. The level of modernization varies curvilinearly with the level of relative deprivation.
2. An integrated group is necessary for generating organized demands.
   a. Group integration varies curvilinearly with the level of relative deprivation.
   b. Hence, the capacity for integrated groups to exert nationalistic demands also varies curvilinearly with the level of relative deprivation.
3. Given the curvilinear relationships between modernization and relative deprivation and between group integration and relative deprivation, nationalism is primarily a phenomenon of transitional societies.
4. Nationalistic demands have a multiplier effect as they in turn promote the integration of social groups.

The above propositions were derived by means of a union of conflict and integration theories of nationalism. This union, however, could

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produce a more powerful theory of nationalism only after the inclusion of several important relationships heretofore neglected in theories of nationalism: (1) relative deprivation and inequality; (2) relative deprivation and modernization; and (3) relative deprivation and group integration.

The proposed theory of nationalism is at variance with, and represents an improvement upon, existing theories of nationalism in four respects. First, the mode of organization—for instance, class identification—is not critical to the development of nationalism. Second, relative deprivation will not lead to nationalism unless there has been a modicum of group integration at the societal level. Third, institutional variables—the form of government, for example—affect the level of nationalism only to the extent to which they are incorporated in the process of modernization and group integration. Finally, the theory provides an explanation rather than an *a priori* assumption for nationalism's propensity to be found in transitional societies.

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NORTHERN IRELAND AS A CASE STUDY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES

By NORMAN FURNISS

Introduction

EVER since the modern state began to arrogate to itself the authority to make uniform rules equally binding on all sectors of the population, there have been calls for a return to the benevolent days of local control, to the benign influence of the country squire. Edmund Burke summarized these feelings when he underscored his dislike of "artificial government": "I have defended natural religion against a confederacy of atheists and divines. I now plead for natural society against politicians, and for natural religion against all three. . . . In vain you tell me that artificial government is good, but that I fall out only with the abuse. The thing! The thing itself is the abuse!"[1] At least as early as the debates surrounding the establishment of the American Constitution, however, there have been advocates of decentralization as a progressive measure, as a guarantee of efficient government closely attuned to citizen demands: "But it is not by the consolidation, or concentration of powers, but by their distribution, that good government is effected. Were not this great country already divided into states, that division must be made. . . . It is by this partition of cares, descending in gradation from general to particular, that the mass of human affairs may be best managed."[2] Although this opinion of Jefferson's was at first not widely shared outside of the United States, it has now—sometimes uneasily combined with the earlier value preference for a "natural society"—been adopted by persons along nearly all shades on the ideological spectrum. Indeed, it is difficult to find anyone who questions the ability of decentralization to ameliorate the problems of contemporary life.[3]

[1] Burke, "A Vindication of Natural Society" (1752); in *Works and Correspondence* (London 1952), II, 541.

[2] Thomas Jefferson, *Autobiography* (New York: Capricorn 1959), 92. A good general account of American feelings on this issue is given by Samuel Huntington, "The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers," in Arthur Maass, ed., *Area and Power* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1959), 150-205.

[3] I explore this issue in greater detail in "The Practical Significance of Decentralization," *Journal of Politics*, XXXVI (November 1974), 958-82.

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This new perception of the beneficial effects of decentralization has been spurred by the current ills of the nation-state. It is not just that the modern state is experiencing difficulties in sustaining relatively stable economic advance, in dealing with the special needs of the aged and unfortunate, and in preserving a modicum of civilized amenities—although all these have occurred. There has also been an often explicit linkage between these difficulties and the overburdened, overbureaucratized central decision-making structure. Decentralization brings the decision point for public and private services closer to the intended beneficiary, a process which in a nonfederal system usually involves the devolution of central powers to a newly defined regional level. It is contended that decentralization reduces the problem of communication overload, limits the irrationalities inherent in any large bureaucratic process, and lessens the role of organizational norms as a motivation for individual bureaucratic behavior.[4]

These general considerations favoring decentralization as a viable alternative to perceived central stultification have been given a special immediacy in Great Britain as a result of the conjunction of several factors. In the first place, the *general public* is showing signs of increasing disenchantment with centralized politics and administration. This disenchantment has been manifested behaviorally—for example, in the declining percentage of the electorate supporting *either* of the two major national parties. The general trend is indicated in the chart on page 389.

Disenchantment has also been shown attitudinally in a continuing series of Gallup polls and in the Attitudes Survey undertaken by the Royal Commission on the Constitution. The latter found that 49 per cent of the respondents felt the present system of running Britain needed "quite a lot" or "a great deal" of improvement; 61 per cent (67 per cent of those dissatisfied with current operations) thought that devolution to greater regional responsibility would be a useful corrective step.[6]

[4] For an argument in favor of the first premise, see Manfred Kochen and Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 734-49. For the second, see Vincent Ostrom, "Can Federalism Make a Difference?" (unpub. paper prepared for delivery at "Towards '76, A Conference on Federal Democracy in the United States," 1972). For the third, see Michael Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (University of Chicago Press 1964), 198-208.

[5] Figures computed by author. Any of a number of indices—increased volatility, declining respect for party leadership, rise of third parties—could have been used.

[6] Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution, Research Paper No. 7: "Devolution and Other Aspects of Government: An Attitudes Survey" (London: H.M.S.O. 1973), 16-23.

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

THE VOTE FOR THE LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE PARTIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ELECTORATE

Second, behavioral and attitudinal frustration has been augmented by Britain's endemic economic troubles since the war. Her failure to share fully in the prosperous growth of the last twenty-five years lends to the current problems of inflation and stagnation an aura of the apocalypse. Since Westminster has been in charge of economic management during this period, it is easy to conclude that decentralized authorities could hardly "do any worse."[7] Finally, the existence of two geographically distinguishable and self-conscious national minorities within the centralized state eliminates the element of artificiality present in decentralization proposals in many unitary states, and gives the reform a political plausibility. The recent discovery of oil in the North Sea off the Scottish coast has further altered the situation by making national unification appear as an economic handicap to the "Celtic fringe," rather than, as formerly, as a (perhaps unfortunate) economic necessity. Witness the success enjoyed by the slogan of the Scottish National Party: "Rich Scots—or Poor Britons."[8]

[7] This is the opinion of the *Economist* (July 6, 1974), 15-16. A perusal of its recent editorials reveals the previously mentioned apocalyptic tone of political debate. For a similar theme from the left, see Paul Johnson, "Whom the Gods Wish to Destroy," *New Statesman*, Vol. 88 (June 14, 1974), 823-24.

[8] Welsh nationalists have attempted to use the issue of water for a similar transformation in outlook; Liverpool and much of the Midlands use water from Wales. See Chris Ryder, ". . . And Will England Pay for Welsh Rain?" *Times* (London), May 19, 1974.

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In short, there exists in Britain, as in no other previously unitary state except Belgium, both a lack of central self-confidence and a presence of regional self-assertiveness—a combination that has made decentralization a viable item on the political agenda.[9] The issue has inspired a lengthy review of the Constitution by a Royal Commission which, although internally divided over specific proposals, was unanimous in its recommendation for some devolution of decision-making power. The Labour Government has now produced a "consultative document" in which seven different schemes involving some form of decentralization are offered, smorgasbord style, from which affected groups are to pick their choice.

The various plans (plus those suggested by academic and other interest groups) can be divided into two broad categories—consultative assemblies and decision-making bodies. The former are not of much concern to us here. Having no real autonomy (which might be defined as delegated control over expenditures and/or revenue), they pose no challenge to the unitary nature of the state, nor do they seem likely to produce anything but frustration. The creation of new regional decision-making bodies with at least theoretical control over some monies would, on the other hand, mark a decisive break from past administrative and political practice. In this context, it is useful to select a model that may suggest how these new entities will operate.

I have chosen to study Northern Ireland as such a model. Not only was Northern Ireland in existence as a decentralized entity for almost fifty years, but its structure closely paralleled the current proposals for decision-making assemblies. I will then examine the question of a future Ulster Government, to which both major British parties seem committed. Finally, in view of the rather sorry record of the Ulster regime, I will suggest possible alternatives to the regional devolution of power.

Northern Ireland as a Case Study of Decentralization

Northern Ireland has seldom been examined from the standpoint of the general applicability of its governmental structure or of its utility

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So far, however, the nature of the two liquids has tended to keep Welsh enthusiasm at a lower level than Scottish.

[9] For an account of general developments in Belgium, see Martin O. Heisler, "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity: The Growing Importance of the Output-side in Belgium," in Heisler, ed., *Politics in Europe* (New York: McKay 1974), 178-220.

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as a model for reform in Britain and in other unitary states. On the contrary, it is usually the uniqueness of Northern Ireland that is emphasized—the clash of dogmatic religions, the crisis of national identity, the peculiarities of the Irish character. The first approach is justified, I believe, because (1) current British decentralization proposals follow the Ulster model institutionally; (2) the advantages posited for the Ulster Government parallel the advantages posited for decentralization in general; (3) at least until its recent troubles, Northern Ireland was held as an explicit model both by many advocates of further decentralization in Britain and by the Commission on the Constitution itself.[10] That is not to say that I will posit a series of generalizations based on a particular experience, but I do believe that the evidence warrants the formulation of several propositions potentially applicable elsewhere.

CLAIM 1: CONGESTION AT THE CENTER IS RELIEVED

This claim might at first glance seem to be a case of self-abnegation, since the center appears to be the prime beneficiary. It can be argued, however, that relieving congestion at the center improves the life of the polity as a whole by making administration more efficient.[11] Although we may accept this assertion as correct in the abstract, there exists some difficulty in deciding what is meant by congestion. From the view of the center, congestion tends to be relieved only to the extent that the problems of the decentralized area are different. If problems remain the same, the amount of work required at the center for spatial administration need not be large and might be more than counterbalanced by the time spent in dealing with the newly created territorial body. It is unlikely, for example, that if Westminster were relieved of direct administrative control over East Anglia or Essex, its work load would be significantly lightened.

It is beyond dispute that the situation in Northern Ireland differs significantly from the British norm. On the other hand, the implications of not dealing with these differences at the center may vary. First of all, it can be maintained that regional peculiarities will not be properly comprehended at the center. Using the metaphors of communication theory, it can be argued that the central decision-making apparatus may either screen out the incoming information as incon-

[10] For examples, see Max Nicholson, *The System* (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1967); and H. J. Paton, *The Claim of Scotland* (London: Allen and Unwin 1968), 261.

[11] Cf. Martin Wallace, *Northern Ireland: 50 Years of Self-Government* (Newton Abbot: David and Charles 1972), 82-86.

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gruent with preconceived categories of analysis, or else it may process the information incorrectly and make an inappropriate response. That line of reasoning is continually expressed in the debates on Northern Ireland's future. William Whitelaw (then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) stated to the House of Commons, for example, that "Westminster alone could not hope to provide" the form of service the people of Northern Ireland had grown to expect.[12]

The potential for misapplied central responses must, however, be balanced against the possibility that abnegation by central authorities could simply leave regional problems festering. To test the probability of this outcome it is necessary to ask why the particular region is different and what is unique about its "needs." In the case of Northern Ireland, a major source of its distinctiveness was the tolerance and/or propagation of attitudes and policies by Stormont designed to exclude the Catholic population from effective political participation. That the means employed have forced Britain to enter an exception to the obligations imposed by the European Convention of Human Rights was seen as a minor matter. It is hard, in short, not to agree with the conclusion of Nicholas Mansergh (written almost forty years ago but rarely seconded since), that devolution in Northern Ireland "intensified a sectarian bitterness which civilized opinion deplores."[13]

Other regions in Britain, as well as other areas targeted for possible decentralization elsewhere, do not, fortunately, share this particular problem. On the other hand, without unique problems or attitudes the drive for decentralization would be much less pronounced. Regional attitudes in particular are often more "backward" than those of the central core—in educational policy, in tolerance of free speech, in "permissiveness."[14] In short, there is a strong probability that tensions may arise between "democratic" and "progressive" values,[15] paralleling the disagreement between the views of Burke and Jefferson discussed at the beginning of this essay. Even in the United States, with its prescribed system of judicial review, reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment, treatment of citizens according to standards laid down at the

[12] Great Britain, *Hansard* (November 13, 1972), col. 46. In general, see Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution, "Minutes of Evidence, Vol. III: Northern Ireland" (London: H.M.S.O. 1971), and "Written Evidence, Vol. VI: Northern Ireland" (London: H.M.S.O. 1972).

[13] Mansergh, *The Government of Northern Ireland* (London: Allen and Unwin 1936), 49.

[14] Furniss (fn. 3), 962.

[15] This point is well made by Thomas Wilson in an excellent memorandum to the Royal Commission, "Regional Government (with Special Reference to Northern Ireland)," in "Written Evidence" (fn. 12), 73-74.

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center remains an aspiration only. To "solve" the issue by refusing to delegate any powers over civil behavior to the regional authority is to rob decentralization of much of its meaning.[16]

Moreover, it must not be forgotten that, far from wishing to meddle in every detail of regional life, central authorities are usually only too glad to abjure responsibility for unpleasant and apparently irresolvable problems. There is no evidence, for example, that Westminster has regretted its long absences of direct administrative control over Ulster. Nor was it the source of much public consternation in the United States during most of its history that the federal system seemingly precluded direct intervention to solve the "Negro problem" in the South. Rather than a pattern of antagonism and strife, a relationship of mutual accommodation was established: provided the situation could be contained (i.e., the issue was not thrust before the general public's consciousness), the center was more than willing to remain aloof.

We may conclude that, although the uniqueness of Northern Ireland has relieved some central congestion, this relief was purchased at a considerable cost. Moreover, although other areas do not share Northern Ireland's problems, their particular "needs" often are operationalized in terms of policies less progressive than those sanctioned by national mores.[17] That outcome need not, of course, be deemed "bad" (indeed Edmund Burke saw it as a major benefit), but it ought not to be overlooked. To recast this conclusion in the form of several propositions:

(P1) Central congestion is relieved only to the extent that regional problems diverge from the national norm.

(P2) From the perspective of the center, regional particularities are likely to be seen as "regressive."

(P3) Central decision-making bodies will be disposed to ignore particular regional problems. If responsibility for these problems can be developed to a lower level, there will be an incentive to do so.

[16] The recommendation of, for example, the Northern Ireland Labour Party. See "Minutes of Evidence" (fn. 12), 71-73. This is also the basic conundrum facing the British Government. There is a strong urge to reestablish a regional government in Northern Ireland, and yet there is a disinclination to accord the body any effective power.

[17] As stated by Mr. Leitch (Parliamentary Draftsman's Office), "We are a different community, I suppose, just as much as Scotland. . . . If legislation is passed at Westminster, it might be doubtful whether people would want it here. Take abortion, homosexuality or even divorce law reform; our community in these matters may be more oldfashioned and so because of having our own parliament, we do not have Acts on these subjects." *Ibid.*, 8.

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CLAIM II: DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES PERMIT ADJUSTMENT AND FLEXIBILITY

This claim is closely associated with the first. For our purposes it seems best to separate them, because it is possible to realize one without the other. That is, one can conceive of a situation in which central congestion is not relieved to any marked degree while decentralization permits significant regional flexibility; likewise, central congestion could be reduced without the achievement of regional flexibility. The matter of adjustment and flexibility should also be given separate attention because it is the most widely articulated claim made on behalf of the Stormont Government. As stated succinctly by the Northern Ireland Council of the Confederation of British Industries, "It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the Government of Northern Ireland has taken, over the years, positive steps to promote the industrial prosperity of the Province. Furthermore, it is our view that such steps as have been taken are greater than would have been the case had we depended solely on the activity of a central legislature. The problems of Northern Ireland are pertinent, real and close to an indigenous government but would be less urgent and pressing if merely those of one of a number of similar areas."[18]

If we attempt to break down this opinion (shared, it should be emphasized, even by bodies such as the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions which has a less than enthusiastic opinion of Stormont operations as a whole), we find that it consists of two parts. First, on the input side, it is stated that Northern Ireland has more political and administrative officials than it would otherwise have, and that these officials are geographically closer to the actual situation. This combination of number and proximity increases the opportunity for bargaining, information exchange, and *ad hoc* meetings. Second, concerning outputs, it is maintained that Northern Ireland has derived special benefits from distinctive policies in economic and social areas. We shall consider each of these alleged advantages in turn.

Northern Ireland indeed had a larger number of administrators and political leaders on the spot than have other areas in Britain. With a population of around 1.5 million, Northern Ireland was served by 24 Senators and 52 members of the House of Commons. It also had 15,553 nonindustrial staff civil servants attached to the regional government in 1973, or one for every one hundred residents. To be sure,

[18] *Ibid.*, 150.

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Northern Ireland has been somewhat under-represented at Westminster, but since its contingent of twelve is only about three under what its quota would have been without a regional government, it is doubtful whether this deficit has had a qualitative impact on Westminster's decisions.

What should be avoided in reviewing these figures is the conclusion that numbers necessarily breed interaction, or that proximity necessarily leads to knowledge. If elected representatives are unavailable for consultation, if they have unlisted phone numbers, if they do not relate to a cross-section of the community, their mere existence is not a great participatory boon.[19] Although there has been no systematic study done on the interaction between a Stormont representative and his constituency, random evidence suggests that it is limited.[20] Moreover—and here we shift ground somewhat to include administrative officials as well—it is not enough merely to open up channels of communication and adjustment in theory; the channels must be given form and substance so that they are actually *used* by the population. The failure of Northern Ireland to provide these facilities is evidenced strikingly in the record of the Commissioner for Complaints. Established in May 1969 as a consequence of social turmoil, the office of the Commissioner and his small staff (never more than 54 persons) were to serve as a sort of ombudsman to make sure that all citizens were accorded equal treatment administratively. During the first three years of its existence, the number of complaints received fell from 1200 in 1970 to 431 in 1972. In the latter year there were only sixteen complaints of religious or political discrimination by local authorities. And the Commissioner's investigation "did not sustain this charge in any case."[21] These might be the deliberations of a sleepy garden suburb.

Turning to the outputs of the system (that is, a consideration of particular policies regardless of how they were made), we find a similarly mixed record. On the one hand, it is a definite advantage to have a body able to give legislative enactment to particular matters (loans to shipbuilders, establishment of folk museums, reformulation of municipal

[19] This point is generally underexplored. For an excellent case study on London, see John Dearlove, "Councillors and Interest Groups in Kensington and Chelsea," *British Journal of Political Science*, 1 (April 1971), 129-54.

[20] Cf. "Minutes of Evidence" (fn. 12), 45-56. Moreover, there is the almost total *nonrepresentation* of those with a religious faith different from "their" representative. This point is made strongly in the Scarman Report, Cmnd. 566, "Violence and Civil Disturbance in Northern Ireland" (London: H.M.S.O. 1972).

[21] Fifth Report of the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints, "Annual Report for 1972" (Belfast: H.M.S.O. 1973); quotation from p. 17.

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boundaries, etc.).[22] Somewhat more broadly, Northern Ireland has paved the way in some areas of public policy. Wild birds, for example, were given legislative protection sooner than anywhere else in Britain; and the Northern Ireland tourist authority was propounding the beauties of the country at a time when the British Tourist Board was still targeting visitors almost solely to London-Stratford-Oxford, with perhaps a journey to Edinburgh for those of the proper ethnic background. Finally, it should be noted that the Ulster Government and administration have been particularly solicitous of the requirements of individual industrialists and have adopted a deliberate policy of attempting to keep tax advantages somewhat higher than in other British "development areas."

The favorable features must, however, be balanced against a more general consideration: especially in economically "backward" areas (those, for example, which are either primarily agricultural with rural overpopulation, or those encompassing a declining heavy industrial base and a net migration deficit—such as Northern Ireland), it is necessary not only to make *ad hoc* adjustments, but to formulate and execute long-range development strategies. A good indicator of this kind of competence is the quality and effectiveness of economic and social planning, and it is here that Ulster's record has been particularly dismal. Despite the British record going back at least to the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, no planning of any kind was even considered here until 1962, when Sir Robert Matthew was commissioned to prepare a regional survey of Belfast. Professor Thomas Wilson followed with a more general study three years later. The findings of these two reports merit some attention. First, in much the same way in which the Ministry of Labour *Reports* in 1934 finally impressed upon Whitehall the magnitude of the depression in industrial Britain, the Matthew and Wilson reports brought to the attention of the leadership at Stormont what should have been evident after a cursory stroll around Belfast: the area was dirty, crowded, and aesthetically displeasing, with a vista comprised of "acres of workers' two-storey terrace housing, unbroken by any open spaces except where blitzed sites remain unbuilt."[23] In

[22] All three examples are taken from the useful compendium of Acts passed by the Northern Ireland Parliament 1965–1969, classified according to whether they were unique to Ulster or parity legislation with Britain. Almost two-thirds of the bills were found to be related to purely Northern Ireland matters. See "Minutes of Evidence" (fn. 12), Appendix II.

[23] Sir Robert Matthew, *Belfast Regional Survey and Plan* (Belfast: H.M.S.O. 1964), 132. This conclusion is echoed by Thomas Wilson, *Economic Development in Northern Ireland*, Cmnd. 470 (Belfast: H.M.S.O. 1966), 39-72.

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aggregate terms, it was found that the civil service had little statistical information upon which a relevant policy could be based.[24]

Government action of any kind, rational or not, was rare. Existing legislation was a dead letter, the recommendations of the Northern Ireland Advisory Board (1946) were forgotten, and local town planning was termed "almost nonexistent."[25] Perhaps even more disturbing to advocates of decentralization was the discovery of impediments to progress in the form of archaic laws and decisions, exactly the sort of situation that a devolved authority was supposed to prevent. In particular, laws governing the rehabilitation of property had not been modernized, and a court case defining planning restrictions as the taking of property, and thus liable to compensation, had been permitted to stand unchallenged since the 1930's.[26] In summary, neither the ability nor the will to plan coherently was shown. Associated with the general negative implications of this absence in terms of future economic and social development were a number of specific cases in which Ulster legislation lagged behind the norm of the United Kingdom. For every example of timely bird preservation or tourist board initiative, there were counterpoising lapses: the failure to institute a National Park system until 1965, for instance, and the tardy establishment of effective controls over effluent discharge into public sewers.[27]

I should emphasize here that this discussion is not intended to debit the Stormont leadership with every deflection from the ideal realization of the claim for decentralized adjustment and flexibility. On the contrary, while the Ulster Government and administration can be blamed for particular misdeeds and omissions, the overall responsibility for the mixed record must be more generally attributed. Planning entails a certain amount of expertise that may either not be available or not be developed in the decentralized administrative structure. That has been the case in Northern Ireland and in the Scottish Office, where the first economist was hired only in the early 1960's. Moreover, effective regional economic planning, even with all requisite expertise, cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Regional economic plans must

[24] There is less statistical information about Northern Ireland, for example, than about Wales. *Ibid.*, 143.

[25] Matthew (fn. 23), 39-43.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] These two examples are recounted in Wilson (fn. 23), 88, and in Great Britain, *Hansard* (December 21, 1972). It is pointless to add up all the positive and negative features (legislation on economic and environmental issues behind and in advance of general British pace) and to see which outweighs the other. The exercise would not only be tedious and inconclusive, but it would obscure the point that the Ulster government generated *both* as a matter of course.

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be coordinated and must cohere with the national development strategy.[28] In Italy, the tension between regional economic planning and separate systems of regional administration and legislation is most evident: Italy *was* given, in its postwar constitution, a regional political-administrative structure that was supposed to deal with economic problems. Nevertheless, *the* regional problem (the *mezzogiorno*) is still handled from the center; the regional authorities, belatedly established, are viewed as a threat to effective planning in the future.[29] Finally, I should note that this tension arises as much from the influence of local elites as from the logic of the planning process.

We can now advance the following general propositions:

(P4) Decentralization increases the number of political and administrative decision makers.

(P5) Adjustment of policy output to fit particular needs is skewed in the direction of elite pressure.

(P6) Regional economic and environmental planning tends to be hindered by the existence of separate regional political and administrative structures, which often lack the necessary expertise.

CLAIM III: DECENTRALIZATION DOES NOT NEGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING WELFARE BENEFITS AT NATIONAL LEVELS

This claim is important because of Ulster's traditional and continuing lower standard of living in relation to the British level (a situation shared, albeit in a more attenuated form, by Scotland and Wales). Gross domestic product per capita is still only about 70 per cent of the average in the United Kingdom, and unemployment rates (despite massive emigration) remain high. The anticipated rundown in traditional industries can be expected to cause further dislocations. In 1973, over 24 per cent of employees in manufacturing industries still worked in textiles, and over 14 per cent were employed in the manufacture of clothing and footwear. These industries had then lost 8,500 and 300 jobs respectively since 1968.[30] The relatively depressed economic and

[28] This argument is developed by Maurice Bourjol, *Les Institutions Régionales de 1789 à Nos Jours* (Paris: Berger-Levrault 1969), 317-51.

[29] See Martin Watson, *Regional Development Policy and Administration in Italy* (London: Longmans 1970), 4-17. A comprehensive discussion is provided in the compendium of papers published by the University of Cagliari, *Burocrazia e Autonomie Regionali* (Milan 1970).

[30] Figures compiled from "Digest of Statistics: Northern Ireland" (Belfast: H.M.S.O. March 1974), Table 8.

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social conditions raise the fundamental question of whether decentralization must lead to a choice between reduced welfare services and exorbitantly high local taxation.

It is in facing this choice that the advantages of a decentralized over a formal federal system become apparent. A federal system, with clearly demarcated spheres of competence among different units, is much less able to provide uniform welfare standards; residents of poorer states or provinces usually receive distinctly lower benefits than residents of wealthier areas. In decentralized systems, on the other hand, with the central authority retaining ultimate jurisdiction in all matters and only by its own revocable decision delegating legal power, it is possible to argue that the decentralized area should not suffer gratuitously. That, in any event, has been the political strategy successfully pursued from the outset by the Ulster leadership, which—as the Minister of Finance explained in 1924—"proceeded on the assumption that in all matters of social welfare we should be entitled to the same benefits as Great Britain."[31] In practice, with a tax yield in 1924 of less than one-half the United Kingdom average per capita, the "same benefits" meant, and still mean, massive subsidies, a situation which can well be described as "getting the services concerned at a bargain-basement price."[32] That is a significant achievement; indeed, it has been considered the crowning success of at least two Prime Ministers of Northern Ireland to have persuaded the Treasury to agree to the extension of welfare reforms to Ulster.[33]

The irony nevertheless is clear: In a unitary government, there would have been no question that Ulster residents would receive equal treatment; the very existence of decentralized authority is what casts doubts. Moreover, as might be expected, along with subsidies have come controls, acceptance of British standards, and an orientation away from the particular problems of Ulster toward the expensive task of ensuring equal services. In short, subsidies have engendered constraints on financial expenditures far stricter than those formally described. It is estimated, for example, that 95 per cent of Ulster's expenditure is mandated from the center.[34] It is also hard to see how

[31] Quoted in Reginald Lawrence, *The Government of Northern Ireland: Public Finances and Public Services 1921–1964* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965), 45.

[32] The phrase is that of Donald Dewar, "Devolution and Local Government Reform," in Neil MacCormick, ed., *The Scottish Debate* (London: Oxford University Press 1970), 66.

[33] Wallace (fn. 11), 82.

[34] The estimate is that of the Northern Ireland Ministry of Finance. "Minutes of Evidence" (fn. 12), 21-27.

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other relationships between the center and the regional authorities could proceed in a different fashion unless the center were willing *both* to relinquish control over how subsidies were spent *and* to make up any shortfall if the particular decentralized expenditure patterns failed to provide equal services.

The outcome of this financial control has not altogether been to relegate Stormont to a moribund, rubber-stamping body. Some financial discretion remains, and it has been used, as I mentioned earlier, to establish a favorable tax climate for particular industries. In the main, however, the lack of maneuverability concerning expenditures has directed attention to social and civil affairs. For Ulster, this preoccupation has obviously been unfortunate; it was one of the reasons, for example, that Terrence O'Neill failed to project a more "modern" economic side of the Ulster leadership; the latter was severely circumscribed economically, but retained considerable flexibility on non-financial matters—a combination that favored entrenched elites (e.g., the Orange Order) by giving them a more meaningful stake in the system.[35]

The foregoing discussion leads us to propose that:

(P7) Decentralized areas are able to secure equal welfare benefits, even if the means involved necessitate subsidies from the center.

It should be noted however, that:

(P8) Central subsidies bring tight expenditure controls.

(P9) The tendency toward increased influence by non-economically oriented regional elites is a consequence of financial control from the center.

General Implications for Further Decentralization in Britain (and in Other Unitary States)

The first conclusion that must be drawn from this study of the impact of decentralized government and administration on economic, social and political life in Ulster is that the total effect has been decidedly negative. The advantages of flexibility to meet the desires of local industry and the maintenance of British welfare levels have been outweighed by the absence of long-range development strategies, the retention of restrictions on civil liberties removed elsewhere in Britain,

[35] The implications of this situation were detailed fully in the Cameron Report, "Disturbances in Northern Ireland," Cmnd. 532 (Belfast: H.M.S.O. 1969).

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and the furtherance of a "hothouse" atmosphere in which traditional hatreds could flourish.[36]

Given this record (which has been rather consistently sustained regardless of the varying capabilities of the Ulster leadership over time), one would predict that the reestablishment of an effective Stormont regime would not mark a sharp break from past patterns. The decomposition of the Faulkner government is indicative of future pressures: either there will be a return to past practices (which is unacceptable to the center, at least in the absence of Catholic quiescence), or there will be endemic political instability (since past practices were fully congruent with the balance of regional political forces).

I would further argue that this record is not unique; rather, it is symptomatic of conditions that might and do occur with decentralization of previously unitary states.[37] The plausibility of my claims is strengthened when the general context of efforts at decentralization is considered.

In differing from the rest of Britain, Northern Ireland shares a condition with other areas desiring or achieving decentralization. Feelings for decentralization are not stirred by considerations of greater economic or administrative efficiency; on the other hand, residents who perceive no great disparity between themselves and the center have difficulty in seeing themselves as part of a separate region. This commonsensical statement has been supported by a series of polls conducted in France during the debate on regional reform in 1968 and 1969. France had been divided into a number of program regions since 1964, and the question was posed whether these regions should be given more authority.

Although the issue did have an impact on French political life—it was, among other things, the immediate cause of General de Gaulle's resignation—the ephemeral nature of the debate was revealed when it was discovered that 74 per cent of respondents to a poll did not know whether their area was located within a program region or not. The remaining 26 per cent were equally divided between those answering in the negative and the affirmative. Moreover, when respondents were informed that they *were* living in a region and asked to name it, the responses were nebulous, to say the least. In Ardeche, for example, seven different answers were given, with "midi" achieving a plurality

[36] Cf. Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus* (Boston: Beacon Press 1971).

[37] In federal states, with long established and *recognized* systems of overlapping jurisdictions, these conditions might not hold to the extent that the federal divisions do not correspond to perceived differences within the population.

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and the correct response, Rhone-Alps, being mentioned by no one.[38] This discovery permits a further modification of my earlier statement: not only is longing for a real devolution not pervasive; if forced to name a region of association, the responses may be geographically diverse; none necessarily correspond to the optimal size for purposes of economic development.[39]

We are left, perforce, with areas in which there is a well-articulated interest in decentralization corresponding to some recognizable boundary. Most are geographically at the periphery of the state: Sicily, the Basque country, Brittany, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. And all of the foregoing share the condition of being poorer than the national average, and therefore being in need of central financial assistance. Unless they elect to sacrifice economic advantages (and, it must be remembered, these are the places least able to do without them), they will lose some of the benefits of autonomous decision making. Since we must assume that such a choice would rarely be made, regional decision makers everywhere are subject to the same economic constraints affecting the political leadership in Northern Ireland.

Moreover, because these areas are located not only at the periphery of the nation but also far from the high growth areas of Europe,[40] there will be a tendency for them to grow relatively *poorer* as new industries established in the core areas act as propulsive mechanisms attracting supportive secondary and tertiary activities.[41] Dependence on the center is therefore unlikely to be a temporary phenomenon.[42]

[38] Results reported in the Club Nouvelle Frontière, *Le Dossier du 27 Avril* (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset 1969), 41-48.

[39] This conclusion is not in contradiction to the widespread affirmation of the idea of decentralization recorded earlier in Britain. Large numbers favored it when the matter was broached, but when asked to name what reforms might help out their area, less than 1 per cent of English respondents mentioned decentralization *spontaneously*. The percentages rose to nine in Wales and twenty in Scotland. This distinction, unfortunately, was not made in the otherwise useful Royal Commission on the Constitution's "Memorandum of Dissent," Cmnd. 5460-I (London: H.M.S.O. 1973), 26-27.

[40] For a discussion of these areas from the perspective of future European economic growth areas, see Geoffrey Parker, *An Economic Geography of the Common Market* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1969), 85-99.

[41] An excellent summary of this argument, which has spawned a whole literature of regional economic analysis, is given by Albert Hirschman, "Interregional and International Sources of Economic Growth," in David L. McKee and others, eds., *Regional Economics: Theory and Practice* (New York: Free Press 1970), 105-20.

[42] Should some extraordinary exogenous factor intrude to render a region *more prosperous* than the center, these remarks obviously lose their applicability. On the other hand, the meaning of decentralization would also change to mean a disassocia-

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The Future of Centralization

The foregoing discussion of the Ulster experience and its implications for other efforts at decentralization would end on a more positive note if it could be determined that the central unitary state was operating effectively and with some public approbation. But, as was described at the outset, that is not the case. The modern central state is overloaded, overbureaucratized, and underresponsive. Far from becoming more responsive, the modern state is becoming *more centralized*, overriding and revamping subnational jurisdictions in the quest for more coordinated efficiency. In Britain this trend is especially conspicuous since it runs directly counter to popular agitation for reduced central control. As a result of the recently instituted "reforms" of local government, separate authorities have been merged and the number of local councillors has been reduced from 37,530 to 23,950. Not only are the new areas more remote from the citizenry (with fewer officials to *be* responsive), but the new areas, burdened with largely artificial boundaries, have the additional disadvantage of lacking any natural (habitual) focus of local loyalty and attention.[43]

Given this context of increasing (and unproductive) centralization, we can advance some reasons for advocating a modest degree of decentralization. First, we can draw upon a general, albeit rarely explicit, finding in the literature of public administration: the reversal of standard practices is a useful technique in combatting routinization. As a corollary in the present case, a centralized decision-making and administrative structure might be made more efficient by decentralization and vice versa—quite apart from the intrinsic merits (if any) of the two organizational forms. Change might produce a welcome questioning of old verities, a search for new procedures. Second, we might argue that even if decentralization were no more efficient—and if we

tion from the problems of the more unfortunate. In this connection, should the discovery of North Sea oil make Scotland more prosperous than the rest of Britain (still an unlikely event) and thereby spark a groundswell for autonomy, Tom Nairn's assessment would seem to assume particular relevance: Scotland "is a junior but (as these things go) highly successful partner in the general business enterprise of Anglo-Scots imperialism. Now that this business is evidently on its last legs, it may be quite reasonable for the Scots to want out. But there is really no point in disguising this desire with heroic ikonry." Nairn, "The Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism," in Karl Miller, ed., *Memoirs of a Modern Scotland* (London: Faber and Faber 1970), 45.

[43] The reforms had their genesis in the Reports of the Royal Commission on Local Government in England 1966–69 and the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland 1966–69, Cmnd. 4040 and 4150. The recommendations were enacted, with some boundary changes, in 1971.

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grant the first point, it might well not be over the long run—it might alleviate discontent and generate at least symbolic outputs (singing of national songs, castigation of central authorities) that are soothing to the populace.

Finally, we should note the possible use of decentralization as a political strategy to put pressure on the center to dispense economic benefits and to force industrial development to the periphery. In other words, militancy pays in dealing with the modern state—provided the militancy can be assuaged by generous supplies of cash. The threat (perhaps even more than the reality) of separation or autonomy seems well suited to galvanize the center into action. When it is recalled that the consequence of economic development is probably a further impoverishment of the periphery in relation to the center, the interposition of political constraints assumes added importance.

These remedies and strategies fail to address, however, the magnitude of the problems facing modern states. They are more appropriate to a situation in basic equilibrium. They do nothing to stop the general trend toward more centralization (in industry and in social life as much as in governmental arenas), nor do they act as anything but minor palliatives for the irrationalities thus created. Yet, as we have seen, the larger claims made by advocates of decentralization are unsupported. Our conclusion must be that although the arguments in favor of decentralization offer an illuminating critique of central governmental practices, decentralization on the Ulster model is not the solution to the problems of the modern unitary state.

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ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

(The New Type of International Relations)

By NISH JAMGOTCH, JR.

THE thesis of this study is that the Soviet concept of "international relations of a new type" (said to be firmly rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory) with select East European states has proved to be a limited but realistic substitute for the original messianism and universalistic goals of communism. In its two major parts, the study sets forth the theory and practice of the Soviet concept of new international relations—in truth, hardly what they are said to be, but very exclusively applied and from a practical standpoint, very instrumental in maintaining a Soviet-East European security community. The study rests upon the belief that it is important to know the special policy manifestations of the new type of international relations (at least six) presumably not practiced with bourgeois-capitalist powers. We could all benefit from a better knowledge of how successfully the Soviets have accommodated realities in the Communist world through the pragmatic and versatile adjustment of national objectives.

The Marxist-Leninist behavioral model of international relations of a new type characterizes the conduct of foreign policy in Eastern Europe as matchless, ethically superior, and destined to realize the highest international objectives of communism. In my judgment, however, the elaboration and implementation of the concept actually signifies the inability to unify worldwide communism and make of it a global system subservient to Soviet interests. As a consequence, the relatively confined East European sector of the international Communist system has been elevated to crucial importance and has become a highly specialized subsystem and irreducible Soviet core interest—indeed, the only area of the world which has been consistently rendered pliant for a wide spectrum of local and global security goals.

To understand alliance management in Eastern Europe, one must first know the major thrusts of Soviet foreign policy. Stalin and his successors, having determined very early after World War II that Eastern Europe must have Marxist-Leninist public order systems patterned closely on the Soviet model, arrogated to themselves the right to in-

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tervene in all East European affairs deemed essential to the territorial defense and the security of entrenched Communist regimes. Through highly diversified policies, often belatedly justified by doctrinal elaborations, Soviet leaders proved that no international system of states since the war has been more forcefully and continuously influenced by the manipulations of a superpower.

Historically strategic to the defense of the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe by the mid-fifties took on even greater significance in terms of four closely related priorities: (1) the ideological commitment to the realization of Marxism-Leninism on an international plane; (2) Soviet national security requirements supported by the pledge that any threat to a Warsaw Pact signatory be considered a threat to the Soviet Union itself; (3) the need for dependable international support for the Soviet Union's great-power status in the Communist world and for the future of its socioeconomic system rapidly maturing at home, but only in somewhat earlier stages in Eastern Europe; and (4) the creation of East European international organizations for concerted political and economic integration designed to prepare the way for a "simultaneous entry into communism within one historical epoch," with special allowances for the admittedly nebulous character of this process.

Nowhere in the scholarly literature on Communist affairs has there been a convincing analysis of why there has been so little American appreciation for these priorities and for the uncommon relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its transplants in Eastern Europe; or for deep Soviet suspicions of sporadic reformist trends, any of which could at least potentially subvert socioeconomic life in the U.S.S.R.; or for fears that if any of the contiguous East European states should generate anything other than a one-party Marxist-Leninist regime, the East European subsystem and probably even the authority of the CPSU might well give way. At least this is the perception of Soviet leaders, easily inferred from effusive declarations of principle and from press and periodical literature on the inestimable value of Soviet-East European solidarity.

No irrefutable explanation for the enduring Soviet-East European interdependence can be given in this brief space. Yet, in the interest of dialogue, it is at least worthwhile to ponder some of the dimensions and characteristics of the East European alliance, so unique and remarkably viable in its twenty-year history. Considerable analysis of determinants and many useful models and typologies have, of course,

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enhanced our understanding of Soviet political behavior, both foreign and domestic. To cite but a few, much has been learned by treating communism as a form of underdevelopment, a crash program for modernization, a bureaucracy writ large, a system of rational policy-makers, a society replete with consumerism and the ongoing pluralization of elites, and a system in which the CPSU is more a broker of interests than an authoritarian leader. In foreign policy, there have been theories that considered Soviet behavior as a continuation of Czarist objectives, or a reflection of a Communist blueprint for world conquest, or even the consequence of Kremlin rivalries and power struggles. And there are more eclectic approaches seeking truth from a combination of sources.

But one very important motivation for policy behavior has tended to elude analysis: the Soviet Union's requirement for a nexus of unprecedented relationships with select contiguous foreign powers. It is not too much to say that no modern public order system has been more intimately dependent upon an international network of states for the attainment of its goals and the continued legitimacy of its rulers. No other world power has been so dependent for much of its governing authority upon a semblance of orthodoxy throughout a closely knit system of which it is the key member. No matter that the pro-Soviet part has been reduced from its original dimensions—from a worldwide fourteen states to about seven in Eastern Europe. The essential point is that, several times in a score of years, the U.S.S.R. has gone to war against some of its allies to make it clear that their alliance is vital and that its significance transcends strategic-military objectives. Surprisingly, so inured has the world become to Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe that systematic political pressures and military coercion are widely regarded as commonplace, unavoidable, and legitimate within the contemporary understandings of power politics.

Thus, the Communist "wave of the future" depends upon a high order of interrelationships among a very select number of Communist Parties currently in power, and no realistic expectation for an increase in the foreseeable future. Rather than constituting the "wave of the future," however, communism as an international movement has been static, if not regressive. Not since Fidel Castro adopted Marxism-Leninism for Cuba in 1961 has there been any addition to the international system. Furthermore, the expansionist potential for communism is very bleak indeed, and except for the example of Castro, it is

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highly unlikely that the conditions which brought communism to power in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, China, and the divided states will prevail again. Precisely this prospect (made more poignant by polycentric communism and the tindery relations with China) explains the indissoluble interdependence between the U.S.S.R. and what it terms the "fraternal socialist allies."

International Relations of a New Type—The Theory

The idea of international relations of a new type among socialist states, as distinct from ordinary relations among bourgeois states, was officially expressed in the Soviet Union's *Diplomatic Dictionary* in 1960. The importance of the idea warrants a rather full quotation.

> The new type of diplomatic relations is free of antagonism and based on the principle of proletarian internationalism and brotherly cooperation in the name of common objectives, i.e. complete respect for sovereign rights and the national interests of each socialist country. At a time when the political relations among the capitalist countries even allied by treaty are marked by antagonistic competition and rivalry (if not attempts to gain hegemony by one over the other), the political relations among the socialist countries exclude such antagonisms and establish relations of friendship and close brotherly mutual cooperation on the basis of equality.
>
> To maintain such relations, socialist countries employ new methods of constructive activity which facilitate unity and the coordination of measures for defense and general peace. The methods of socialist diplomacy employed in the mutual relations among socialist countries spontaneously develop into organizational forms and joint efforts of united free peoples throughout the world who are for the general principles of building communism and preserving world peace.[1]

Hardly an issue of *International Affairs* (Moscow) or *World Marxist Review* is published without detailed references to the contemporary significance of both the theory and practice of these new relations,

[1] A. A. Gromyko, Chief Ed., *Diplomaticheskii Slovar*, I (Moscow 1960), 467-68. Analyzed further in 1964 by two Soviet specialists in world affairs, the foreign policies of Marxist-Leninist states were said to be characterized by: (1) political cooperation firmly based upon Marxism-Leninism with its objective laws for both international and domestic development; (2) maintenance of individual national independence and sovereignty; (3) sincerity and honesty (correspondence between words and deeds), rooted in the power of socialism; (4) solidarity of socialist countries, which serves the interests of all peaceful peoples by restraining aggressive circles and maintaining the forces for peace; and (5) recognition of the Soviet Union's definitive role in the peace efforts of our time. See M. E. Airapetian and V. V. Sukhodeev, *Novyi Tip Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii* (Moscow 1964), 157-58. For an updated and expanded definition under the rubric of "Socialist Internationalism," see *Diplomaticheskii Slovar*, III (Moscow 1973), 404-05.

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frequently used interchangeably with the idea of socialist internationalism.[2] Again, the themes are monotonously familiar:

> Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, noted: "The socialist states have introduced new, unknown before, principles and standards in international affairs, generated by the communists' ideology and the lofty and noble goals of their struggle. The founder of these principles was Lenin. . . ."
>
> The creation and development [of the world socialist system] has brought into being a totally new and unprecedented type of relations between states. Further developing and enriching the theory of scientific socialism on the basis of the experience, gained in the course of socialist and communist construction, the countries of the socialist community are consolidating and expanding their inter-party and inter-state relations and are improving the forms and methods of cooperation, including cooperation in the international arena.
>
> The cooperation and cohesion of socialist countries, as well as the coordination of their foreign policies, are based on common interests determined by the community of their political system, ideology, and their common class approach to present-day realities. The common ideological basis of the foreign policies . . . enables them to take a common stand on pressing world issues and to solve the complex problems of their inter-relationship in a spirit of fraternal friendship.[3]

Nor is the cultural realm excluded.

> As distinct from bourgeois culture, which belongs to the well-to-do strata and serves their selfish interests, the new culture basing itself on the revolutionary creativity of the masses and on their rising standard of living, is directed toward the harmonious and comprehensive development of every member of society. At the same time, revolutionary humanism "manifests itself in the fusion of the socialist cultures of fraternal nations, in the striving of all the peoples building the new world to evolve a world culture, a culture of militant goodness and love of mankind."
>
> This natural convergence of socialist cultures leads to two interdependent processes: the genuine blossoming of national cultures and the forming of a worldwide communist culture.[4]

The significance of these statements is that they are samples of highly utopian theory purporting to show that multilateral relations

[2] For a critical analysis of the major problems in using the concepts of socialist internationalism and proletarian internationalism, see Jan Triska, ed., *Communist Party-States* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill 1969), esp. 9-22.

[3] Y. Nikolayev, "Soviet Foreign Policy: Basic Ideological Principles," *International Affairs* (November 1973), 65-66.

[4] A. I. Arnoldov, *Culture and Contemporary World. The Dialectics of the Cultural Consolidation of the Socialist Countries* (Moscow 1973), 69, 123. Reviewed in *International Affairs* (October 1973), 108-10.

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—economic, political, ideological, cultural, and international-legal—among the fourteen Communist Party states are conducted on an ethically exalted plane, based on uncommon mutual trust, interests, benefits, and obligations. It is of course not without purpose that official testimonials emphasize socialist internationalism, respect for individual national sovereignty, and agreements founded upon exclusive friendship, honesty, cooperation, and the lofty goals of struggle, despite evidence that such values have had very little operational significance in Communist foreign policies at all. Certainly, legitimate questions can be raised concerning the general isolation of the Asian Party states, the precise allegiance of the Yugoslavs and Albanians, and the divisive disputes between the Communist superpowers. How to explain this gap between myth and reality?

Robert Tucker has pointed out that it is in the nature of aging Marxist-Leninist movements that as they become less radical and more willing to revise revolutionary doctrine, ideological verbalizations continue and are even exaggerated to compensate for losses in militancy and the failure to attain professed goals. In Tucker's words,

> Not only would a Soviet Communist movement in process of deradicalization go on proclaiming its adherence to the final goals of the movement; it would, by virtue of the dialectic of the process, reaffirm the goals in very strong terms, as it has done. For intensified *verbal* allegiance to ultimate ideological goals belongs to the pattern of deradicalization.
>
> Not the end of ideology but rather the growth of a stable discrepancy between ideological symbols and political deeds is the true mark of deradicalizing change in once-radical movements.[5]

Another insightful explanation has been suggested by Chalmers Johnson. Emphasizing two components of any revolutionary ideology —goal culture and transfer culture—he offers the following:

> In order to move the [revolutionary] system toward the ideologically desired configuration, as well as to keep the social system going during the transition period, the mobilization regime leadership must create new organizations that bridge the gap between ideology and reality.
>
> . . . A communist party in power adopts a transfer culture, which it expounds and defends as moving society toward a utopian goal culture but which in fact has as its first two priorities the preservation of the party's power monopoly and the maintenance of the social system. Third in priority, but still of decisive importance, are schemes thought to be necessary for achieving the goal culture—a classless society, the

[5] Robert C. Tucker, "The De-radicalization of Marxist Movements," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (June 1967), 358.

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defeat of "imperialism," socialist construction, the "new socialist man," etc. It is the particular contents and precedents of the Marxist-Leninist goal culture that distinguish Communist from other revolutionary movements.[6]

Continuing with this theme, Richard Lowenthal observes in a brilliant article that,

> . . . in contrast to nationalist movement regimes, which may have no higher goal than the achievement of complete independence and the effective modernization of their country (a pragmatic task limited in space as well as in time), Communist regimes are officially dedicated to the struggle for the utopian goal of a classless world society, a struggle that is not only worldwide but unending, since its goal can never be achieved.
>
> Unable to continue its revolutionary offensive against society and unwilling to be reduced to a mere expression of the constellation of . . . social forces at a given moment, [the postrevolutionary party regime] . . . is on the defensive against the forces of autonomous social development, a guardian clinging to his role after his ward has reached adulthood.
>
> One symptom of this defensive situation of a Communist party ruling an industrial society is its search for a new ideological legitimation. No longer able to justify its rule as a dictatorship of the proletariat needed to achieve full Communism, it claims that its guardian role is necessary to assure a steady growth of production and welfare (which will eventually lead to Communism), to prevent the penetration of foreign influences hostile to the country's socialist achievements, and generally to maintain national unity, independence, and greatness.[7]

Thus, Communist public order systems must develop transfer cultures in order to make possible their goal culture of the future. In doing this, they unwittingly sabotage the attainment of that goal culture; for transfer cultures are typically characterized by bureaucratization, autonomous groups, deep loyalties, and vested interests in maintaining the current status rather than in making more sacrifices for a radically restructured future social order at the international level. Johnson, Lowenthal, and Tucker have provided useful clarifications of why myth and reality can be so out of phase in Communist policies. In reality, of course, Soviet leaders have opted for the best of both worlds: on the one hand, the maintenance of their own authoritarian state power, and on the other, the toleration of some elements of international pluralism (where they can be controlled absolutely in East-

[6] Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford University Press 1970), 15, 25.

[7] Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in Johnson, *ibid.*, 40-41, 115.

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ern Europe) in the name of the Communist future on their own terms.

Finally it should be emphasized that, as Communist ideology becomes less action-oriented and more historical, its mobilization functions are gradually replaced. The new imperative is to extend and invigorate a political mythology to which Communist ideologues cling tenaciously, not because they believe in its historical objectives unreservedly, but because myths die hard; and it is always difficult to discard ideas to which years of dedication and loyalty have been given. Narrowing the geographical context for the realization of professed goals is a rational solution to this doctrinal problem.

International Relations of a New Type—The Practice

Actual policies in the name of international relations of a new type have been remarkably diversified, sophisticated, and purposeful in serving specific Soviet national needs and objectives. Included are at least six distinct applications prominent in Soviet-East European relations in the past decade—none of them anticipated; all of them at variance with original Marxist-Leninist tenets; and all of them underscoring the indispensability of Eastern Europe for Soviet political, ideological, and military purposes. Each of the following constitutes a vital contemporary perspective from which Soviet policy formulators view Eastern Europe's relevance to Soviet security interests. In every case, the new relations include activities and understandings which are exclusive among a select group of Communist ruling-party states.

First, if one surveys the whole history of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe since World War II, international relations of a new type denote continuous accommodations to the disruptions of polycentric communism resulting from ideologically unaccounted-for challenges to the Soviet Union's capacity to control the worldwide Communist movement. Decisive watersheds in this evolution would include Tito's successful bolt in 1948; the Polish and Hungarian bids for greater independence in the fall of 1956; markedly independent Albanian and Rumanian diplomacy since 1961; the growth of self-sufficient, self-assertive communism in the People's Republic of China (the most serious challenge to Soviet ideological legitimacy and leadership since 1963); and the new course in Czechoslovakia, 1967–68, necessitating a theoretical elaboration on limited sovereignty.

There has been far too little analysis and understanding of the profound influence of Yugoslavia upon the experimentation and devia-

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tions in Eastern Europe. It is probably safe to say that new Communist international relations have in large measure been a response to Tito's historically challenging policies—his independence, economic reforms, free-wheeling diplomacy, and steadfast insistence that socialism of the Marxist-Leninist brand is perfectly compatible with Yugoslav nationalism.

One consequence has been a greater Soviet acceptance of pluralism as both natural and inevitable among Communist states. Examples include cautious and measured attitudes toward the workers' strikes in Poland, in December 1970; Hungary's New Economic Management, operationalized in January 1968; Rumania's insistence on national control of its international ventures; and the development of productive relationships with Yugoslavia, especially improved by Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade in September 1971. Relations have produced greater diversity among the states of Eastern Europe, limited domestic independence, gradual economic modernization and decentralization, more fluid international business alignments, varying degrees of de-Stalinization designed to humanize communism, and a modicum of self-imposed restraints on excessive Soviet intrusions in East European affairs.

The ideological underpinnings for these developments were outlined by Nikita Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, when he accomplished a theoretical adjustment to fact and spoke approvingly of "many paths to socialism." Although the Khrushchev Doctrine was superseded by Brezhnev's own after the punitive expedition into Czechoslovakia in 1968, the trend toward pluralization has persisted. Within the general understandings of Soviet security requirements, it appears to be irreversible.

Second, from a historical viewpoint, international relations of a new type mark a transitional phase in which a select number of socialist states are presumably laboring to enter communism more or less simultaneously. The idea of a simultaneous entrance into communism was originally expressed by Nikita Khrushchev, whose view it was that true communism is a future international condition to be realized through increasing social, economic, and political cooperation, including eventual economic abundance, equalization, and integration. Phrased in Khrushchev's inimitable style:

> Comrades, we are working hand in hand with you to build communism. The Soviet people will come to communism together with you, the working people of Hungary. It is out of the question that we, Com-

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munists and internationalists of the Soviet Union, the first to seize power and to engage in the great cause of Communist construction, should come to communism alone, and, to use a figure of speech, should eat ham every day while the rest look on and lick their chops. That would be wrong.

Where would the proletarian solidarity, the internationalism, of that socialist country be then? The country with the more developed economy, capable of raising the living standard of its people still higher, must by all means help the other socialist countries to level out with time. All the countries will rise to the level of the foremost ones, which are also not going to mark time. We must enter the Communist world all together.[8]

In the decade since Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, there has been considerable speculation about new directions and even about substantive revisions in Soviet policy on this score. Many of Khrushchev's policies have been disavowed. There is as yet, however, no hard evidence that either the theoretical or practical commitments to a simultaneous entry into communism have been officially abandoned. Such a decision, of course, would signal a further weakening of the international socialist system as we know it. The idea of a transition to communism by several states is crucial not only to the internationalist pretensions of the CPSU but also to the continued legitimacy of individual East European Communist Parties as well. Having evolved beyond socialism in one country (the U.S.S.R.), Marxism-Leninism is required to explain the existence of four distinct socialist countries (U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania) plus ten states in lesser stages of economic and political development, all ostensibly experiencing a higher order of relationships, but necessarily short of ultimate Communist fulfillment on an international level.

Consequently, in this second perspective, international relations of a new type must be considered as interim and transitional, emphasizing the international socialist system's current place in an extended historical continuum between Communist revolution in one country (1917) and its highest political, economic, and social operation in two or more countries, yet to be realized. That all of the most advanced states—those having reached the socioeconomic level of socialist development—happen to be located in Eastern Europe places a special priority upon at least some combination of them to effect the historic transition.

[8] "Speech at Meeting of Csepel Iron and Steel Works During Stay in Hungary of Soviet Party and Government Delegation," April 9, 1958, quoted in *For Victory in Peaceful Competition With Capitalism* (New York: Dutton 1960), 327.

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Third, the idea of international relations of a new type is a patent admission that worldwide communism as envisioned by Marx and Lenin is a vain hope. The East European states of the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) constitute the only genuine context for the realization of international communism on any level, subject to the leadership of the Soviet Union. The result is an ongoing system of highly specialized exchanges and interdependence, based on the shared political origins of Eastern Europe's ruling Communist Party states—excepting of course Yugoslavia and Albania, which for special historical, geographical, and political reasons continue to operate outside the mainstream of East European politics reliably dominated by the Soviet Union. The essential countries are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the G.D.R., plus the more peripheral countries, Cuba and Mongolia.[9] Even though limited in geographical scope, the example of this predominately East European subsystem is proof that cooperative plans in the name of international communism are conspicuously productive, doctrinally sound, and realizable.

The orientation in this third perspective is dictated by the practical realities of a more limited operational scope for Communist activities. Such activities are characterized by excessive ideological verbiage and ostentatious demonstrations of unity which, however exaggerated or unrealistic, nevertheless satisfy the need for collective expressions stressing the international commitments of the CPSU and the most loyal East European Communist Parties.

It is not easy for non-Communists to understand that, as an ideologically oriented superpower and the first Marxist-Leninist state, the U.S.S.R. is unusually dependent upon its allies in Eastern Europe. Articles drawn from the Soviet press and scholarly journals repeatedly stress the indispensable functions of what are termed "fraternal allies" in advancing the cause of the international movement.[10] Coupled with appropriate doctrinal interpretations, such articles serve to sustain some-

[9] Cuba and Mongolia participate regularly in the international conferences of the East European subsystem. However, at least for the present (because of substantial distances and lower levels of economic development), they cannot be considered part of the mainstream of the subsystem's life.

[10] For a representative sample from *International Affairs*, see V. Tsapanov, "Proletarian Internationalism: the Basis of Relations Among the Fraternal Parties and Countries" (September 1972); O. Selyaninov, "Cohesion of the Socialist Community: An Earnest of Peace" (April 1973); B. Strashun, "Socialist Countries Consolidate Their Political Foundations" (July 1973); and B. Kozin, "Socialist Countries: Unity and Cohesion" (March 1974).

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thing of a fragmented political faith. Granted that what appears in print may be a far too ambitious and visionary way of describing a commitment to the highest form of Marxist-Leninist relationships, as yet unrealized; the fact remains that it is precisely this Soviet vision that constitutes the foundation of an operational East European Communist subsystem with a unifying *raison d'être* of its own. Understandably, the Soviet Union has in addition become unusually dependent upon its allies in Eastern Europe, not only as a matter of ideological fulfillment, but also for military and strategic support, particularly in view of periodic confrontations with Chinese communism.

Fourth, ever since the late fifties the Soviets have tried to cope with the dynamics of political and economic development in the East European subsystem by stressing problem solving through functional international organizations. Activity has been dominated by commitments to coordinate and integrate multilateral defense planning and command operations and also, in some cases, to industrialize and modernize lagging economies, in accordance with rational cost-price indices, modern marketing techniques, more efficient economic management, and personnel and wage policies long prevalent in capitalist economics.

More specifically on the economic front, the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation has performed useful work in narrowly defined projects such as the Friendship Oil Pipeline, the Peace Electric Power Grid, the Brotherhood Gas Pipeline, a railroad freightcar pool, the COMECON Bank, and numerous exchanges of scientific and technical personnel. According to periodic accounts, scientific research is advanced primarily at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, U.S.S.R.; the International Laboratory of Strong Magnetic Fields and Temperatures in Wroclaw, Poland; the International Scientific and Technical Information Center; the COMECON Institute on Standardization; the Institute of Management Problems (Automation and Telemechanics); and the International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Socialist System.[11] The COMECON Executive Committee has also approved draft agreements and statutes for the establishment of Intertekstilmash (cooperative and specialized production

[11] S. Mikheyev, "New Stage in the Economic Cooperation of CMEA Countries," *International Affairs* (March 1972), 34. For a more detailed elaboration on these and other projects, see *International Affairs*: B. Grebennikov and L. Nikolayev, "CMEA: Integration Year" (October 1972), 8-15; and A. Shabalin, "Main Trends in the Economic Integration of Socialist Countries" (January 1974), 20-26.

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and research on textile machinery), Interatomnergo (collaboration on facilities and personnel for nuclear power plants), and Interelektro (coordination to insure high-quality electrical engineering products).[12]

Aside from the benefits of cooperative research and economic planning, considerable political significance may be found in periodic multilateral contacts through which the Soviet Union's primary interests are defined and defended and collective affirmations of unity and purpose communicated. Organizational controls addressed primarily to the membership of the East European subsystem can, in their own subtle ways, emphasize the acceptable limits of national independence and deviation, preferred objectives for collective support, and economic preferment to those who avoid offending Soviet sensitivities. Interdependence thus becomes an institutionalized game which over time familiarizes everyone with its essential rules. Military controls are thereby rendered far less necessary.

On the military side, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was originally conceived as a unified defense command against NATO and especially against the threat that West Germany might seek to revise the results of World War II. From the beginning, the organization's primary significance has consisted in its inextricable relationship to the Soviet Union's own defense policy, apart from which it has little independent identity and no military significance. WTO does, however, provide the aura of an international command through which the Soviet Army can exercise punitive and retaliatory policies as if they were genuinely cooperative defenses against threats to East European security. Periodic formal gatherings serve primarily as forums for the expression of joint approaches to defense problems, with the Soviet Union delegated as chief spokesman. As expected, individual national armies have been fully subordinated to the power of the Soviets, and although there are affirmations about a fully integrated international command and higher forms of organization and cooperation, there are as yet no firm indicators that these have materialized.

Both WTO and NATO had their genesis in political calculations dedicated to tightening up alliances and regularizing the presence of the two non-European superpowers in Europe. On balance, military functions have been far less important. The intriguing question is whether WTO performs more adequately as a security community than NATO. Certainly there are major differences: as the Soviet threat has seemingly subsided, NATO allies have exhibited considerable

[12] *Pravda*, December 14, 1973, p. 5.

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disarray and lack of agreement on common goals and purposes; the NATO alliance does not have a safety mechanism to police itself and maintain political orthodoxy and cohesion on major issues; nor has the United States intervened militarily in the affairs of individual NATO members in the name of an internationalist duty. On the other hand, WTO appears to have a lot more going for it in the way of security and unity on programs which transcend mere military objectives. It is at least worth suggesting that the reasons may lie in a more extensive elaboration of principles and programs stressing matters other than security against foreign aggression. For example, one of the communiqués of WTO's Political Consultative Committee reads: "The WTO members will continue to strengthen their indestructible friendship in the interests of socialism, progress, and peace, raising even higher the prestige of socialism, which sets for other peoples an example of a new type of inter-state relations and of a truly democratic society, an example of the socialist way of life."[13]

In this fourth sense, then, international relations of a new type mean rational, pragmatic, organizational undertakings, based on COMECON and WTO, emphasizing the largest volume of multilateral exchanges in the international socialist system, considerable institutional flexibility, and individual participation based more or less on national self-interest, prudently understood. Again, in the words of *International Affairs*, the purpose is of a very high order:

> A new, still higher stage is being reached in coordinating national interests, and this insures the leading role of the international interests expressed by the communist parties, the advanced contingents of the working class of the socialist countries. The integration of the national economies of socialist countries is the highest form of internationalizing the economic life of mankind at the present historical stage. Simultaneously it is the most acceptable and objectively inevitable form of combining national and international interests, of materially preparing their fusion in [the] future.[14]

Fifth, relations of a new type can be manifested in regular international conferences as Communist policy forums. It is probably true that no world conference of Communist Parties can ever restore the prestige and undisputed leadership of the Soviet Union to their former height. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that even in periods of considerable Communist dissension, intensified by intervention against the

[13] *Pravda*, April 19, 1974, pp. 1-2.

[14] B. Ladygin, "Socialist Internationalism: Fraternity and Cooperation," *International Affairs* (June 1973), 10.

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Czechs and warnings of even future interventions, international gatherings can serve to enunciate Soviet attitudes on major world questions before an audience that can generally be counted on for support; for as long as the U.S.S.R. remains the overwhelmingly powerful member of the East European subsystem, no combination of powers can challenge her effectively. Herein lies the key to the Soviet Union's utilization of conferences as policy vehicles. Conferences can be places where general Communist positions are advanced as if they were specific Soviet policies, and specific Soviet policies as if they were orthodox international Communist positions.[15]

There are, after all, minimum and maximum objectives of policy. Admittedly, there is little chance for another Comintern or Cominform, and no realistic expectations for the restoration of the old camp spirit of 1957 or even 1960. Yet in the face of unprecedented disunity and challenges to Soviet influence, the outcome of the 1969 Moscow Conference amounted to a major watershed in the international Communist movement. The Soviets gave the appearance of relinquishing supremacy and agreed that the speeches of dissident party leaders would be published in *Pravda*; and they were. More important, an atmosphere of flexibility took hold, encouraging franker expression and greater independence of views. As officially pronounced, "All parties have equal rights. At this time when there is no leading center of the international communist movement, voluntary coordination of the actions of parties in order effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased importance."[16]

Understandably, the final conference summation was sufficiently vague and lacking in binding commitments. Scattered with doctrinaire platitudes and exhortations, it stressed the mainstays of minimum cohesion: the historic significance of Vietnam as a beleaguered outpost of socialism in Asia; the struggle against imperialism—especially that of the United States and West Germany; socialist and proletarian internationalisms; international relations of a new type; and finally, more of the perennial dedication to peaceful coexistence and greater vigilance against bourgeois ideology. The greatest surprise was the absence of any word in the summation about the feud with China and the 1968 disciplinary action against Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the most profound challenges to the Soviet Union and international Commu-

[15] For an authoritative appraisal of the conference idea, see L. I. Brezhnev, "Fresh Upsurge of the Communist Movement," *World Marxist Review*, XII (August 1969), 4, 9.

[16] "Basic Document Adopted by the International Conference of Communists and Workers' Parties in Moscow, June 17, 1969," *Pravda*, June 18, 1969.

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nist unity—Peking and Prague—were relegated to the status of unmentionables, although they mark the Soviet Union's most vulnerable frontiers, 5000 miles apart.

Since the 1969 conference, all vestiges of the Dubcek-Cernik reforms in Czechoslovakia have been systematically purged, and the offended Communist parties of Europe—especially the French and Italian—have returned to their general pro-Soviet positions on international questions. The Soviets have used periodic conferences, most notably in the Crimea, to ventilate problems and forge unity, two objectives which cannot be realized easily because they are mutually exclusive: ventilating problems weakens unity; and forging unity restricts the ventilation of problems. Yet the conference mechanism has proved useful in generating regular gatherings of the most loyal supporters whose very presence speaks well for public relations and the appearance of basic expressions of unanimity in the movement.[17]

Sixth, international relations of a new type can signify the military dimension of the Soviet Union's keenly felt internationalist duty, which saw its ultimate theoretical refinement in the Brezhnev Doctrine of November 12, 1968. This is not to say that the policy is new, for the Soviets have since the early fifties had an implicit policy of maintaining their hegemony in Eastern Europe by military force when necessary. Harking back to at least the time of the Hungarian revolution, the commitment has been expressed in a variety of ways worth quoting at some length.

> Comrades! Believe me, the decision was difficult, but we could not stand by indifferently when brazen fascist elements began to brutally attack workers, peasants, Communists and other fine representatives of the Hungarian working people . . . when the counter-revolution tried to drown the socialist gains of the Hungarian working people in the blood of the people. . . .
>
> In giving aid to the Hungarian people in routing the forces of counter-revolution, we fulfilled our international duty.[18]

> Today the whole world has had an opportunity to be assured that anyone who dares to encroach upon the inviolability of the Soviet Union's borders as well as those of other socialist countries, will receive a crushing rebuff. The Warsaw Treaty Organization is based on the principle

[17] For the significance of the Crimean meetings, see V. Dolgin, "Unity of the Fraternal Countries—A Condition for Strengthening the Positions of Socialism," *International Affairs* (December 1973), 10.

[18] N. S. Khrushchev, "Speech in Budapest During Soviet Party and Government Delegation Visit," *Pravda*, April 8, 1958.

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of all for one and one for all. The Soviet government has frequently stated that the borders of all its true friends—the socialist countries—will be defended by the Soviet Union exactly as if they were its own borders. This is how we understand proletarian internationalism, and this is how all the peoples of the socialist countries understand it.[19]

The defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not only the internal affair of the country's people but also a problem of defending the positions of world socialism. It is for this reason that we are rendering support to the peoples of Czechoslovakia in defense of the gains of socialism. In giving fraternal internationalist support to our Czechoslovak Communist comrades and the entire Czechoslovak people, we are discharging our internationalist duty to them and to the international Communist workers' and national-liberation movement. For us this duty is the highest of all.[20]

There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this in placing sole emphasis on the autonomy and independence of Communist Parties lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his internationalist obligations.

The Communists of the fraternal countries naturally could not allow the socialist states to remain idle in the name of abstract sovereignty while the country [Czechoslovakia] was endangered by antisocialist degeneration.[21]

One of the most authoritative Soviet scholars in the field of foreign policy has offered the following analysis deriving from Leninist sources:

The Socialist countries base their relations on principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty and non-interference in one another's affairs.

In a definition of the tasks facing the Comintern in developing international relations of a Socialist type, Lenin wrote: "The Communist international policy in the sphere of relations within the state *cannot be restricted to the bare, formal, purely declaratory and actually noncommittal recognition of the equality of nations to which the bourgeois democrats confine themselves—both those who frankly admit being such*

[19] Editorial, *Pravda*, May 14, 1960. [20] Editorial, *Pravda*, August 22, 1968.
[21] Sergei Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Countries," *Pravda*, September 26, 1968.

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and those who assume the name of Socialists." This means that in defining policy in relations between nations, between states, Marxist-Leninist parties are guided above all by the class interests of the working people, the task of preserving revolutionary gains and strengthening Socialism. "Which should be put first, the right of nations to self-determination, or Socialism?" Lenin asked and right there replied: "Socialism should."[22]

Several times in the 1950's and 1960's (most dramatically in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968) Soviet armies were called upon to put socialism first and restrain the course of national particularism, liberalization, and democratization in parts of Eastern Europe. It was, however, in the specifically military applications of the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty," followed by the Brezhnev Doctrine of *ex post facto* justification, that something unprecedented was added. In the earlier campaigns, the emphasis was overwhelmingly military, retaliatory, and punitive. In the Czechoslovak case, the campaign was jointly undertaken by five Warsaw Pact members and later linked to a widely publicized theoretical follow-up legitimizing intervention by Marxist-Leninist states in each other's domestic affairs if dangers of antisocialist degeneration are perceived.[23]

Thus, in this sixth sense, international relations of a new type in effect nullify the doctrine of many paths to communism dating from the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. Through both explicit and implicit understandings, limits on sovereignty and on the pace and substance of liberalization have been set for all to observe. The following statement by a Soviet professor of law poses (and attempts to clarify) the resultant *modus operandi* for nation-state sovereignty:

> The principle of state sovereignty in general international law above all implies the demand for respect of the external and domestic independence of countries. But in relations between socialist countries, the principle of respect for state sovereignty also includes their close friendship and mutual assistance in building socialism and communism and in defending their sovereignty against encroachments by imperialist powers. . . . The entire socialist community guards independence and

[22] Sh. Sanakoyev, "Proletarian Internationalism: Theory and Practice," *International Affairs* (April 1969), 11, 14; emphasis in original.

[23] More specifically, the provisions of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of May 6, 1970 require the Czechs to aid the U.S.S.R. in the event of an attack by a third party. It is an explicit recognition that the northern tier of WTO members are a defense not merely against the old cold-war enemies of Europe but against the much newer and more threatening Communist enemy in Asia. For a praiseful argument that the treaty "reflects a new and higher level in Czechoslovak-Soviet relations," see B. Chňoupek (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic), "Unity, Solidarity and Cooperation: the Basis of Our Successes," *International Affairs* (May 1973), 8-13.

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territorial integrity of the socialist countries. This helps to strengthen the sovereignty of each and provides reliable guarantees for their sovereignty.[24]

Following up this presentation of the Soviet Union's internationalist duty, it is important to bear in mind a much wider range of security concerns. Although a downgrading of Eastern Europe's military significance logically followed the revolutionary development of nuclear weaponry and the missile age, the Soviets nevertheless have since the mid-fifties considered the area a security priority comparable to the U.S.S.R. itself. Contrary to popular conceptions, however, certain parts of Eastern Europe tend to be more sensitive than others. The location of Czechoslovakia made its moves toward selective independence potentially more dangerous than, say, those of Rumania, whose foreign and domestic policies, whatever their newsworthiness, did not pose a threat to either the territorial or regime security of the Soviet Union. Rumania's common frontier with the U.S.S.R. is very long, thus making access easier; and it is also situated on the southern flank of Eastern Europe—not athwart the highly sensitive central region which Stalin once referred to as the corridors through which foreigners historically march to Russia. Czechoslovakia's location is far more strategic because it fronts on *both* Germanies and bifurcates the whole of the Soviet Union's East European defenses. In retrospect, the reasons for Soviet military moves in August 1968 appear much clearer. Obsessed by presumed West German schemes to subvert Czechoslovakia through diplomatic overtures and economic penetration, the Soviets responded to forestall the development of a chink in their defense system.[25]

Looking beyond strictly military concerns, Eastern Europe's indispensability to the Soviet Union's strategic defense perimeter must also be viewed in the perspective of political requirements—especially regime security. Obviously, the Communist "wave of the future" must never be permitted to recede in a client state, for this would cast serious

[24] E. Usenko, "International Legal Principles of Relations Between Socialist Countries," *International Affairs* (August 1973), 51.

[25] During a visit to Moscow's Institute of Law in the summer of 1969, I witnessed a highly emotional and impassioned oration in response to questions about the Soviet Union's military reaction to Czechoslovak events. Twenty million casualties and poignant reminders of World War II were repeatedly cited as valid justification for the Soviet Union's resolute military response to what was construed as Czechoslovak tinkering with East European security. My references to greater ongoing trade between other East European countries and West Germany, or even Rumania's diplomatic relations with Bonn, had no apparent effect on numerous representatives of the Soviet Union's political science community. Czechoslovakia was simply placed in a special category.

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doubt upon doctrinal predictions and undermine the leadership and legitimacy of the U.S.S.R.'s own exclusivist Party. Thus, once a state is Marxist-Leninist and ruled by a Communist Party, it must not be permitted to become anything else. (The policy toward Prague emanated at least in part from the belief that the character of the Soviet Union's own public order system was being threatened by unrestrained political and social experimentation in Czechoslovakia.) In this context, the reasons for a military commitment to the antiliberal forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were remarkably similar to the crucial decisions affecting Castro's Cuba in the fall of 1962, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam beginning in the mid-sixties. Soviet doctrine is simply not geared to withstand the loss of a Marxist-Leninist state to some other kind of political system.

As the reforms in Czechoslovakia became more bold—especially freedom of the press and the rumored multiplication of political parties—Soviet leaders were forced to ponder the ramifications of tolerating democratic practices in a bordering East European state but not at home. Why, one may ask, should the Soviets tolerate freedom of press in Prague when they do not tolerate it in Moscow? Unwilling to brave an expanding wave of nonconformity, they acted in August 1968 to preempt further liberalization which the euphoria of a pending Czech Party Congress and 50th anniversary celebration would most assuredly have sustained. Displeasure with Professor Ota Sik's unorthodox economic views, some of which came close to capitalist principles, reinforced all of these developments in underpinning Foreign Minister Gromyko's explanation to the United Nations General Assembly on October 3 that the Soviet Army's movement across the Czech frontier was an internal matter and that the countries of the socialist commonwealth constitute "an inseparable entity cemented by unbreakable ties, the like of which history has never before known. The socialist states cannot and will not allow a situation where the vital interests of socialism are infringed upon and encroachments are made on the inviolability of the boundaries of the socialist commonwealth and, therefore, on the foundation of international peace."[26]

It could, of course, be argued that the intensity of the demands upon Czechoslovakia should logically have driven the Soviets to strike at Yugoslavia, which is after all the heart of successful ideological deviation and the most persistent example of Communist sovereignty in Eastern Europe. But if the Soviets cannot have the best of the East

[26] *Christian Science Monitor*, October 4, 1968.

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European world, neither will they settle for the worst. Given the strong possibility that a disciplinary expedition against Yugoslavia would lead to protracted warfare across a number of states, the Soviet objective has been to maintain a balance between moderate pluralism and self-determination on the one hand, and territorial and regime security on the other. By refraining from punitive actions against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Rumania, the Soviets have thus far rejected Stalinist garrison-state solutions.

Though history will probably note that Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe in the late sixties was characterized by the explicit Brezhnev Doctrine and punitive internationalist duties in Czechoslovakia, the Rumanian experience has exemplified an acceptable range of diplomatic independence, largely contingent upon the maintenance of certain domestic political requisites. Generally, Soviet attitudes have been tolerant of East European policy initiatives if they appear to reinforce Soviet diplomacy and do not jeopardize the security of the U.S.S.R. (The Czech experience clearly violated this tenet.) The difficult feat is to hit precisely upon an acceptable balance among three things: Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, reforms in the name of national self-interest, and sufficient respect for the Soviet Union's current assessment of foreign policy priorities.

More than any other East European nation contiguous to the Soviet Union, Rumania has demonstrated that its diplomatic initiatives, however nettlesome to Moscow, have not as of this writing posed a security threat. At least since the summer of 1963 and the initiation of their own industrialization campaign, the Rumanians have steadfastly insisted upon independence for all Communist Parties and the practice (not merely the theory) of sovereignty. They have in their own national way operated as dedicated and relatively conservative Marxist-Leninists within the framework of East European politics. Opposing projects for economic cooperation that might impinge on national sovereignty, they have managed to maintain somewhat of a hybrid regime: quasi-Stalinist economic autarky within a comparatively orthodox and conservative domestic system, plus an exceptionally versatile foreign policy. Most important, they have shown a keen sense for the rational limits of nationalist bravado.

Attracting the world's attention to daringly executed foreign policy decisions, Rumania has confirmed the persistence of nationalist preference within the uncertain limits of Soviet toleration. The record includes deft maneuvers in the maintenance of correct relations with the

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People's Republic of China, Albania, and the more orthodox people's democracies; impressive improvements in economic and cultural ties with Western Europe; the maintenance of diplomatic relations with both Germanies; initiatives toward economic preferment with the United States, underscored by President Nixon's visit to Bucharest in July 1969; and finally, a firm but apparently sensitive attitude toward the Soviet Union. These policies have been highlighted by considerable diplomatic sparring and forthright declarations, including the conclusion of a second Friendship and Mutual Aid pact with the Soviets in July 1970 and a qualified willingness to cooperate in select COMECON projects.

The Soviets for their part know that their stakes in East European security are very high. Their reactions show a cautious and patient attitude that the Rumanians must not be pushed into reckless demonstrations of independence which the logic of international developments and the inevitable pluralization in East European life since Stalin have naturally allowed them. One must recognize that from the outside, even measured dissidence within the relatively closed East European subsystem invariably signifies heresy and collapse; to those on the inside, expressions of independence denote deep changes, to be sure, but not necessarily destructive ones. The pattern of East European interaction is thereby more complicated, requiring greater efforts toward accommodation and more sophisticated policies for balancing particularistic interests in the name of collective security and ultimate Marxist-Leninist fulfillment.

In the final analysis, liberalization in Eastern Europe is a highly complex process which always has to be sensitive to Soviet interests: how will Soviet leaders appraise reforms and their possible dangers to Communist regime security and the fundamental authority of the CPSU? The experiences in Czechoslovakia and Rumania are intriguing in that what seems to count is not only which specific institution or practice is democratized or liberalized, but also the actual processes of communicating political change to Soviet decision makers. And one must also consider the question of impact. Since it obviously makes a difference who perceives what political developments in which East European state, it would be important to know the sources and processes of data collection and the mode of transmission to Soviet leaders. Who, for example, are the Soviet Union's chief watchers of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania? What specific social and psychological factors influence their perception and sorting of data for evaluation and transmission? What local contacts and sources of intelligence

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information do they rely on? How current are their assessments of East European developments? And what access do they have to top officials in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Politburo? Answers to such questions would no doubt lead to greater sophistication in our understanding of how Soviet leaders assess change and continuity in Eastern Europe as they relate to territorial and regime security. Obstacles to acquiring such information (which are understandably very great), should not rule out dedicated efforts to explore potential breakthroughs; for as long as we lack thorough knowledge of the Soviet Union's diplomatic and intelligence activity in *each* East European nation, our capacity to foretell specific Soviet initiatives and reactions will be severely hampered.

Conclusions

Some may argue that perhaps it is too ambitious to redefine and narrow Communist theory in an effort to show the true forms and significance of Soviet alliance management. My response is that it is worth the risk if the consequence is greater clarity. Essential to a critical understanding of reality is the capacity to strip away idealistic vocabularies which have so typically described Soviet foreign policy behavior and in the process obscured its important objectives and successes. In this study, I have been willing to take Soviet theoreticians and party spokesmen at their word: *There are new forms of relations in the Communist world.*

The Soviet Union has utilized a wide variety of strategies and tactics designed to regularize its hegemony in Eastern Europe and maintain the security of its one-party regimes. Joined together by conventions, treaties, and agreements of a political, military, economic, and cultural character, the international socialist system has over the past decade experienced serious military clashes in Czechoslovakia and along the Siberian frontier in East Asia. At the same time, there have been regular gatherings of COMECON and WTO, the major Moscow Conference in June 1969, and periodic conferences in the Crimea demonstrating institutionalized cooperation, mutual benefits, franker exchanges, difficult compromises, and the usual doctrinaire expressions of socialist unity—indeed a highly complex pattern of international behavior with both doctrinal and political significance for the Soviet Union and the contiguous states of Eastern Europe.

For more than a decade, the theory of international relations of a new type has been expounded to characterize Soviet-East European

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relations. In contrast to vague and highly utopian Communist generalizations, this study has focused upon six functional aspects of the new relations. They include pragmatic adjustments to polycentric communism; theoretical provisions for a transitional phase prior to the realization of communism on an international level; emphasis upon the East European subsystem as an indispensable core of Soviet national security; organizational efforts toward economic and political integration through COMECON and WTO; Communist summit conferences to forge and publicize unity; and the internationalist duty of socialism, with special military obligations toward territorial defense and the security of Marxist-Leninist regimes.

Not often do theoretical interests have such immediate relevance to the security policies of a nation as in the present case. Faced with the unacceptable economic costs and military risks in forcibly expanding the international socialist system, the Soviets have instead concentrated on system maintenance, and especially on the maintenance of their East European subsystem. As an irreducible minimum, this much must be done if Soviet rule is to retain its essential characteristics. The narrowing of international communism's organizational scope and practical application to the manageable part of Eastern Europe has helped to perpetuate some key myths of early revolutionary thought. The consequences have fortified what is left of the Soviet Union's ideological commitments beyond the bounds of its own territorial security. As a byproduct, the Soviet public order system is infused with greater legitimacy. Herein lies the fundamental significance of international relations of a new type and of the Soviet Union's self-declared internationalist duty, perhaps better described as a nationalist duty.

It is from this vantage point that the case for orthodoxy vis-à-vis China is best made. The ideological thrust of Chinese claims has been that the revolutionary center of gravity has shifted from Marx's proletarian Western Europe to Lenin's agrarian Russia (the weakest link in the chain of international capitalism), and now finally to the village and peasant populations of Asia where Peking claims special leadership rights. But if Mao Tse-tung insists that most of Asia under Chinese leadership is the new repository of truth, revolutionary initiatives, and ultimate Marxist-Leninist success, the Soviets can counter with Eastern Europe, a living example of socialist internationalism and new international relations—indeed the most mature and sophisticated organizational effort on behalf of international communism to date.

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Of course, none of these observations are meant to diminish the strategic significance of Soviet-American relations, including periodic talks about ABM's, MIRV's, European security, and mutual reductions of military investments, hardware, and deployments across the board. Yet it is precisely the resolution of frontier insecurities—Asian and East European—that bulk largest in the Soviet purview. Détente with the United States can proceed realistically only in conjunction with the Soviet conviction that pressures on its borders have abated, or that new negotiations with the Americans will have a positive impact on frontier enemies.

In this connection, the end of bipolarity has forced the Soviets into three reconsiderations affecting their East European alliance: (1) under conditions of détente with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, it will be more difficult to hold the East European allies together on strictly military grounds; (2) but they must be held together because of persistent and even long-range dangers from the Chinese; (3) therefore, the Chinese threat must be persuasively exaggerated to justify the highest levels of unity and cohesion in Eastern Europe. Soviet policy thus exaggerates one military challenge (China) to enforce stringency with another (Eastern Europe), all the while maneuvering to ameliorate tensions with a third (U.S.).

Even assuming a settlement of major East-West security questions with the United States, or a hypothetical installation of impregnable defenses all along Soviet frontiers, still Eastern Europe would continue to be of central importance for security planning and projections: for as long as the Soviet Union maintains its exclusivist Marxist-Leninist one-party system, underpinned by a strongly futuristic internationalist doctrine, the East European nations will constitute an indispensable source of both regime security and ideological fulfillment. Uncommon though this interdependence may be, it is viewed as fundamental to the future attainment of international communism's goal culture.

Meanwhile, alliance management goes on, motivated by the pressing security objectives of the Soviet Union—so pressing, indeed, that there is a very real prospect that successful transfer-culture policies and programs are likely to become habitual, and therefore ends in themselves. A fascinating question suggests itself. Is it too much of a paradox to conclude that the efficient applications of international relations of a new type increasingly make their long-range objectives unnecessary?

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COMMUNAL VIOLENCE:
The Armenians and the Copts as Case Studies

By MARGARET J. WYSZOMIRSKI*

THE effect of communalism on both the internal and international politics of nations has been notable as well as increasingly frequent in the last two centuries. Communalism can be defined as "competitive group solidarities within the same political system based on ethnic, linguistic, racial, or religious identities."[1] In societies deeply divided by communal cleavages, a high degree of competition and conflict is apparent. Primarily since the advent of the ideas of self-determination and popular sovereignty in the nineteenth century,[2] communal groups have presented themselves as possible candidates for nationhood.[3] Not all such bids for independence succeed; nor do all communal groups seek to resolve societal conflict and competition by opting for nationhood. In each instance, the conflicts are too fundamental to be ignored. They require resolution or management.

Four Environments: A Proposal

In a general sense, communal conflict during the last two centuries can be said to have taken place in four environments. The first was during the emergence of the major historical states, particularly in the West. Such instances of communalism can be found in Britain, with the Welsh and the Scots, and in Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In all of these cases the ethnic conflict was "managed" by a variety of methods, resulting in a "balanced adjustment which provides conditions favorable to stable democratic government."[4] The process of integration and the emergence and fostering of democratic

* I would like to thank Professors Milton Esman of Cornell University and Richard H. Dekmejian of SUNY-Binghamton for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this manuscript.

[1] Milton J. Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict," *Public Policy*, XXI (Winter 1973), 49.

[2] Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, XXIV (April 1972), 319-55.

[3] Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press 1963), 111.

[4] Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971), 7. One method of managing ethnic differences during this period was secession, as in the case of Norway breaking away from Sweden, and Ireland's break with England.

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procedures in these countries has had a long historical development.[5] They have had time to manage their internal affairs gradually. Additionally, and quite importantly, they were not confronted with multiple, concurrent "crises of development."[6] Rather, such "crises" were sequential and could be dealt with individually. Conflict management was also much easier to achieve under conditions of relative isolation and/or separation and with less extensive or developed means of communications. The period of time available to such countries for evolving methods of managing communal conflict is a distinctive characteristic of this group. The time factor, coupled with the sequential occurrence of crises of development under conditions of limited communications and technological resources, lends the group an aura of historical distinctiveness and unreplicability. There seems to be little chance that the developing states of today will have sufficient time to avoid multiple crises of development. It therefore seems plausible to suggest that the patterns of communal conflict management which succeeded in the emergent historical states of the West have little imitative value and constitute historical cases under conditions radically different from those prevailing at present.

The second environment could be called "colonial post-independence." This environment is characteristic of the majority of Third-World countries (with the major exception of the Middle Eastern states), which were formerly part of various Western colonial empires. During their struggles for independence, communal conflicts were generally submerged or at least subdued because of the common cause. However, once independence was secured, internal politics became concerned with the division of limited resources among indigenous interests. Eventually the multicommunal coalition remaining from the struggle for independence was reduced to a minimum winning coalition. Elites of communal groups, both those remaining in the coalition and those eliminated from it, then engaged in tactics of outbidding. This in turn has fostered extremist positions, the disappearance of

[5] It is somewhat difficult to classify Russia. Czarist Russia could probably best be placed as a polyglot empire, while the Soviet Union might seem to resemble the major historical states of this first group. Although the Soviet Union's methods of managing its communal conflicts would not generally be called democratic, they are formal and institutionalized and represent a "balanced adjustment."

[6] For a broad overview of the crises of political development as well as detailed treatments of each, see Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton University Press 1971).

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brokerage institutions,[7] and the breakdown of former management and regulatory procedures. Although Rabushka and Shepsle are specifically concerned with the "consequences of ethnicity for the practice of democratic politics in the plural society,"[8] their scenario for interethnic competition in the post-independence period seems to be generally applicable and not merely restricted to those societies with democratic politics. The arena in which outbidding occurs, and the formal positions of authority for which leaders vie, may differ for systems that are democratic and those that are not. However, authoritarian systems can be equally disrupted by the politics of outbidding.

Unlike the historical states of the West, ex-colonial states in their post-independence period are often confronted with multiple crises of development. Indeed, the quest for independence may itself have precipitated some of these crises, particularly those of participation, distribution, and penetration. As the nationalist, anticolonial coalition begins to break down, a crisis of legitimacy results. The problem of concurrent crises of development is compounded by the technology available to most of these countries.[9] Modern communications resources such as radio and newspapers are widely used by both national and communal leaders; they often exacerbate the problems created by multiple crises of development as well as by communal competition.

The third environment of communal conflict is found in the disintegration of polyglot empires, i.e., the Austro-Hungarian or the Ottoman. The existence of the environment, like that of the historical states of Europe, seems to constitute a historical case. Although there may yet be instances of polyglot, tribal empires in Africa, the phenomenon of empires has largely disappeared from the contemporary political scene. Polyglot empires incorporated methods of dealing with recognized communal groups in their very structure. Unlike a nation or even a state as commonly understood, an empire has no pretense of being the political expression of a culturally, socially, or historically homogeneous collectivity. An empire professes to be the central governing structure for a number of communal groups which may have little in common except this overarching authority and organization. Imperial systems were viable until the first half of the twentieth century. After that time, the quest for self-determination and the forces

[7] Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1972), 74-88.

[8] *Ibid.*, 63

[9] Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, eds., *Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism* (Ann Arbor: Michigan State University Press 1971).

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of communal nationalism were too many and too strong to be successfully managed by imperial systems. Indeed, imperial authorities were themselves infected with the doctrine of nationalism. This created situations of competing and mutually exclusive nationalisms, thereby producing the major cause of their failure to continue managing communal competition. Under an imperial system, the imperial authorities constituted something of a noncommunal group. Access into this group may have been more or less open; yet it was not entirely ascriptive. Since limited access to the imperial group was possible for members of the various communal groups, a degree of legitimacy was accorded the imperial authorities. However, when the imperial group began to develop its own sense of communalism, thus closing access and becoming ascriptive, it lost its legitimate claim to authority over all communal groups and merely became one of a number of competitors. Once this happened, the ability of an imperial system to manage conflict became severely handicapped, and the clash of antagonistic nationalisms was likely to lead to violence and/or repression.

In the imperial situation the crises of development are often sequential and generally have begun before the full impact of modern technology and communications is felt. However, the very process of modernization contributes to the break-up of the empire by accentuating communal differences which in turn place increased pressures and strains on the imperial system.

While the passions of nationalism dismembered the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, a variant of the polyglot empire may have appeared. Such countries as the Soviet Union, India, and China could be seen as modern polyglot empires, where certain national or ethnic groups which have achieved dominant status command substantial state resources for maintaining order. Even though these dominant groups possess identities which conflict with other ethnic groups within the empire, there seems to be an attempt to co-opt others to the imperial identity, e.g., attempts to russify the various ethnic groups of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the modern polyglot empire, unlike the historical one, the imperial group is nationalistic as well as imperial.

The fourth and final set of circumstances conducive to the rise of communal conflict is found in post-industrial states. This is a relatively recent phenomenon since only the most advanced states have begun to enter the post-industrial era. In such cases, competing ideas of communalism may reemerge, resurrecting differences which were believed to have faded out or been successfully managed long ago. Examples

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can be seen with the Scots, the Welsh, and the Bretons. The original crises of development were resolved; what seems to be occurring now is a renewed relevance of communalism, particularly in matters of legitimacy and distribution. If that evolves as a common pattern among states which have achieved industrialization and modernization as they are presently conceived, a reevaluation would seem in order regarding the effectiveness and desirability of integration, assimilation, and acculturation. Since this type of reemergent communalism takes place in a post-industrial period, it is quite possibly historically replicable and therefore the most widely applicable environment of the four.

Theories and Hypotheses

Methods and theories of methods for managing communal conflict abound. One focuses on the congruity or incongruity of common values.[10] Formation and maintenance of values are greatly influenced by language, religion, and history. Cohesion may be based on race and kinship as well as these three factors.[11] However, it is proposed here that the essential communal bonds and/or values stem from language, religion, or race. Neither kinship nor history (tradition) are primary factors. Kinship ties alone, unreinforced by language, religion, or racial factors, represent clans rather than structurally diffuse or culturally distinct groups. Although common historical experiences are a general characteristic of communal groups, the reasons for a group's common history are generally found in religion, language, or race. Geographical location, or regionalism, is another possible explanation of a common tradition. Regionalism, however, is not communalism; if a regional group develops a communal sense, it will be through the coincidence of language, religion, or race with geographical concentration.

It is therefore posited that religion, language, and race, singly or in combination, form the core of communal identities and values. It is these elements of the communal identity which are "non-compromisable."[12] As long as they retain political salience, they cannot be traded

[10] See Kuper's discussion of the conflict model of pluralist societies in Kuper and Smith (fn. 4), 42-45. R. A. Schermerhorn, in *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House 1970), 15, 189-226, sees ideologies as contextual variables with centripetal or centrifugal tendencies.

[11] See Rabushka and Shepsle (fn. 7), 8-10, for a discussion of these factors as the bases of cultural pluralism.

[12] In contrast to class division, the greater difficulty of compromising on ethnic, racial, or religious solidarities may be attributable to the deeper emotional attachments inherent in these identities; see Esman (fn. 1), 54.

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over or bargained with. For instance, how does one compromise between Muslims and Christians as to which day to recognize as a day of worship—Friday or Sunday? If one tries to "compromise" on both, one disrupts the efficient functioning of both government and industry. The matter of religion is particularly significant to societies which are still traditional or which possess a strong traditional component. Since this includes most developing nations, and the West during its modernizing phase, as well as recent historical empires, the key role of religion in communal conflict is obvious.

Language is often the element most closely associated with communal identity. If individuals or groups cannot understand one another, cooperation becomes extremely difficult and suspicions find fertile ground. Since language is basic to other activities, it, like religion, is a difficult area for compromise, particularly if one language group is in competition with another. In such situations, the ideal compromise would be a blend of the two languages. However, if a group is very nationalistic, it would not wish to give up its language or see it "corrupted" by another. Even if the groups involved agreed to a merger of their languages, the difficulties and dislocations involved in formulating, standardizing, teaching, and using the new language would be enormous. Occasionally something of a compromise is achieved by adopting a nonindigenous language as a "lingua franca" whereby no communal group has an initial advantage over any other and all must adopt a new language. However, such a tactic aims at depoliticizing the language issue and will not always succeed, especially if a community possesses a highly developed and literary language.

Finally, race provides the most evident mark of communal status; it identifies a member of the group on sight and can exert a visible and inescapable effect on all facets of life. Just as it is extremely difficult to compromise on religion and language, so it is on race, particularly in a physical sense. Whereas religion and language express social and cultural values, race is a set of physical characteristics. Although such physical elements can be relatively easily compromised through intermarriage, it is often unfeasible. Communal groups differing in race are frequently unwilling to intermarry, and it is extremely difficult for political structures or authorities to campaign for such a solution without incurring a great deal of hostility and resentment for encroaching on what are considered strictly personal matters. Unwillingness to intermarry can be rooted in a variety of social, ideolog-

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ical, or even religious doctrines. Thus race, because of its visibility and immutability,[13] can create a communal identity which is just as strong as those centered on the value system of a religion or the cultural system of a language.

It is therefore posited that the difficulty of communal conflict management rests on the presence of these three elements. The chances of conflict are great in any pluralist society divided by one of these factors and without a basis of common identity or overriding common values. If a cleavage on one of these dimensions is reinforced by a second or a third, the possibility of violence and/or conflict is greatly increased.

It is important to note that violent conflict among communal groups is hypothesized as arising in the presence of two conditions:

1. the presence of cleavages along one or a combination of religious, linguistic, or racial lines;
2. the absence of any common identity or value.

The presence of some common identity or value can help to mitigate even extremely serious societal cleavages along racial, religious, or linguistic lines, and is imperative if conflict is to be managed successfully.[14] Lebanon presents an example of a society deeply divided along religious lines: there is the major cleavage between Muslims and Christians, as well as a number of subdivisions of each of these (Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, as well as Druzes, and Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox Christians).[15] The situation is not, however, compounded by racial or linguistic factors. Although a considerable proportion of Lebanese speak Middle Eastern languages other than Arabic in the home (primarily Armenian and Greek), Arabic is the official and public language of all and is accepted as such. What probably contributes most to mitigating the "non-compromisable" religious cleavages in Lebanon is an overriding concern with trade and business. Lebanon has been a nation of traders since ancient

[13] Immutable in the sense that an individual cannot do anything to alter his condition. Whereas an individual can convert to another religion or learn another language, it takes generations to substantially change racial characteristics.

[14] One might argue that the exercise of unquestionable coercive power is another means of controlling communal conflict. However, as various political theorists, including Robert A. Dahl, have noted, it is nearly impossible to maintain political authority by pure force alone and in the absence of legitmacy. See *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970), 41.

[15] There are also smaller groups, mainly of various Protestant denominations.

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times and has occupied a strategic spot as an economic crossroads. In view of its location, general lack of natural resources, and small size, Lebanon has largely based its economic prosperity and development on its role as merchant. Indeed, a peculiar feature of the Lebanese people is their attachment to a local version of the "Protestant ethic" in matters financial and commercial. This fiercely capitalistic, free-enterprise orientation has become the keystone of a Lebanese collective identity. The importance of carrying on "business as usual" has usually provided enough of a restraint on communal antagonisms to limit conflict and violence.

Switzerland is an even better illustration of the tempering effect of an overarching common value in communally divided societies. In the Swiss case, society is divided along two lines—language and religion. Although the two do not completely coincide, they substantially reinforce one another. The three-way linguistic cleavage is compounded by a Protestant-Catholic division. Although religion generally does not divide the Francophones from the Italophones, it constitutes a cleavage between the German-speaking and the French- and Italian-speaking populations.[16] Despite communal divisions on two core factors, Switzerland, like Lebanon, provides one of the most notable examples of successful conflict management. Once again, one can find a common value, in fact the same one as in Lebanon—the business imperative—working to reduce communal conflict and facilitate its management. Like Lebanon, Switzerland is a small, centrally located, resource-poor nation. Situated at the crossroads of Europe, it has thrived on trade and commerce and developed a strong sense of entrepreneurship. Indeed, the value common to the communal groups is the recognition that trade and commerce form the backbone of Swiss prosperity and that communal conflict should at least be kept below a level which would disrupt business.

However, the few examples of successful management of deep communal cleavages based on race, religion, or language are outweighed by the many counter-examples of failure, particularly among the newer nations. In this context, the case of Lebanon is particularly important since that state was once part of a polyglot empire and is a developing country.

[16] Both the French and German groups have Protestant as well as Catholic components; however, the Catholic Germanophones and the Protestant Francophones are only small parts of the German- and French-speaking communities.

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In the following section of this paper, I intend to examine why communal conflicts sometimes erupt into violence and repression and other times lead to integration and/or successful management. The two cases to be studied are the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the Copts in Egypt. Technically, both the Armenians and the Copts were minorities within the Ottoman Empire. However, Egypt was really only nominally a part of that Empire from the time of Muhammad Ali (c. 1831). Thereafter, Egyptian history and development progressed along a path distinct from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. The case of the Armenians is used as an example of a Type 3 environment—communal conflict within a disintegrating polyglot empire. The Copts, on the other hand, fit more into a Type 2 model—communal conflict in a colonized country. In the case of republican Egypt, the Copts seem to have emerged as a distinct but integral part of Egyptian society. They are generally quite free to practice their religion, and they participate in politics and government approximately in proportion to their size in the population. Although communal differences occasionally break out in incidents of violence, these are infrequent, of a relatively small scale, and officially disapproved of by governmental authorities.

The Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, however, have not been so fortunate. Although it was possible for Armenians to achieve status, position, and wealth in the Ottoman Empire, as a community they were never accorded more than "second-class citizen" status and were regarded as fundamentally alien to the Muslim character of Ottoman society, as were the other non-Muslim minorities (Greeks, Jews, Chaldeans, etc.). As the spirit of nationalism began to manifest itself among the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire, it was suppressed brutally and with a heavy human toll.[17] The Armenians were massacred in 1895–96, 1909, and 1914–15. One could say that the Ottomans were not seeking to manage this communal conflict but to

[17] Although Turkish nationalism developed later than Armenian nationalism (or many of the other minority nationalisms of the Ottoman Empire), there existed a continuum between it and the earlier Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkist ideologies, particularly in their anti-Christian elements. For a discussion of the development and interrelation of various ideologies in the Middle East, see Richard H. Dekmejian, "Political Thought: Quest for an Ideology," in Abid al-Marayati, ed., *The Middle East: Its Governments and Politics* (Belmont: Duxbury Press 1972), 101-23. Even though the Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turks) worked with Armenian and other revolutionary groups in exile in Paris, the CUP had "little or no sympathy for the aspirations of any of the minority groups of the Ottoman Empire." Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks* (Beirut: Khayats 1965), 129.

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resolve it. Indeed, they were so successful in decimating the Armenian communities within the Empire that they bequeathed to their present-day successors in Turkey a far more homogeneous state.[18]

Why has communal management been so successful in the case of the Copts, whereas such Draconian measures were employed to "resolve" communal conflict in the case of the Armenians? In the attempt to explain the difference, the following hypotheses are advanced.

1. The concurrent development of conflicting nationalisms within the same political system will intensify communal conflict and increase the possibility of violence. The nationalist sentiments, however, must be at approximately the same level of development. That is, both nationalist ideologies should be at the intense, emotional, "beginning-of-ideology" phase; neither should be routinized yet. If one group has not developed a sense of nationalism or is in an "end-of-ideology" stage and is confronted by the other's communal nationalism, it may be capable of concession to or compromise with the communal group.[19]

One might also use some ideas of deterrence theory to express this hypothesis.[20] In these terms, communal conflict is likely to break out when the value of peace (V_p) is less than the value of a first strike (V_{fs}). That is what happens when nationalist sentiments inflame passions and expectations to the point where peace, or maintenance of the status quo, is intolerable to at least one community. If conflict is expected, deterrence can obtain only if the expectation of waiting is greater than the expectation of striking. In terms of ethnic conflict, this would mean that, for the subordinate group, the pay-off of either working within the system as it is or of delaying demands is greater than insisting that demands be met, which frequently precipitates conflict. On the other hand, if in the perception of the superordinate group, a subordinate group is causing or intends to cause serious conflict, then the former may feel that waiting may only allow the situation to get

[18] The liquidaiton and/or expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor came in 1920-23, after the Greek defeat by Ataturk. This left only the Kurds as a non-Turkic, though Muslim, minority. After the suppression of the Kurdish insurrection (Dersim) in 1924–25, the government's policy of Turkification was only partially successful and the Kurdish problem remains an internally explosive issue.

[19] It is interesting that in her discussion of ideology and ethnic identity, Cynthia Enloe pays little attention to the power of nationalism *per se*. Rather her emphasis seems to be on somewhat more formal and more inclusive ideologies such as Marxism, Fascism, Democratic Liberalism, and African Socialism. See Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973), 35-83.

[20] Richard Rosecrance, *International Relations: War or Peace?* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1973), 242-47.

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out of hand. It will therefore favor a "first strike," and deterrence (or conflict management) will not work.[21]

2. Subordinate communal groups which traditionally possess a financial, economic, or cultural elite status constitute particularly visible and likely targets of the superordinate group's resentment, suspicion, or hostility.

Although the foregoing may suggest a degree of interrelation between socioeconomic classes and communal groups, that is certainly not the case.[22] It would be incorrect to characterize either all Copts or all Armenians as members of the upper or even middle class. Both of these communal groups were diversified in terms of class. The stratification that might be applicable would be along an urban-rural dimension, with a greater proportion of the rural Copts and Armenians falling into the lower class. The economic elite status of these minorities was more evident in the urban centers, where both groups contained upper- and middle-class components notably out of proportion to their numbers. In addition, the preeminence of both these Christian groups in financial circles (and to a lesser degree in commercial circles as well) was sanctioned and perpetuated by the religious ethics held by the superordinate Muslim groups. Since Muslims were proscribed by Islamic tenets from engaging in financial activities, these functions were assumed by the various non-Muslim elements of their societies. Such activities frequently brought prosperity and wealth to individuals already regarded with a degree of suspicion by the majority of their countrymen. It was thus an easy step for members of the Muslim upper and middle classes to envy and covet the wealth of such individuals.

[21] Contributory to the perceptions of the values of peace, conflict, and first strike are conflict-regulating motives. The desire to ward off external pressure is often cited as such a motive. However, that would not be the case if one of the communal groups could be seen as an irredentist group, or if one of the subordinate groups felt that it would be better off within the external power's system. Nordlinger advances three other motives: (1) to increase or maintain economic well-being; (2) to acquire or retain government office or power; and (3) to avoid bloodshed among one's own group. The first of these has already been dealt with in references to Lebanon and Switzerland and falls into the more general category of a common value. The remaining two motives could both become subject to nationalist ideologies. That is, if the nationalist sentiments of one communal group are intense enough, the political system under which it functions may lose legitimacy to the point where acquiring or retaining government office loses its conflict-regulating value. Likewise, nationalist movements can, and frequently do, reach a stage where liberty or self-determination is more important than life. Hence the avoidance of bloodshed among one's own communal group would cease to be a conflict-regulating motive. See Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs 1972), 42-53.

[22] For a discussion of class and ethnicity, see Enloe (fn. 19), 27-34.

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Although the lower-class Muslims could basically envy all those better off than themselves, the "infidels" who gained their prosperity at the expense of all the Islamic faithful were a convenient target. An element of class antagonism may thus be added to religious animosity, heightening communal conflict and increasing the possibility of violence.

3. Differential rates of modernization, whereby communal minorities modernize faster or earlier than the superordinate group, will tend to increase communal conflict unless the innovative group possesses deep and acknowledged roots in the society.[23]

The fact that both the Armenians and the Copts began to modernize faster than the societies in which they lived may be attributed to a number of reasons. Middle Eastern Christians possessed religious and cultural ties to the West. They had also regarded the Christian West as friends and natural allies for centuries, certainly at least since the crusades. Since the minorities were engaged in the commercial and financial spheres, they came into contact with the West earlier than other segments of their societies. Coupled with their cultural and religious affinities with the West, this led many to obtain a Western education and acquire a proficiency in foreign languages at a time when few Muslims in the Middle East even considered doing so. It should also be pointed out that Coptic and Armenian merchants encountered the West on competitive rather than conflictual bases. The Muslim governmental and military sectors of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire not only frequently encountered the West on the battlefield, but were also usually defeated by Western powers. In addition, these elements felt they had far more to lose to an increasing Western influence than did the Christian minorities. The modernization espoused by Ottoman and Egyptian officials was therefore in response to a Western threat.

The Christian minorities, having begun to modernize earlier, absorbed Western ideas more quickly; that often led to the development of a sense of national identity and a drive for self-determination and popular sovereignty.[24] Such strivings were internally disruptive to the political systems under which they lived, and were frequently used by Western powers as excuses for extending their own influence

[23] For a treatment of the idea that innovative behavior by an alien minority group is apt to promote expulsion or suppression rather than imitation, see Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press 1962), 248-50.

[24] Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXVII, No. 1 (1973), 2-11.

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within Egypt and the Ottoman Empire.[25] It thus became plausible for the superordinate groups to characterize the minorities as subversives in league with the external Western threat. Since they were ideologically more progressive than their rulers, the espousal of nationalist ideas often made the minorities feel unduly oppressed by a group which had lost its legitimate right to rule them.

4. If a minority, particularly an "elite" minority, is perceived as being associated with any of the major colonial powers, the possibility of communal conflict will be increased by the displacement of anticolonial feelings onto that minority.

In situations where a Western colonial power either ruled or exerted great influence over another nation, it was natural for the inhabitants of the colonized state to resent their Western rulers. However, both the Ottomans and the Egyptians were too weak to dislodge the Western powers from their countries. The latter were feared and resented, and at the same time admired and imitated. When members of the Christian minorities seemed to be prospering under the colonial regimes and seemed to be westernizing relatively quickly and easily, resentment was aroused among the majority group. There was the added fact that Western nations frequently extended the capitulary privileges they enjoyed in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire to cover native Christians. That may have helped to improve the situation of the religious minorities, "but it also drew upon them the hatred of the government and the majority. They were regarded as potential traitors, sources of weakness and instruments of European policy."[26] Although the Egyptians and the Ottomans could do little about the Western powers, the Coptic and Armenian minorities were under their direct control, and became the targets of hostility and frustration created by anticolonial sentiment. The Armenian case, however, was far more intense and violent because a number of factors coalesced

[25] With the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, the great European powers began to intervene directly in its internal affairs, with the intention of preventing or hastening the empire's collapse. A major pretext for their intervention was the relation between the Sublime Porte and its Christian subjects, based not only on formal Sultanic edicts guaranteeing the status of the various Christian millets, but also on the fact that many individual Christians and Jews had secured European nationality or protected status and thus fell under the jurisdiction of the capitulations. See A. H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London: Oxford University Press 1947), 23-24, and "Political and Social Background in the 18th Century," in Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914* (University of Chicago Press 1966), 29.

[26] Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (fn. 25), 24.

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to exacerbate the situation. In the case of the Copts, various elements intervened to mitigate the tensions caused by anticolonialism.

In summary, the first two conditions—racial, linguistic, or religious cleavages and the absence of a common value or identity—can, if catalyzed, be sufficient to result in communal violence. Each of the four succeeding conditions—conflicting nationalisms, elite status of a minority, differing rates of modernization, and association of a minority with a colonial power—tends to exacerbate communal conflict and therefore to make it more probable that a catalyst will set off communal violence. The catalyst can be any one of a number of unpredictable events, such as a fistfight which turns into a riot, an accidental death, an assassination, a change in governing personnel, or an inflammatory speech. In other words, a situation characterized by all the foregoing conditions is more than ripe for communal violence, which could be triggered by even a minor incident.

In the description that follows, I will attempt to use the preceding hypotheses as a framework to analyze the cases of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and of the Copts in Egypt.

The Copts

The Copts, numbering over six million, constitute the major indigenous minority of Egypt. Egypt had been Christianized early in the Christian era, and Alexandria was one of the five major centers of early Christendom. However, the Egyptian Christians broke with Rome and Byzantium over the Monophysite doctrine. They were persecuted by the Byzantine authorities and initially found the Arab conquest of the seventh century a respite, particularly since Islam doctrinally accords Christians and Jews (Ahl al-Kitab) a degree of tolerance and protection.

The major consequences of the Arab conquest were the Islamization and Arabization of the larger portion of the Egyptian populace, thus placing the Christian Copts in the minority. Although Coptic continued to be spoken, it died out as a literary language in the fourteenth century and as a spoken language by the seventeenth century. Racially, the Copts are of the same stock as their Muslim compatriots. Thus, at least for the last four centuries, the major cleavage has been along the religious dimension (and inherent customs and traditions), and uncomplicated by either linguistic or racial elements.

There was also a shared identity between the Coptic and Muslim

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Egyptians. Both were active in nationalist organizations of the early twentieth century. Indeed, the strain of Egyptian nationalism propagated by Taha Husayn, Makram Ubeid Pasha, and others, argued for a separation of religion and politics,[27] and looked to both the pharaonic[28] and Islamic heritage as a basis for a national identity. A second brand of nationalism also developed, which had a more Muslim content and emphasized the Islamic heritage of Egypt. Although this type of Arab nationalism was less appealing to the Copts, it left room for cooperation between Muslim and Copt.

Throughout the 1940's and 1950's, Egyptian sentiment vacillated between Egyptian nationalism and Arab nationalism. The debate continued during the early years of republican Egypt. It was not until the mid-fifties that the balance tipped in favor of Arab nationalism (Pan-Arabism) which gradually evolved into Arab Socialism. However, as confirmed secularizers, the Nasirites were trying to de-Islamize Arab socialism.[29] Such a trend would seem to work toward giving the Copts a full-fledged role in Arab Socialist Egypt. Indeed, Nasir made a number of moves to include the Copts in his regime. When the first republican Assembly was elected, Nasir used his appointive powers to select eight Christians in an attempt to equalize the proportional representation of the Copts.[30] He also chose at least one Copt to serve in each cabinet of his government; this has continued to be the case under Sadat. Moreover, in 1968 Nasir took part in dedication ceremonies of the new Coptic cathedral.[31]

Thus, in regard to the first hypothesis, concerning the potential for intercommunal violence, the Coptic situation appears to exhibit a relatively low potential for conflict. Although the religious cleavage is a fundamental one, it is not compounded by racial or linguistic divisions. Furthermore, as Egyptian society becomes more secular, religious divisions may become less salient and therefore less explosive. In addition, the Copts share with their Muslim compatriots a common identity as Egyptians, particularly since the Copts' claim to Egyptianness is acknowledged by Copt and Muslim alike. Since both Muslim and Coptic

[27] *Ibid.*, 42; Dekmejian (fn. 17), 110.

[28] Lutfi al-Sayyid was the chief ideologue of such an Egyptian nationalism which "sought its cultural personality in a revival of the pharaonic past and the Greco-Roman and Coptic-Christian heritage . . . ," *ibid.*

[29] For a detailed analysis of Egyptian ideological development during the Nasirite period see, R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir* (Albany: SUNY Press 1971), 82-143; specifically 114-18.

[30] Jay Walz, *The Middle East* (New York: Atheneum 1965).

[31] *New York Times*, July 25, 1968.

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Egyptians developed a sense of Egyptian nationalism at approximately the same time, the Coptic case does not present a problem of conflicting nationalisms within the same political system. This ideological compatibility has helped to suppress the potential for communal violence.

The second hypothesis concerns minorities with economic and/or cultural elite status. Partially because of religious restraints on the Muslims, commerce, banking, finance, government treasury service, and account-keeping were the domain of the Christians (and Jews).[32] The Copts were particularly prominent in administrative posts, dating from at least the Mameluke period (1514–1800). In his drive toward modernization, Muhammad Ali had even more use for efficient assistants and administrators and employed more Copts in administrative positions than had the Mamelukes. During this period of initial contact with the West and thereafter under British rule, the Copts fulfilled a "necessary economic function."[33] Their ability to handle financial and administrative posts during this period was due in part to their aptitude for and their opportunity to acquire foreign languages (at mission schools) and their high esteem for education.[34] This facility made them useful not only to the native government, but also to Western governments and companies who "tended to draw a disproportionately large number of their minor employees from the minorities."[35] Thus, their early recognition of the benefits of education and their higher cultural level made the Copts an economic and cultural "elite," much to the irritation of the Muslim majority.[36]

However, during the British Protectorate of Egypt, the British "neither attempted to use the Copts as instruments of government nor gave them in any way a privileged position."[37] Rather, the British sought to employ their traditional technique of ruling through the native authority structure, which meant they would not want to antagonize the Muslim majority. This treatment dashed the Copts' expectations concerning their position under the rule of Christian Westerners. While British policy seemed even-handed to the Muslims,

[32] Hourani (fn. 25), 21, 45.
[33] *Ibid.*, 45.
[34] *Ibid.*, 26.
[35] Charles Issawi, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press 1947), 161.
[36] Kyriakos Mikhail, *Copts and Moslems Under British Control* (London: Smith, Elder 1911), 11.
[37] Hourani (fn. 25), 29.

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it appeared unequitable to the Copts.[38] This sense of injustice may have combined with the possible realization that sooner or later they would have to come to terms with the nationalists. Therefore the Copts (as a group) never threw in their lot with the British; the British never really encouraged them to do so.[39]

Thus, though the Copts modernized faster and somewhat earlier than the Muslim Egyptians, their recognized and integral place in Egyptian society did much to make them an acceptable innovative group. While the Copts' financial and cultural status engendered a degree of resentment which occasionally manifested itself in conflict, communal conflict on the whole has been kept to a minimum.[40] The fact that the Copts were not perceptually associated with the Western colonial power also mitigated the potential for communal conflict.

The Armenians

Unlike the Copts who are found only in one country, Egypt, the Armenians are distributed throughout the Middle East and the Caucasus. The major Armenian communities of the Ottoman Empire were found in Eastern Anatolia, Constantinople, and Cilicia. There were also many smaller communities in Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. Outside the Ottoman Empire there was a large community in Persia.

Historically, the Armenian people have lived in the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia; they trace their habitation of the region to ancient times (the Kingdom of Urartu of the eighth century B.C.). They were converted to Christianity in 301 A.D. and, like the Copts, they broke with Rome and Byzantium over the Monophysite controversy and thereafter constituted a "national" church.

[38] Indeed, the perceived grievances of the Coptic community against British authorities played an important part in rekindling communal cooperation and consciousness among the Copts, but prompted, in turn, a Muslim reaction unfavorable to them. For an account of the Coptic Congress and its aftermath in 1910–11, see Mikhail (fn. 36).

[39] Hourani (fn. 25), 47.

[40] As a part of its strategy to maximize support on the home front after the defeat of 1967, the government attempted to strengthen the Copts' identification with the regime. This amicable policy may have also been prompted by Nasir's desire to gain world Christian support against the Israeli presence in Jerusalem; in this campaign, the Coptic Church hierarchy served as propagandizers of the Egyptian-Arab cause in various transnational Christian bodies. Indications of the government's policy were Nasir's prominent role at the consecration of St. Mark's Cathedral in mid-1968 and the favorable media coverage of the apparition of the Virgin Mary (1968). Also Dr. Ramzi Stinu, a Coptic Minister, became one of the eight members of the ASU Supreme Executive. After Nasir's death in 1970, the frustrations arising from Sadat's inability to force an Israeli withdrawal led to outbreaks of Islamic fanaticism and Muslim-Coptic clashes and church burnings. Lacking Nasir's prestige, Sadat had to compromise; not until 1973 was he decisive in checking the Muslims' pressures against the Copts.

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Although the Armenians were indigenous to the Caucasus area, they were regarded as "aliens" by all of the conquering powers: they were Christian in Pagan Rome and Zoroastrian Persia, as well as in the Ottoman Empire of Muslim Turks and Arabs. Since they were Monophysite heretics to the Roman Catholic Church and the Byzantines, they were even alien within the Christian context. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the cleavages between the Armenians and the Ottoman Turks widened. In Asia Minor, the dominant group as well as the majority of government officials were Turks. Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire were not considered as "part of the community of the State and had no share either in its military or its religious organization."[41] Instead, they were organized in millets, headed by indigenous leaders who exercised both civil and religious authority.[42] Government jobs, particularly at the higher levels, were open only to Muslims, although Christians who converted could be appointed.[43] However, by meeting the "job qualifications," they renounced their communal identity.

In addition to the religious cleavage, there was a linguistic one between the Armenians and the Ottoman Turks. For the Turks, the language of religion was Arabic and that of government was Turkish, which was written in the Arabic script and which adopted a considerable amount of Arabic and Persian vocabulary. The Armenians, on the other hand, spoke their own language which was not linguistically related to either Turkish or Arabic. Armenian also had a long written tradition, both in liturgical and literary terms, dating back to the fifth century A.D.

The societal cleavage between Turks and Armenians was further compounded by racial overtones. The racial issue, however, did not become evident until the early twentieth century. Before the rise of Pan-Turanism (Pan-Turkism) the two groups had been divided pri-

[41] Hourani (fn. 25), 20.

[42] *Ibid.*; Kemal Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations* (Princeton: Center of International Studies Research Monograph No. 39, 1973), 10-23; Avedis K. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria Under Ottoman Dominion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1965), 31-35.

[43] Some scholars advance the argument that although Christians seeking governmental jobs were required to convert to Islam, the change of religion was "only skin deep," and that the convert did not necessarily have to possess a deep, inner attachment to his newly embraced religion. For example, see Karpat (fn. 42), 23. This argument, however, seems to miss the point that a Christian, *while* a professed Christian, was not eligible for government office; only the change of his minority identity made him acceptable.

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marily by religion and secondarily by language.[44] With the promulgation, after 1910, of Pan-Turanism by the Young Turk leadership, a racial element was introduced. This ideology revived the myths and symbols of past Turkic unity and created hope for a future Pan-Turkish state in Central Asia, incorporating the Turks of Russia, Central Asia, and Anatolia. In practice, the ideology led to a drive for Turkification and a consequent suppression of ethnic minorities.[45]

The thrice-compounded cleavage between Armenians and Turks possessed great potential for violence. Unlike the Copts and Muslim Egyptians, the two communal groups had no overarching common value or identity. The Ottoman imperial identity was a combination of a shared religion "conceived to be *the* religion; loyalty to a person and a family; and the awe inspired by the universality of the Empire, whose roots stretched back in time to unremembered ages."[46] However, such an imperial identity had little appeal or relevance to the Christians, particularly the Armenians, of the Ottoman Empire. The case of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire is an instance of a subordinate communal minority which differed from the superordinate group in religious, racial, and linguistic terms, and in which the two groups shared *no* value or identity.

Armenians, as indeed all the Christians of the Ottoman Empire, were the targets of varying degrees of oppression and persecution. However, the Armenians seem to have been in a more precarious position than most minorities, since they were concentrated in a border region vital to the center of the Empire. Following the Russo-Persian War of 1826–27 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–29, Russia acquired territories which brought some of the Armenian people within its sphere of influence.[47] Russian expansion provided Armenians with an escape

[44] However, in both communities language and religion are perhaps more emotionally intertwined than is often the case. For Muslims, Arabic is the sacred and revealed language of the Koran. Indeed, for most Muslims the only instruction they receive in both language and religion is acquired from the Koran. In the same way, Armenian is the language of their religion for the Armenians; their faith is professed and manifested through that language alone.

[45] Pan-Turkism was strongly influenced by German nationalism and in a sense foreshadowed the racial overtones of Aryanism. For a discussion of the evolution of Pan-Turkism, see Dekmejian (fn. 17), 102-5. The rise of Pan-Turkism antagonized not only the Armenians but also the Muslim Arabs, since Turkification meant to replace Arabic with Turkish.

[46] Hourani (fn. 25), 119-20.

[47] Sarkis Atamian, *The Armenian Community* (New York: Philosophical Library 1955), 70-72. It should be noted, however, that the situation in Russia was sometimes little better than that in Turkey. In 1903, the Russian Government confiscated most of the landed property of the Armenian national church and closed down church schools

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from the oppression they endured in the Ottoman Empire. It is estimated that, even though migration into Russia was hazardous, 100,000 Armenians crossed over from the Ottoman Empire into Russia in 1829 alone.[48] In the aftermath of the European ideological furor of the 1840's, revolutionary ideas voiced in Russia came to influence immigrant Armenian intellectuals living there.[49] These ideas of national consciousness began to spread back into the Turkish Armenian communities. In the forty years between the 1840's and the late 1870's, the communal consciousness of Armenians in both Russia and the Ottoman Empire was heightened. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 was followed by a series of unprecedented massacres of Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, partly in reaction to the humiliating defeat which Armenian generals in the Russian army had helped Russia inflict on the Ottoman Empire.[50] The negotiations surrounding the treaties ending the Russo-Turkish War had aroused Armenian hopes for European protection, and in the process had contributed to communal consciousness and organization. Although much had been made of the promise of reforms and security to the Ottoman Armenians, the stipulations in the San Stefano and Berlin Treaties of 1878 were weak and went unenforced. In the face of such disappointments, various nationalist organizations, i.e., the Hunchakian Party (1887) and the Dashnaks (Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries, 1890), were formed. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, these organizations helped to imbue all levels of the Armenian community with a desire for national emancipation.[51]

The Ottoman Turks lagged somewhat behind the Armenians in ideological development. The first ideological strain to develop in response to the Western impact was Ottomanism. This was an imperial doctrine, striving to transform the Ottoman realm into a modernized, westernized, and liberalized Empire. However, the accession of Sultan

and libraries. During the Russian revolution of 1905, there were a number of massacres of Armenians by Tatars who were often aided and abetted by the local Russian governors. In 1912, a mass trial of Armenian nationalist leaders was held in St. Petersburg; fifty-two individuals were given sentences of imprisonment or exile. See David Marshall Lang, *Armenia: Cradle of Civilization* (London: Unwin and Allen 1970), 287.

[48] Atamian (fn. 47), 70-72.

[49] Another avenue of European intellectual influence was the large Armenian community in Constantinople which had ties with Europe.

[50] While Ottoman-Armenian sympathies were with the Russians, there is little evidence that they gave them anything other than moral support. See Atamian (fn. 47), 64-65.

[51] For a discussion of the rise and role of the Hunchaks and the Dashnaks see *ibid.*, 94-114.

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Abdul Hamid II put a halt to the liberal aspects of Ottomanism and marked the beginning of a more repressive political climate under a new ideology—Pan-Islamism.

Sultan Abdul Hamid's adoption of Pan-Islamism represented an effort to reinvigorate the Empire through a return to the Islamic ethos. Pan-Islamism offered no possibility of improving the lot of the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire,[52] and represented a change for the worse when compared to the possibilities and promises extended by Ottomanism—a change from an inclusive to an exclusive ideology. In addition, the timing of this change created a situation of conflicting ideologies. The conflict was intensified after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 overthrew Abdul Hamid. The young revolutionaries at first attempted to revive Ottomanism. However, military reverses in Libya and the Balkans, as well as internal problems, changed the ideological orientation of the regime to Pan-Turkism and eventually to Turkish nationalism. Thus, by 1910 at the latest, the situation had evolved into one characterized by the conflicting and mutually exclusive ideologies of Turkish and Armenian nationalism. Not only were these two communal groups competing within the same political system, but the Armenians constituted a physical barrier to the realization of Pan-Turkish hopes. Although Armenian nationalist development had begun earlier than the Turkish, both Armenian nationalism and Pan-Turkism began to crest at approximately the same time. Indeed, their mutual antagonism intensified each.

Another factor which contributed to the tension between Armenians and Turks was the financial and cultural elite status the Armenians had achieved. As in other Islamic countries, finance and commerce were largely in the hands of Christians and Jews[53] who often enjoyed foreign protection under the capitulations[54] and could sometimes even avoid paying taxes.[55] To Ottoman officialdom, the Armenian merchants in Constantinople represented a constant source of irritation since they were a "financially well-off, Westernized group in contact with the Western world."[56] Indeed, Armenians were frequently the financiers of the state.[57] The Armenian peasant, while not as prosperous as the city dweller, also tended to adopt Western methods and often improved his lands.[58] The poverty-stricken Turkish peasants and no-

[52] Hourani (fn. 25), 27. [53] Issawi (fn. 25), 10. [54] Hourani (fn. 25), 121.
[55] Atamian (fn. 47), 59. [56] *Ibid.*, 60. [57] Issawi (fn. 25), 124.
[58] A German scholar has stated that in the years preceding World War I, a number of large landowners who were Armenian, Greek, or Syrian Christians were employing more modern methods in agricultural production aimed at increasing their output. See W. F. Bruck as quoted in Issawi (fn. 25), 68.

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madic Kurds regarded the relatively prosperous Armenian peasants as a "standing insult" and an inducement for plunder.[59]

The Armenians of nineteenth-century Turkey were able to achieve and maintain positions of relative economic prosperity and cultural advancement for two reasons. The first was the fact, discussed earlier, that they carried out necessary economic functions which the Muslims of the country tended to avoid. The second reason was that the Armenians tended to modernize and westernize earlier. Once European nations began to have commercial and political relations with the Islamic countries, the Christians of the Ottoman Empire looked eagerly to the West as their salvation. Often with little political loyalty to the state in which they lived, Armenians (and indeed, most Christians and Jews) adopted an attitude of uncritical acceptance of the West, and quickly assimilated Western culture and learning through travel, commerce, and education.[60] Like the Copts, the Armenians often had access to Western learning through mission schools. The relatively early and widespread development of Armenian nationalism was substantially a result of contact with Western ideas.

As a result, the status of the Armenian communities in the Ottoman Empire was precarious at best. Racially, linguistically, and religiously different from the Ottoman Turks, they occupied an economic elite position in society; they began to modernize earlier than the Turks; not only was there no common value or identity between the two groups, but each had developed a brand of nationalism which excluded the other. Such a situation was so potentially explosive that even the smallest incident could result in violence. Finally, there was the fact that the Armenians came to be associated with a European power—Russia.[61] Given the unstable position of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, such a perceived association made them easy targets for the venting of Ottoman frustration and the displacement of hostility toward the untouchable European powers.

Although the hopes aroused by the negotiations following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 were not realized, the limelight given to the Armenian question had two results. First, it heightened communal

[59] A. O. Sarkissian, "Genocide in Turkey," *History of the First World War*, No. 48 (1970), 1.

[60] Hourani (fn. 25), 24-25.

[61] Turks, including the Young Turks, professed to be of the opinion that the antagonism started at this time and at the instigation of the Russians. Whether this is what they really believed is doubtful; however, it is the rationalization that many Turkish leaders used. See, for example, Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* (New York: George H. Doran 1922), 241-49.

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consciousness among the Armenians, for they had been recognized as a legitimate collectivity by the European powers. Second, by exposing Abdul Hamid and his policy to the criticism and intervention of the combined Western countries, the Armenians earned Hamid's undying enmity. He never forgave them and set about a policy of resolving the Armenian question.[62] As soon as the Russian troops withdrew from Eastern Anatolia, the majority of the Armenian villages in the region were razed and the townsmen massacred.[63] The massacre contributed to the emergence of Armenian revolutionary activity, bolstered by the hope that Europe, and particularly Russia, could be expected to render assistance.

Within the next decade and a half, incidents continued to occur while Abdul Hamid strengthened his hand by creating a highly centralized personal government[64] and deploying Kurdish troops, ostensibly as border guards. Actually, they were given license to pillage and persecute the Armenians. In 1894, the Armenians finally fought the Kurds in Sassoun and severely beat them.[65] The Kurds called for reinforcements; Armenian revolutionaries in Constantinople seized the Ottoman Bank and used it as a podium from which to seek Western assistance. This brought a flurry of diplomatic protests and Western sympathy, but little support. It served to antagonize the Sultan further, however, and signalled the beginning of the major massacres of 1895–96 in which 300,000 Armenians perished and 80,000 more fled to other countries.[66] This time the killing was not restricted to the eastern

[62] That the Ottomans perceived the need to resolve the Armenian question is clear from the following views of Kamil Pasha who served as grand vizier to Abdul Hamid in the 1870's:

> . . . the sensible thing to do is to destroy and eliminate any and all elements which may some day give rise to the same danger, afford the opportunity for foreign intervention and serve as its tool.
>
> . . . therefore, for the sake of that sacred cause—and our right as a sovereign state demands it too—it is imperative that we exterminate any and all suspicious elements in order to insure our future security. Thus, we must eliminate, leave behind no traces of that Armenian nation. . . . And if that Armenian "nation" is destroyed and if Christian Europe should look for a co-religionist and does not find it in Asiatic Turkey, it will leave us alone. . . .

Quoted in E. K. Sarkissian and R. G. Sahakian, *Vital Issues in Modern Armenian History* (Watertown, Mass.: Library of Armenian Studies 1965), 17.

[63] Atamian (fn. 47), 64-65.

[64] William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801–1927* (London: Cambridge University Press 1936), 428.

[65] The Armenians were generally an unwarlike people, who were further handicapped by legal strictures against Christians bearing arms in the Ottoman Empire. It is also interesting to note that the Ottoman Turks were setting minority against minority by using the Kurds, who were a Muslim minority, against the Armenians.

[66] Lang (fn. 47), 287.

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provinces, but also raged in Istanbul itself under the very windows of the European ambassadors.[67] However, the "sick man of Europe" was practically on his deathbed; before the end, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire were to lash out at least twice more at the communal group they had come to perceive as being in league with their Western enemies.

In the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks proclaimed an end to the oppressive policies of Abdul Hamid, but they did not immediately dethrone him. Within a year, Abdul Hamid launched a counterrevolutionary effort to restore his absolute rule. While civil war raged in Constantinople and the Young Turks fought for their survival, a massacre of Armenians was initiated in the city of Adana. It is probable that Abdul Hamid ordered this massacre; at any rate, he was associated with it in the popular mind. While it is true that the Young Turks were preoccupied in the capital at this time, it is also true that neither they nor their local military commanders did anything to stop these massacres in which over 15,000 Armenians lost their lives.

During 1910, a group of militant Pan-Turkists within the Young Turk executive came to direct the movement. Led by the triumvirate of Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Jemal Pasha, this junta dreamed of ruling a vast Turkic empire extending from Istanbul to Samarkand.[68] The first obstacle to that goal lay in the Armenian communities of Eastern Anatolia, which these Pan-Turkists regarded as racially, religiously, and linguistically inferior. When, in 1914, Turkey entered World War I on the German side, it almost immediately found itself between a massive Russian invasion from the Caucasus and the British landing at Gallipoli, very close to Istanbul. The fact that the Armenian's Western friends, France and England, were the Ottoman Empire's and Germany's enemies only worsened the situation. After Enver Pasha's Turanist march in the Caucasus was turned back by the Russian Army (which included Russian-Armenian soldiers), the Young Turks, infuriated by the frustration of their Pan-Turkist aspirations at the hands of their traditional Russian foe, vented their fury on the "enemy within"—the Armenians.[69] Those who were not massacred in

[67] See descriptions in Miller (fn. 64), 427-30.

[68] Lang (fn. 47), 289. For detailed studies of Pan-Turkism, see C. W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1957); and Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press 1961), 34-52.

[69] For accounts of Enver Pasha's and Talaat Pasha's hostility toward the Armenians, see U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau, as quoted in Dickran H. Boyajian, *Armenia: The Case for a Forgotten Genocide* (Westwood, N.J.: Educational Book Crafters 1972), 8-10.

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their villages were deported in forced marches to the Syrian desert.[70] Even the intellectual Armenians of Istanbul were wiped out. Toynbee estimates that at least 600,000 perished, an equal number escaped abroad, and another 600,000 survived the deportations.[71] Others estimate that one and a half million Armenians out of a prewar total of three million were eliminated.[72] Although during World War II the Jews were to lose more in numerical terms, no other people has come so close to being a victim of genocide as the Armenians did during the first World War.[73]

Concluding Remarks

In this study about the use of violence as a method of communal conflict management, I have hypothesized that communal conflict has historically arisen within four environments—during the evolution of the major European states, in post-independence colonies, during the disintegration of polyglot empires, and in post-industrialized societies. (The second of these should probably be modified to read "within colonies, both during their colonial period and after independence." The experience described by Rabushka and Shepsle was concerned only with the phenomenon of communal conflict during the post-independence period. However, communal conflict can often become quite distinct under a colonial regime, particularly if a subordinate minority is popularly associated with the colonial power. Although it is true that communal differences are frequently dampened during the struggle for independence, communal conflict remains, if only under the surface. The relevant characteristics of this environment are the presence of a colonial power or the recent removal of that presence.)

I further hypothesized that a number of conditions served to heighten the possibility of the use of violence in communal conflict. These were (1) the presence of communal cleavages based on religion, race, or language, combinations of these cleavages being more volatile than their occurrence singly; (2) the absence of a common value or

[70] For a fictionalized account of the 1915 massacres, see Franz Werfel, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh* (New York: Viking Press 1934).

[71] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire* (London: Causton & Sons 1916), 651.

[72] Lang (fn. 47), 289; also see Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918* (Princeton University Press 1968), 200-270, esp. 268-70; Lewis (fn. 68), 212-350.

[73] Concerning the massacres of Armenians in Cilicia in the early 1920's, see an eyewitness account by Stanley E. Kerr, *The Lions of Marash* (Albany: SUNY Press 1973).

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identity among the various communal groups; (3) the concurrent development of antagonistic nationalisms; (4) the possession of an economic or cultural elite status by a subordinate communal group; (5) differential rates of modernization, with the subordinate group moddernizing faster, earlier, or easier than the superordinate group; and (6) the displacement of anticolonial feelings upon a communal group perceived as associated with a colonial power.

In the case of the Copts, a number of these factors were missing; it is therefore proposed that the absence of these factors made the relatively peaceful methods of conflict management possible, and encouraged the integration of the Copts into Egyptian society.

On the other hand, in the case of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire all of the above factors were present. In addition, it seems that the already volatile situation was exacerbated by the occurrence of external war. Because of the deep communal cleavages and mutual suspiciousness of both groups, Armenians and Ottomans could not unite to fight a common enemy. Indeed, the enemy of the Turks was seen as a friend by the Armenians.

Although these hypotheses are tentative and based on only two case studies, further inquiry may reveal them, with some modification, to be more generally applicable to the study of communal conflict in post-colonial or -imperial situations.

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Review Article

SMALL STATES: A TOOL FOR ANALYSIS?

By PETER R. BAEHR*

Edward E. Azar, *Probe for Peace: Small-State Hostilities*. Minneapolis, Burgess Publishing Company, 1973, 89 pp., $1.75 paper.

Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships*. New York, Free Press, 1972, 431 pp., $10.95.

I

UNTIL recently, great size usually was understood to be an advantage for a state in international relations. The creation of new and larger political entities from the many smaller states into which the world was divided was proposed as an effective and practical means to avoid war. World Federalists, the European unification movement, and various "pan" groups attracted considerable support from peace seekers who hoped that integration of states would produce a more tranquil future.

Nor was this hope restricted mainly to those who sought to reform the pattern of governmental relations or to agitate for precipitous change. Scholars, too, showed strong interest. For example, Karl Deutsch and his colleagues tied international integration closely to the prospects for peace.[1] According to Deutsch's pioneering study, if integration took the form of so-called "amalgamated security communities," the resulting fewer and larger political entities would lessen the chances of war. "If the entire world were integrated as a security community," he wrote, "wars would be automatically eliminated."[2]

Although this highly hypothetical statement about international war was of course true—if not a truism—what was less clear, even at the time of publication almost twenty years ago, was whether *regional* security communities would bring a similar contribution to world peace. Suspicion was strong of plans to organize along the lines of George Orwell's fantasy of 1984, which envisioned a world consisting

* The author wishes to thank Dr. Alfred van Staden for his critical comments.

[1] Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton University Press 1957).

[2] *Ibid.*, 5.

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of three superpowers, two of which were usually at war with the third. Whatever other purposes the creation of fewer, larger states might serve, its usefulness from the view of achieving world peace was not self-evident to those who related unbridled conduct to size.

The last two decades have produced anything but a decrease in the number of states in the world. The tremendous increase in newly independent states—most of which are "small" by any criterion—has undoubtedly stimulated growth in the number of scholarly publications that focus on the phenomenon of *small states*.[3] Most of these studies assume that a focus on the size of states may help to explain the behavior of those states in international relations. The books by Azar and Singer fit reasonably well into this category. A recent, relevant study by Dahl and Tufte differs in examining national size mainly as a problem in domestic politics.[4]

II

The size of a state, however defined, has both domestic and international ramifications. In the domestic realm the question can be raised as to how great a size provides the people or their representatives with the best possibilities to exercise effective control over their government. Big government, it has been asserted, cannot be democratic government. But in order to have the capacity to carry out the people's wishes, government should not become too small. Recalling Plato's 5,040 citizens, Professors Dahl and Tufte seek the ideal size for a state.[5] Their conclusion—that "no single type or size of unit is optimal for achieving the twin goals of citizen effectiveness and system capacity"—seems to be quite realistic, if not strikingly novel. They do not deny the necessity for developing democratic theory further in order "to offer useful guidance about the appropriate relations among units."[6]

[3] The most important of these are: Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II* (University of Chicago Press 1959); David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (Oxford University Press 1967); Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York and London: Columbia University Press 1968); Trygve Mathisen, *The Function of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1971); two articles by Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," *International Organization*, XXIII (Spring 1969), 291-310, and "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, 1 (Spring 1971), 161-82; Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," *World Politics*, XXV (July 1973), 556-76.

[4] Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, *Size and Democracy* (Stanford University Press 1973).

[5] *Ibid.*, 5.

[6] *Ibid.*, 138, 140.

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Their tight, well-ordered, and systematic little book mainly serves to state the problem rather than to offer full solutions.

From an international point of view, the size of states poses the closely related problems of *viability* and *stability*. How small may a state be and yet survive? Is the stability of the international system endangered, or *further* endangered, by the continual creation of small, independent units? Shortly after the second World War, considerations of size played at least some part in deciding whether a unit was fit to become independent. In recent years this criterion has been discarded. Looking at the membership of the United Nations in terms of population only, one finds states with populations as small as 119,000 (Maldive Islands) and 180,000 (Qatar). Therefore—to cite just one case—there seems to be no reason why the island of Aruba (61,000 inhabitants) should not be free to claim its independence from the yet-to-become independent Netherlands Antilles (231,000 inhabitants). The rationale for independence is furnished by the circumstance that a territory was formerly governed as an entity under colonial rule. Indonesia, for instance, which for many years claimed possession of West New Guinea (West Irian) because it was part of the Netherlands East Indies, never asked for Australian-governed East New Guinea or the Portuguese part of the island of Timor.

Although a consideration of size no longer enlightens the decision to grant independence to a territory, the conclusion reached by Dahl and Tufte, "that a country's chances of survival do not depend significantly on its size," seems premature.[7] After all, it has only been a short period in modern history in which so many small independent states have appeared. The present large number could diminish quickly. A new world war—even if only of a conventional nature—could conceivably bring about a sharp reduction of both large and small states. Relevant questions about size and the stability of small states in world politics would seem more useful than trying to provide prematurely definitive answers.

Even if few valid conclusions can be reached now regarding the problem of *viability*, many hypotheses have been formulated regarding the relationships between a growing number of small states and international political *stability*. Considered in relation to the connected problems of international armaments in general and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in particular, international stability is, to say the least, not helped by the continual creation of new states, many of which

[7] *Ibid.*, 122.

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combine a weak economic structure with domestic political instability. Such shakiness may invite political and possibly military intervention by one or more stronger powers, and result in violent international conflicts. Moreover, even small states which have a rather limited power base are potentially dangerous if they come to possess nuclear weapons. What small states do with nuclear weapons may become *the* most dangerous issue with which the world may be faced, especially as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty fails to attract new adherents. The point is not that the decision makers of the great powers are necessarily more "rational" or sensible than their colleagues in smaller states. Rather, in order to solve regional conflicts, smaller states may be tempted to use means that might help to escalate local conflicts into major international wars involving the great powers and resulting in a global disaster. It may be trite to invoke the situation in the Middle East, but it remains to the point nonetheless. The obvious hypothesis, not yet confirmed or falsified by scholarship, is that an increase in the number of small independent states would increase the danger to international stability in the world.

III

Is the concept of "small states" useful as an analytical tool in understanding world politics? The literature in the field inclines one to answer that question in the negative. An obvious difficulty is that "small" and "large" are relative concepts, subject to great differences in interpretation. Most authors who want to use the concept of "small states" for purposes of analysis struggle at length with the problem of definition. First of all, there is the problem of which criteria are to be adopted. Should one look at size of population? Or also at size of territory? National income? Available natural resources? Once the criteria are set out, the problem remains where to draw the line among "small" and "large," or possibly "small," "middle," and "very large." Often the preferred solution may be clear and unambiguous, but at the same time arbitrary and intellectually difficult to defend; more sophisticated definitions, on the other hand, are often more ambiguous and difficult to apply to concrete cases.

A definition proposed by David Vital, who based it on the size of population, appears to belong in the clear and unambiguous category. He limits the class of small states to those having (a) a population of less than 10 to 15 million in the case of economically advanced coun-

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tries, and (b) less than 20 to 30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries.[8] Still, the fact that he makes allowances for the degree of economic development can be construed as an implied doubt about the main standard of size in terms of population. But adding categories or dimensions does not necessarily enhance the possibility of consolidating or comparing results from different researches. Azar's study of hostilities among small states certainly deals with a group of states different from those examined by Dahl and Tufte, who concentrate on Western democracies. Azar clearly sets a broader scope, for he asserts that "two-thirds of the world's nation-states are small and poor" (p. 3). Granting that Dahl and Tufte focus on small states, too, it is still unmistakable that their subjects must be distinguished from most of Azar's universe of small states because of their wealth and nature of government.

Discussion on definitional problems is useful, because it clarifies how a particular concept is employed. It is a pity therefore that Azar, having adopted Deutsch's definition of a small state as an international political actor whose total GNP accounts for less than one per cent of the world's GNP, does not explain in what way this definition is "a very useful one for studying power relations and interstate conflict" (p. 29). He is right, of course, that rigid criteria—particularly quantitative ones—can lead to hairsplitting, especially if one wonders why a state which produces 1.01 per cent of the world's GNP should be considered "large," and one that produces .99 per cent "small." However, it is not enough to add that in such cases a second dimension, such as population, should be considered (p. 29). Rather, the very concept of small states should be questioned.

Examples of a more sophisticated second category of definitions include those proposed by Robert Keohane: "a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system";[9] and by Robert Rothstein: "a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so."[10] It is true that this type of definition indicates more clearly what exactly a small state is supposed to be; yet, it gives rise to an obvious problem of operationalization.

In view of the difficulties of operationalization and the variety of

[8] Vital (fn. 3), 8.
[9] Keohane in *International Organization* (fn. 3), 296.
[10] Rothstein (fn. 3), 29.

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criteria which could be used, Singer wisely directs his attention to "weak" rather than "small" states. In this way he avoids the dilemma other writers have had to face—that a state may have a large population (India) or a large territory (Australia, Brazil), yet be economically and militarily less powerful than states with a smaller population or territory. There are "small" developed countries with a high per capita GNP, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland which are, economically at least, more powerful than many "larger" states.

A few authors come out clearly *against* the distinction between large and small states. William Coplin, for example, argues that all states—large and small—do have interests beyond their immediate borders.[11] He may be overstating his case somewhat when he adds that small states no longer serve as pawns for the great powers, at least insofar as these are concerned with their national survival. One might retort that the United States and the Soviet Union in their bilateral confrontations, such as SALT, often act as if the other (smaller) nations were not much more than those very pawns. That, however, ties in directly with Coplin's final argument, in which he states that a fundamental distinction should be made between nations with extensive nuclear capability and the remaining states. The everyday notion of "superpowers" would be in line with his reasoning. For the sake of brevity, I shall not go into the question whether a further distinction should be made between small states and the so-called "ministates" at the far end of the scale.[12]

The case for specifying the small state as an analytical concept appears weak indeed. Either the ambiguity or the arbitrariness of the definitions will create problems that may lead one to agree with Coplin's view—that in the final analysis *all* states, as compared to the United States and the Soviet Union, are more or less "small." But such a conclusion leaves a category of "small states" too large to serve as a valid concept for scientific analysis.

IV

However vague the term "small states" as an analytical concept, there is still good reason to be interested in relationships between

[11] William D. Coplin, *Introduction to International Politics* (Chicago: Markham 1971), 128 ff.

[12] See Patricia Wohlgemuth Blair, *The Ministate Dilemma* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1968); Jacques Rapaport, Ernest Muteba, and Joseph J. Therattil, *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems* (New York: Arno Press 1971).

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powerful states and less powerful ones. But that interest should include wariness about authors who have axes to grind for or against either category of states. Singer's book provides an example. It focuses on the relations between five major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Great Britain, and France—and those "weaker" states that are formally or informally associated with them. In fact, the weaker states include nearly all the rest of the world. Most of the book deals with ties—perceptual, economic, military, political, and ties of identity—that bind individuals and groups across state boundaries.

Singer warns his readers that his book is "written in social science English, by an American social scientist, with all the perceptual biases that implies" (p. 110 n). Whatever these biases may be—Singer does not provide his readers with a specific list—they do not, surprisingly enough, include a striving for "hard" evidence, e.g., quantitative data in the behavioristic tradition. Many of Singer's conclusions are based on very conventional, rather impressionistic evidence. At that level his *personal* biases do interfere. For instance, Singer writes that after World War II "the U.S. was perceived—even by Englishmen—as the most powerful country in the world, and *therefore* the one with the best educational institutions" (p. 153, emphasis added; see also pp. 163 and 167). There are undoubtedly all kinds of reasons why non-Americans want to study in the United States, some related to national power, others to some of the excellent educational facilities America has to offer. However, a great deal of theoretical explanation would be needed to tie the two together.

A second example of bias can be found in Singer's discussion of communications ties. He makes the valid point that decision makers in weaker states cannot compete with their counterparts in more powerful states with regard to the quantity and diversity of information that is available to them (p. 179). He then elaborates this point with reference to embassies: Weaker states have fewer diplomats available than the more powerful states. Their limited staff will be stationed in capitals with which their governments already have good relations, with the result that "weaker states receive an essentially one-sided view of world affairs" (p. 201). That sounds rather convincing. But what happens in the more powerful states which have a larger diplomatic staff that can turn in the "conflicting information" cherished by Singer? Are there, in consequence, different results in actual policy making? Ole Holsti's classic study of John Foster Dulles's basic pattern of perception of the Soviet Union does not lend support to the

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notion that the availability of "conflicting information" is of fundamental importance—if the will to use that information is lacking.[13] Singer's analysis stops where it really becomes interesting: Is the quantity of information available to a government a factor which may change the quality of the decisions that are reached? The fact is we just do not know.

We do know (or can find out) some of the data about which Singer is vague. He "suspects," for instance, that young diplomats are first sent to assignments "where they will not be exposed to much contradictory material" (p. 202). Maybe they are, maybe not; maybe in some countries they are, in others not. Rather than resting one's judgment on such "suspicions," one could uncover the facts, or at least the policies, by asking foreign services whether they have any general rules with regard to first assignments. Finally, it is definitely not true that it is usually the inexperienced diplomat who may "overly identify with the values of the country to which he is assigned to the possible detriment of the values of the country he represents" (p. 202). It may happen to veteran diplomats of long experience. The exploits of the strongly pro-British United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom during World War I, Walter Hines Page, are a case in point. All foreign-service departments are aware of this possibility; it is the reason for their shifting the diplomatic staff around the world.

I am left with the strong impression that Singer—consciously or not—prefers a world consisting of strong states rather than of weaker ones. He stresses the fact that in many newly created states in Africa and Asia, nations were artificially divided into three or four different states (p. 382). Yet in large states, such as the Soviet Union, India, or Indonesia, different nations were just as "artificially" brought together. Even in Europe, most contemporary nation-states were assembled as rather artificial units by a ruling dynasty or by conquest. It should be common knowledge that "nations" are by no means "natural," but are gradually formed by people living together under common rule. Thus, for example, many of us in the West may consider the German Democratic Republic an "artificial" fragment of the German nation. However, there can be little doubt that eventually the G.D.R. will develop into a nation (if it has not done so already).

Singer also uses an organizational argument in favor of a world consisting of strong states: "How much more powerful would many

[13] Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (September 1962), 244-52.

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of these ministates be if they could unite (organize) with other small states to form larger units?" (p. 382). He goes on to speak disparagingly of the resistance of large numbers of ministers and other officials who are now employed and who would be in danger of losing their jobs if their states were to unite with others. He realizes that it would be difficult to bring about this type of union. "Nonetheless, efforts to reverse the colonial legacy of division should—must—be made" (p. 383). Why? Why should notions of organization and efficiency be applied to former colonies in Asia and Africa, when Western nations are loath to apply them to themselves? This question may be asked with even greater emphasis in view of Dahl's and Tufte's well-placed warnings of the dangers of large size if one is concerned about an effective democratic control of government. It is not enough to argue that most of the former colonial territories do not conform to Western notions of democratic government. They may or may not develop in that direction in the future. What is important, however, is that Singer's implied notion, that big government is necessarily better government, should not too easily be taken for granted.

V

If there is anything that the literature about the role of small states in international relations has accomplished, it is to bring the relativity of the notion of "independence" sharply into focus. Full independence, in the sense of governments making their own decisions without being subject to any influences from beyond the borders of their territory, simply does not now exist, if it ever did. Singer is right in introducing the related concepts of "dependence," "counter-dependence," "independence," and "interdependence." He makes an effort to apply his basically psychological model to the sphere of politics, but fails to make quite clear to what extent that is possible. "It is a superficial analysis of the relations among states that ignores the psychological dimension of those relationships," Singer writes. "It would, however, be equally as superficial to analyze the relations among states in purely psychological terms and to ignore the power dimension of those relations. The two are mutually reinforcing, and in some ways inseparable" (p. 51).

Few would take exception to that statement. The real question is whether such a view as Singer's is sufficient. Many of the notions Singer puts forward about ties among states are based on fundamental concepts of relations among human beings. It is undoubtedly true that

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relations between states are a facet of human relations. States are governed by human beings. Yet, once human beings act as political rulers, they seem to acquire traits different from those they display in their "normal" relations with other human beings. Although Singer is undoubtedly aware of the problem, he transfers notions developed in the study of interpersonal relations too easily to the realm of international politics. Probably the best illustration of this misconception can be found in his statement that "failures of the communication process" constitute one of the major reasons why, throughout recorded history, man has said he wanted peace and yet has found it impossible to attain (p. 25). If only that thesis were true! The main thing we would then have to work at would be an improved communications network. As students of the problems of war and peace we know, however, that better communication is not enough. "Peace" is as abstract a concept as "justice" (which everyone favors) and "wickedness" (which everyone abhors). Peace becomes a problem only when it is necessary to be clear about it, the conditions under which it can be obtained, and at what price.

In view of the emphasis Singer attaches to psychological notions, it is no surprise that he ascribes great importance to what he calls "the realities of human nature." If one wants to change society or the international system itself, "one can do so only by carefully studying the laws of human nature" (p. 62). The startled student of international relations finds himself back at Hans Morgenthau's first principle of "political realism"—that politics is governed by objective laws which have their roots in human nature.[14] I do not wish to disparage the importance of discovering laws that govern human behavior. The difficulty is that, since Aristotle, philosophers have been quarrelling about human nature and have agreed only on the infinite complexity of the human mind. What counts for the student of international politics is not so much that all men are selfish—if that is what they are—but under what conditions this selfishness will result either in cooperation or in conflict. Idealists and revolutionaries will not be as shocked as Singer expects by the realization that both "haves" and "have-nots" value wealth, if what they have in mind is a *redistribution* of that wealth (p. 62). If we want to understand politics in general or the relationships between stronger and weaker states in particular, it is not going to help us much to study the laws of human nature.

[14] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (4th ed.; New York: Knopf 1967), 4.

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VI

My main conclusion after reviewing these writings on the role of small states in international politics is that the inquiry is still in a very elementary stage. The reason should not be sought in insufficient skills or qualities on the part of scholars who have devoted their time and efforts to this subject. Rather, it lies in the insufficiency of the concept as an analytical tool. Whatever criterion is adopted, small states form too broad a category for purposes of analysis. There does of course exist a continuum of size of states in international relations. However, notions of a sharp dichotomy between large and small states, and of a special role played by small states, should be discarded. If all cars were black, as Henry Ford wanted, there would be little purpose in studying the colors of automobiles. If all states, with the possible exception of two, are small, one might as well abandon smallness as a focus of study.

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

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Samuel I. del Villar, **Necesidad de regular la inversión extranjera, criterios para su evaluación**
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